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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an empirical study of a diplomatic dialogue on human rights between the U.S. 
and Vietnam. The two countries represent an interesting duality of asymmetric power relation 
and human rights dichotomies: superpower/much less powerful country, 
developed/developing, capitalist/socialist, and Western/Asian among others. The theoretical 
frameworks for the study are the two models of a genuine dialogue drawn from Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics and Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Applying the 
conditions for, and the indications of, mutual understanding of the models as criteria, the 
thesis explores the nature and extent of, and identifies the obstacles to, mutual understanding 
on human rights in the dialogue. Its findings are that the Vietnamese and American 
interlocutors failed to narrow the gap of human rights differences due to their evasive, 
reserved and disengaging attitudes and use of strategic actions in the dialogue. Underlying 
these attitudes and actions are the impacts of ethnocentrism, ongoing suspicions due to war 
legacies, and differences in power and development levels. These factors have distorted the 
interlocutors’ perceptions of the other side’s justifications for its human rights position, and 
blinded them from appreciating any possible valid rationality in the others’ arguments. This 
exploration of the dynamics behind the process of understanding supports the view that it is 
not the diplomatic framework and the incommensurabilities of different human rights 
understandings that obstruct the bridging of differences on human rights. Accordingly, any 
attempts to narrow human rights differences must pay due attention to the contextual factors 
of ethnocentrism, power asymmetry, and distrust among the interlocutors. In this regard, the 
thesis supports Charles Taylor’s dialogical approach of an overlapping consensus. Countries 
may agree on the norms stipulated in certain international human rights conventions of which 
they are signatories, despite their profound differences on those norms justifications. This 
consensus serves as the starting point for them to discuss and reach mutual understanding on 
particular human rights issues. What count as rational by all involving parties from such 
discussion constitute small but solid steps towards truly universal human rights values. 
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Introduction 
 
“All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." This 
immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United 
States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the 
earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and 
free...Those are undeniable truths. 
Vietnamese President Hồ Chí Minh in 1945 1 
[Our socialist democracy is] total difference in essence to and tens of thousand times 
higher than capitalist democracy. 
 Vietnamese Vice-President Nguyễn Thị Doan in 20112 
 
As a desk official of U.S. - Vietnam relations in an international relations think-tank of 
Vietnam, I have found it fascinating to follow the human rights dimension in this bilateral 
relationship. Human rights has been said to hinder improvement in American and Vietnamese 
relations. To settle this problem, in 1994 one year prior to the normalisation of the 
relationship, the two sides organised the first annual dialogue on human rights. Despite some 
hiatus along the years, so far up to eighteen rounds of dialogues have been organised.
3
 After 
                                                          
1
 The first line of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic Democratic of Vietnam written by President 
Ho Chi Minh. It is noteworthy that he made three intentional changes from the American text: "in a broader 
sense", the order between liberty and happiness was changed with happiness taking the priority over liberty; the 
expansion from “all men” to “all people”; and the drop of the phrase “we hold these truths to be self-evident”. 
The original text in Vietnamese can be found on, 
http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail.aspx?co_id=30196&cn_id=119997#, accessed on 
September 26, 2011. For a detailed account of this analysis, refer to the article in Vietnamese by Duong Trung 
Quoc, a famous Vietnamese historian and a Vietnam’s National Assembly Deputy (MPs), on 
http://nld.com.vn/201069p0c1002/tuyen-ngon-doc-lap-va-nhung-tu-tuong-mang-tinh-thoi-dai.htm, accessed on 
September 26, 2011. The question is, given these intentional changes, did Ho Chi Minh and Thomas Jefferson 
conceptualise these human rights, i.e. “liberty,” in the same way? Consequently, do the Vietnamese and 
American officials conceptualise the same thing when they talk about human rights in their dialogues? 
2
 Nguyễn Thị Doan, “The Role of the Party in the Vietnam revolution in the renewal time,” Nhân Dân [The 
People Newspaper], 5 November 2011, this can be found on http://www.baomoi.com/Vai-tro-lanh-dao-cua-
Dang-doi-voi-cach-mang-Viet-Nam-trong-thoi-ky-moi/122/7298483.epi, accessed 21 April 2014. 
3
 After the dialogue in 2002, the U.S. decided to suspend human rights dialogue in the three following years due 
to “inadequate progress on human rights concerns” in Vietnam. Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The 
U.S. Record 2003 – 2004, this can be found on http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/shrd/2003/31020.htm, accessed 15 
April 2014. The two sides agreed to reopen annual human rights dialogue after Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan 
Van Khai’s visit to the U.S. in 2005. 
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each dialogue, both sides have described their dialogues in positive terms, such as 
constructive, candid, open and conducive to narrowing their human rights differences.
4
  
However, after more than two decades of exchanging views on human rights and satisfaction 
with the current human rights dialogues, human rights has remained a thorny, high-profile 
and contested issue raised in almost all of their official meetings. Mark Manyin observed in 
2013 that although their disagreements over human rights have not prevented the two sides 
from improving relations, the issue remains “the biggest thorn in the side of the 
relationship.”5 Accordingly, disagreements over human rights between the U.S. and Vietnam 
will continue to “create a ceiling for the speed and extent” of the improvements in the 
bilateral relations.
6
 Besides, numerous reports by non-governmental organisations, 
Vietnamese overseas organisations and others continue to criticise the worsening human 
rights situation in Vietnam.
7
 This reality casts doubts to the positive assessments mentioned 
above and raises question about the true nature and outcomes of the dialogues. Given the 
public satisfaction of both sides with the current mechanism, and the lack of an independent 
assessment of those dialogues, it is unlikely that the current exchanges on human rights will 
change much in the short to mid-term.  
This is problematic for a number of concerned parties. Advocates for greater freedom and 
democracy in the U.S. and Vietnam may expect greater human rights reforms in Vietnam 
after such dialogues. As for the Vietnamese people, the question is whether such dialogues 
help to improve their rights and prevent them to be victimised in the political games between 
the two states. In other words, would the release or arrest of certain Vietnamese whom the 
U.S. calls political dissidents and Vietnam law breakers continue to depend on the trade-offs 
of political interests by both sides? For example, the U.S. put pressure on Vietnam to release 
certain Vietnamese “dissidents” in exchange for the U.S. dropping its restriction of exporting 
                                                          
4
 See for example Vietnamese spokesperson on the 18
th
 dialogue on http://vietnamconsulate-
ny.org/news/2014/05/regular-press-briefing-mofas-spokesperson-le-hai-binh-may-15-2014, accessed 15 Jun. 14. 
For an interview with the head of American delegation Tom Malinowski after the latest dialogue, see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZyZoyYITwE, accessed 15 Jun. 14. The interview is in Vietnamese. 
5
 Manyin, Mark E., “U.S. – Vietnam Relations in 2013: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. policy,” 
Congressional Research Service, this can be found on http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40208.pdf, accessed 22 July 
2014. 
6
 Ibid. Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Acting 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Joseph Yun stated on June 5, 2013 that, “We have 
underscored with the Vietnamese leadership that the American people will not support a dramatic upgrading of 
our bilateral ties without demonstrable progress on human rights.” This can be found on 
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2013/06/210297.htm, accessed 24 July 2014. 
7
 According to Human Rights Watch, “The human rights situation in Vietnam deteriorated significantly in 2013, 
worsening a trend evident for several years.” This can be found on http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2014/country-chapters/vietnam, accessed 23 July, 2014. 
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non-lethal weapons to Vietnam or concluding negotiations on trans-pacific partnership 
agreement with Vietnam.
8
 The Vietnamese government, as some human rights advocates in 
the U.S. charge, feel free to arrest or release those people as political leverages in its dealing 
with the U.S. Moreover, have those dialogues, as a kind of cultural exchanges, enriched the 
values and understandings of both the American and Vietnamese people? And finally for 
those who want to see a stronger U.S. – Vietnam relation that evolves along a mutually 
agreeable and beneficial line, it is important to ask whether and how this “ceiling” can be 
removed. 
Searching for solutions to this puzzle motivated me to write this thesis. Its core research 
question is, “Can diplomatic dialogues narrow the differences on human rights understanding 
between Vietnam and the U.S.?” 
To answer this question, it is necessary to investigate the following questions:  
 In which ways do Vietnam and the U.S. respectively understand the concept of human 
rights? 
 What obstacles to mutual understanding are encountered by the American and 
Vietnamese diplomats? 
 Can these obstacles be overcome within a diplomatic framework, and if so, how? 
The remainder of this Introduction is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the 
human rights debates in international politics that share certain similarities with the U.S. – 
Vietnam human rights encounter. The U.S. and Vietnam human rights dialogue can be said to 
represent the debates between the developed North and the developing South, the capitalist 
camp and the socialist camp, and the proponents and critics of the “Asian values.” A brief 
survey of the arguments raised in those debates and of the factors that determined their 
outcomes is helpful for answering the research questions. If certain arguments by the 
Americans and the Vietnamese echo those preceding debates, does this mean that U.S. - 
Vietnam dialogues will share the same outcomes and determining factors of the latter? The 
second section presents various scholarly attempts to bridge the differences on human rights. 
Their different approaches are suggestive to possible paths for identifying criteria of genuine 
dialogue. Through an emprical analysis of a particular U.S. – Vietnam human rights dialogue, 
                                                          
8
 In the words of Joseph Yun, “I would like to emphasize that our concern for human rights factors [reaches] 
into all aspects of our policy approach and engagement with Vietnam….[and] We regularly engage Vietnamese 
officials to emphasize that building a vibrant, innovative economy requires allowing people the freedom to 
think, create, and take full advantage of the trade and investment ecosystem that TPP [trans-pacific partnership] 
will afford.” See Note 6 above for the context and source of this statement. 
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the satisfactions or failures to meet these criteria will shed light upon the nature of the 
dialogue and the obstacles to their mutual understanding on human rights. The third section 
discusses the nature and purposes of diplomacy, as the U.S. – Vietnam human rights 
dialogues have been conducted within official diplomatic framework. The possible 
diplomatic enabling or impeding factors to mutual understanding are discussed in this 
section. The fourth section is a detailed chapters outline. 
 
I. The human rights debates in international politics 
1. The North-South debates
9
 
Developing countries challenge Western human rights understanding on a number of issues. 
First, they argue that social and economic rights are more important than civil and political 
rights and constitute a prerequisite for a meaningful realisation of the latter rights. In 1976, 
for example, an Iranian delegate argued at the UN General Assembly that "it must be 
admitted that there was a hierarchy of rights and that respect for psychological and political 
rights was frequently almost unattainable as long as the realization of material rights was not 
guaranteed."
10
 Likewise, a Pakistani representative claimed that “once basic human needs had 
been met,” then “civil and political liberties which normally represented a higher standard in 
socio-political development, could best be promoted.”11 Second, developing countries 
consider the right to development an inherent and fundamental human rights, and the third 
challenge is the South’s insistence on the right to self-determination. These two rights were 
(and still are) of utmost importance for those countries that had just regained their 
independence and were underdeveloped. As R.J. Vincent observed in 1986, “a widespread 
and often repeated argument of the Third World” is that without this latter right, “the rights of 
individual within national groups could mean very little.”12 This is because “[i]ndividuals 
could enjoy civil and political rights only if their community did not suffer foreign 
oppression. Self-determination was the precondition for the enjoyment of all other human 
rights.”13 This self-determination right, R. J. Vincent argues, connects with the calls for 
eliminating all racial discrimination, consolidates the stress on social and economic rights, 
                                                          
9
 In this thesis, the North is designated as developed countries, and the South developing countries. 
10
 In Jack Donnelly, “Recent trend in UN human rights activity: description and polemic,” International 
Organization, 35, 4, Autumn 1981, p. 638. 
11
 A statement by the Pakistani delegate at the UN National Assembly, cited in Ibid., p. 644. 
12
 R. J. Vincent, op. cit., p. 80. 
13
 Antonio Cassese, “The Self-Determination of Peoples,” in Louis Henkin (ed.), The International Bill of Rights 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 92-3, cited in Ibid. 
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and reflects a shift from internal self-determination (the right to elect political representative) 
to external self-determination. This shift, in his words, reflects “the ascendancy of socialist 
and Third World conceptions of the right of self-determination over those of Western 
countries at the United Nations.”14 
In the 1960s and the 1970s, developing countries successfully gained official recognitions of 
these human rights understandings. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the General Assembly in 1960 asserts that, “the 
subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of 
fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and was an 
impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.”15 The General Assembly 
resolution 32/130 of 16 December 1977 recognises that, “the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political 
rights.”16 This line was also reiterated in the Proclamation of the International Conference of 
Human Rights held in Teheran in 1986, demonstrating the continuous priority for collective 
economic and social rights over political and civil rights.
17
 Also in that year, the General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the right to development which confirms this right as 
an inalienable human rights.”18 These developments prompted proponents of universalism 
like Donnelly to lament that “[t]oday in the UN little attention is given to any rights other 
than economic, social and cultural rights…. [and] in general civil and political rights today 
receive little more attention in the UN than economic and social rights received twenty years 
ago” and this “actually represent[s] an ideological reinterpretation of the previously 
                                                          
14
 Ibid., p. 81. 
15
 “Therefore, lack of preparedness for independence should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence; 
and immediate steps should be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of non-self-governing territories.” 
“Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples”, UN Resolution 1514 (XV) 
947
th
 plenary meeting, 14 December 1960; this document can be found on 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/ares15.htm. The right to self-determination is also reaffirmed in the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the United Nations World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna Austria World Conference in June 1993; this document can be found on 
http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm, accessed on September 28, 2011. The right to self-determination is 
argued to even take precedence over the right to territorial integrity; see Susan Marks, “Self-Determination and 
Peoples’ Rights,” King's College Law Journal, 2 K.C.L.J. (1991-1992), pp. 87-92. This document can be found 
on http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/kingsclj2&div=8&g_sent=1&collection=journals, 
accessed on September 28, 2011.  
16
 Its full name is, “Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving 
the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms” and its code A/RES/32/130, this can be 
found on http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/32/ares32r130.pdf, accessed on September 28, 2011. 
17
 It proclaims that “since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil 
and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights, is impossible.” E/CN-4/SR. 
1314, cited in Jack Donnelly, “Recent trend in UN …,” p. 638. 
18
 Ramcharan, Bertrand G., Contemporary human rights ideas, New York, NY: Routledge, 2008, p. 90. 
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authoritative statements of principles contained in the Universal Declaration and the 
Covenants” and the United Nations’ voice in human rights “is not only limited in range, but 
shrill, and quite disturbing.”19 
The question is how these views came to be so predominant. Their philosophical background, 
according to R. J. Vincent, is the ‘basic need’ doctrine that argues for the priority of what is 
necessary for human survival, such as food, drink, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualisation 
over classic human rights. This doctrine, he argues, “might have no greater appeal to Third 
World countries than Western theories of human rights.”20 However, the doctrine were more 
appealing to those countries, as mentioned above, that had just regained their independence 
and were struggling with poverty and underdevelopment. As the North was and still is in 
majority in the UN General Assembly, these ideas dominated the debate about human rights 
“at the United Nations and elsewhere;” accordingly “history of human rights doctrine at the 
United Nations reflects the change in the balance of power” in the General Assembly from 
the North to the South.
21
 This power struggle was intertwined with the competition for 
influence over the South between the capitalist and socialist camps; both Western politicians 
and scholars proposed solutions to draw the newly dependent countries to their camps. A 
French minister wrote in Foreign Policy in 1982 that any responsible policy maker must 
address the fact that “the true ground for competition between East and West is therefore in 
the South”22 while R. J. Vincent suggested an “appealing policy” for the West to “outflank 
the Soviet Union in the Third World by meeting Southern claims.”23 With the dependence of 
the debate outcome on power struggle, the North-South debate has not yet settled; and the 
two sides still differ on their interpretations on the right to development.
24
 
 
2. The East-West debate
25
 
                                                          
19
 Jack Donnelly, “Recent trend in UN …,” p. 635 and p. 655. For a criticism against this assessment of UN 
roles, see Philip Alston, “The Alleged Demise of Political Human Rights at the UN: A Reply to Donnelly,” 
International Organization, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 537-546. 
20
 R. J. Vincent, op. cit., p. 90 and p. 88. 
21
 Ibid., p. 79 and p. 83. Italics added. 
22
 Jean-Pierre Cot, “Winning East-West in North-South,” Foreign Policy, No. 46 (Spring, 1982), p. 5.  
23
 R. J. Vincent, op. cit., p. 91. 
24
 Ramcharan, Bertrand G., op. cit., p.86-88. At the 1993 World Conference on human rights in Vienna, the 
rights to development and self-determination were confirmed as human rights. For a comprehensive account of 
the conference, See Kevin Boyle, “Stock-taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna 1993,” Political Studies, 1995, XLIII, 79-95. 
25
 In this thesis, the East-West debate is understood as the debate between socialist countries and Western liberal 
democracies. 
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The debate between the socialist and capitalist sides can be exemplified as between the U.S. 
and the former Soviet Union. The two countries differed in almost every aspect of human 
rights: the origin, the subjects, the contents, and the priorities of human rights as well as the 
roles of the state in matters regarding human rights. While there is not enough space here to 
canvass the whole debate, some of these differences are reviewed.
26
 On rights origin, for 
example, the Americans hold that human rights are deeply rooted in natural law; they are 
self-evident, inherent, and universal.
27
 Whereas in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, human rights 
are conferred, guaranteed and protected by the state through law, a law that is presumed to be 
the product of underlying economic relationships and used by the economic dominant class 
as a means to maintain its power. Thus, the individual has no inherent rights; outside the 
state, human rights is "a mere abstraction, an empty illusion easily created but just as easily 
dispelled."
28
 Moreover, as in the former Soviet Union the dominant class was deemed to be 
the workers (the proletariat), human rights were presented there as the product of the 
collective will of the people.
29
 As for the government’s roles, as R. J. Vincent relates, in 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine the state is viewed as “the buttress of liberty” while in the West it is 
viewed as “the threat to freedom against which individuals must constantly be on their 
guard.”30 
In regards to the priorities of rights, the Soviet Constitution lists the right to labour as first 
among basic rights and the subsequent rights are rest, free health care, housing, education... 
which are social and economic rights. As Mary Hawkesworth notes, only after these rights 
are guaranteed, does the Constitution move to "freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, 
of mass meetings and of street procession and demonstration." However, these latter rights 
are contingent; they must be "in accordance with the working people's interests and for 
purposes of strengthening the socialist system" and "may not be used to the detriment of the 
working people interest" or "to weaken the socialist system."
31
 Moreover, interpretation of 
these contigencies were left to the discretion of the Soviet Communist Party. In sharp 
contrast, the U.S. Bills of Rights contains none of the social and economic rights; for 
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Americans, these are merely ideals for which man can strive, whereas only civil and political 
rights are true rights.
32
 
Underlying these differences are philosophical disputes between Marxism-Leninism and 
natural liberal rights theory.
33
 For example, the social contract theory in the West holds that 
individuals traded off parts of their inherent rights in exchange for order and protection from 
a state. Thus, liberty is the freedom to do whatever one wishes to as long as it does not 
infringe upon others’ legitimate rights. Viewing society through the lens of class struggle, the 
Soviets held that liberty was freedom from exploitation and oppression and argued that 
workers’ freedom to choose between working in sweatshops or starving to death is a 
masquerade for capitalist’s economic exploitation.34 From a legal perspective Richard Dean 
concludes that the two human rights philosophies are irreconcilable, while Mary 
Hawkesworth holds that the ideological differences led to immunity to human rights criticism 
and interventions.
35
 
In practice, the debate on human rights between the two superpowers was illustrated by the 
debates over the dissidents in the Soviet Union and the implementation of the Final Act of 
Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe after 1975. While the West 
viewed the dissidents as “outstandingly courageous individuals on whose qualities the 
possibility of progress in the Soviet Union depends,” the Soviet officials held that these were 
those who surrendered to Western paymasters and their “self-interested egoism … allied 
them with anti-socialist interests outside the Soviet Union, from which their protest really 
sprang.”36 With this conviction, they regarded the Western human rights campaign as “a 
conscious incitement of mistrust and hostility, the falsification of reality or, least of all, 
subversive activity;” in other words, a subversive “psychological warfare.” It should be noted 
that fears for subversion were not only prevalent in the socialist camp, as the Soviet Union 
also called for the unity of the proletariat and workers worldwide to topple down the 
exploiters - the capitalists in the West. However, in their interactions on human rights these 
suspicions were not addressed. As Vincent observes, “each side, especially when represented 
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by its chief advocate the United States, or the Soviet Union, seeks to persuade the other, by 
various means, to adopt the better course.”37 If more constructive dialogues are not to be 
built, Richard Dean warns, subsequent Helsinki follow-up conferences would be “little more 
than biennial shouting matches as each side seeks to justify its position on human rights at the 
expense of the other.”38 In fact, eventually such shouting matches had stopped altogether, as 
one side of the dialogue imploded after the collapse of socialism in the former Soviet Union 
and Europe. 
 
3. The “Asian values” debate 
Proponents of the “Asian values” hold that Western values inherent in human rights are not 
compatible and suitable to Asian societies as reflected in Asian cultural essence. For 
example, the individualistic focus and antagonistic form of Western rights concept contradict 
the communitarianism and harmony promoted in Confucian political thought. Given the need 
for economic development, they deem that it is necessary to focus on meeting this need, i.e. 
poverty eradication, even at the expense of temporarily suspending civil and political rights. 
In a more general term, “particular rights in particular contexts can and should be curbed for 
particular economic or political purposes.”39 Besides, the promotion of Western “universal” 
rights is charged “as essentially a means of asserting Western cultural hegemony and so 
undermining the national competence, sovereignty and self-determination of the state in 
regard to domestic conflicts.”40 The debate was initially inspired by the leaders of successful 
economies in the early 1990s, most strongly by Singaporean and Malaysian Prime Ministers 
Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad, and it reached a regional consensus in the Bangkok 
Declaration in 1993 that preceded the UN Conference on human rights in Vienna in the same 
year.
41
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The critics of these “Asian values,” included most of the Western media, human rights 
NGOs, and prodemocracy academics. Kingsbury and Avonius observe that “[t]he great 
majority of scholars researching this issue” have challenged the Asian leaders’ interpretations 
of ‘Asian values’ and claimed that the latter had selectively interpreted those values for 
supporting “the political ambitions of authoritarian regimes” and “oppress[ing] the critical 
voices within the countries.”42 These criticisms challenge the advocates of “Asian values” on 
the latter’s authority and legitimacy in representing the essences of their own values.43 The 
debate, however, slipped off public agenda after the East Asia economic crisis of 1997–1998 
and the fact that Lee Kuan Yew himself seemed to abandon his advocacy.
44
 For critics of 
“Asian values,” the collapse of a number of Asian economies demonstrated that 
“authoritarian rule had not guaranteed economic success after all.”45 A Singaporean scholar 
observed that:  
I think the real interests underpinning the debate .. are related to Asian economic 
success and confidence and Asia's continuing reaction to colonialism. I doubt very 
much if this debate would have even started, were late twentieth-century Asia 
nothing but a sea of poverty, degradation, and squalor … [and] the fact that many 
Asians appear to be speaking from a position of strength; strength drawn not from 
the merits of intellectual arguments but from economic success.46 
Anthony Langlois seems to share this observation when he states that although it should not 
be thought that the “regional economic crisis has permanently ended the debate,” the Asian 
economic miracle has “acted as a moral and strategic high ground from which these positions 
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[of the Asian values proponents] could be argued.”47 This observation points to the linkage 
between Asian economic successes and the assertion of distinctive values, with the 
dependence of the latter on the former. Viewing the “Asian values” debates in this light, it 
could be argued that it is the strength of material success, not of better arguments that helped 
to determine the emergence and dying out of the debate. 
In retrospect, it is interesting to note that the previous debates on human rights in 
international politics had not concluded with a rational mutual understanding on the issue. 
Instead of being settled by the force of better arguments, the debates of the 
developed/developing, the capitalist/socialist, and the Western/Asian parties had been much 
influenced and determined by the balance of power, the conviction on the 
incommensurability of capitalist/socialist human rights understanding, and a position of 
strength, respectively. The First and Third worlds debate has been determined by the 
overwhelming majority of newly independent countries in the UN General Assembly. The 
East-West debate was between two opposing political regimes whose ultimate goal was to 
eliminate the other, and the debate and the “Asian values” one ended with the economic 
failures of the challengers to the liberal universal human rights. 
As shown later throughout the thesis, in their human rights dialogues today, the Americans 
and the Vietnamese use a number of arguments similar to those in these historical debates. 
Does this mean that U.S. – Vietnam human rights dialogues will lead to similar ending? That 
is, that no consensus on human rights can be ultimately achieved via rational and better 
arguments and any human rights compromises are made in response to pressures and 
considerations of external factors. Moreover, does this mean that the balance of power and 
other material factors determine the nature and outcomes of the U.S. – Vietnam human rights 
dialogues? Is the incommensurability of their human rights approaches a decisive obstacle to 
their mutual understanding on the issue? And lastly, does this mean that their human rights 
differences can only be settled with the collapse of one side; in this case, the Vietnamese 
communist regime is the more likely candidate? Before discussing the diplomatic factors that 
may determine the outcome of a contemporary human rights dialogues, this text now turns to 
discuss scholars’ attempts to narrow differences on human rights. 
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II. The initiatives to bridge the differences on human rights understandings 
Attempts to bridge differences can be roughly put into two categories: those that discern a 
number of commonalities as foundations for the universality of human rights and those that 
adopt a non-foundational and dialogical path. The foundational approaches carry with them 
unresolved charge of imposing values onto others. The dialogical approaches, however, seem 
to surmount this critics but lacks a specific model and empirical studies. 
 
1. Foundational approaches 
a. The liberal approaches by Donnelly and An-Na’im 
The previously reviewed debates occured after the United Nations’ adoption of a Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. As Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler observe, with 
the preamble of the UN Charter, the Declaration “marked the beginnings of a full-blown 
global human rights regime … [and] established a standard of civilised conduct which applies 
to all governments in the treatment of their citizens.”48 It can thus be argued that those three 
preceding debates, in a way, relate to controversies surrounding the contemporary human 
rights regime. These controversies on human rights understanding, especially those in the 
“Asian values” debate, would be explained by Donnelly and An-Na’im differently. For the 
former, although cross-cultural differences on human rights are undeniable, “it is the 
similarities across civilization that are more striking and important.”49 Donnelly claims that 
there is now “remarkable international normative consensus” on the list of such basic rights 
as ‘the rights to life, liberty, security of the person; the guarantee of legal personality; and 
protections against slavery, arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile and inhuman or degrading 
treatment.”50 With this abstract and general consensus, Donnelly holds that the differences 
relate to specific interpretations and implementations of these rights. For example, everyone 
has the right to work and protection from unemployment, but what counts as adequate 
protection from unemployment differs among civilizations.
51
 Donnelly thus may explain that 
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the differences on the “Asian values” debate are minor, whereas the similarities across 
cultures are sufficiently important for an agreement on the rights in the Declaration.
52
 
Therefore, Donnelly himself is "all in favour of a cross-cultural dialogue that will allow the 
incorporation of non-Western symbolism into the international human rights discourse, and 
make support for human rights more powerful in non-Western societies."
53
 Such 
incorporation, for Donnelly, would lead to a relative universality of human rights. 
An-Na’im may explain that “Asian values” debate originated from the fact that Asian 
traditions, like many other cultural traditions have had little say in the formulation of those 
standards. Hence, for An-Na’im, the claim that all the existing standards already enjoy 
universal cultural legitimacy may be weak, "since people are more likely to observe 
normative propositions if they believe them to be sanctioned by their own culture."
54
 To 
address this lack or insufficiency of intercultural legitimacy of human rights standards, An-
Na’im calls for both internal and cross-cultural dialogues on human rights.55 Internal dialogue 
is possible, he argues, because a society’s views on the meaning and implications of cultural 
values and norms, and therefore the evaluation of legitimacy of human rights standards, are 
neither unified nor unchangable. Rather, these views reflect and are the result of the internal 
struggle for control over the cultural sources and symbols of power between dominant and 
dominated groups or classes within that society. Thus, internal dialogue is encouraged to 
establish “enlightened perceptions and interpretations of cultural values and norms” “within 
the major traditions of the world.”56  
Once “an adequate level of legitimacy” is achieved within each tradition, cross-cultural 
legitimacy shall be constructed by human rights scholars and advocates from diverse cultural 
traditions. The goal of their dialogue is to agree “on the meaning, scope, and methods of 
implementing these rights.” Such an agreement is achievable, as An-Na’im believes that 
despite their diversity, “human beings and societies share certain fundamental interests, 
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concerns, qualities, traits, and values that can be identified and articulated.”57 Moreover, for 
him, the current human rights regime is “the best possible candidate for the proposed 
universality of human rights” because it is “not the exclusive product of Western societies,” 
and has “legitimacy in Western societies and … growing familiarity and relevance in non-
Western settings.”58 Besides, An-Na’im argues that “it is better to try to improve an existing 
regime, if only as a point of departure and framework for critique, than to seek to dismantle 
and replace it with a new system.”59 
Though different in ways, both An-Na’im’s and Donnelly’s dialogues take cultural 
differences into considerations. Such considerations, however, for both Donnelly and An-
Na’im to a lesser extent, have a limitation: they do not challenge the current human rights 
regime. Donnelly takes the current regime as the regime and persuade others to agree with 
this “fact” via dialogue, while An-Na’im keeps defending its legitimacy and necessity. Thus, 
the dialogues on human rights in An-Na’im’s and Donnelly’s term cannot escape the cultural 
relativists’ critique of moral imperialism associated with the current human rights regime, 
which is discussed below. 
The proponents of cultural relativism claim that the source for moral rules and the validity of 
rights is the actual socio-cultural context.
60
 Given the plurality of cultures in the world, it 
could appear that the claim of universal human rights is an imperialist attempt to impose 
moral values onto others.
61
 A radical relativist position, according to Steiner and Alston, 
considers that the consequences of this cultural diversities are that no culture or state … is 
justified in attempting to impose [values] on other cultures or states” and “no transcendent or 
transcultural ideas of rights can be found or agreed on.”62 A radical relativist thus may reject 
the liberal dialogues above on the two following arguments. First, the claim to universality of 
human rights, even Donnelly’s “relative universality,” is indeed an attempt to impose values 
onto others. Second, those dialogues would bring no agreement on ideas of rights. 
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Responding to this challenge, Donnelly argues that the “single most important explanation 
for the prevalence of arguments of cultural relativism …. is that they are used by vicious 
elites as a way to attempt to deflect attention from their repressive policies.”63 Donnelly finds 
support for his argument from a number of scholars preceding him.
64
 Among them, R.J. 
Vincent criticises cultural relativism for allowing the injustices that “outraged the conscience 
of mankind” to take place with immunity from external criticism and intervention.65 Elvin 
Hatch contends that cultural relativism neutralizes moral judgment and thereby impairs action 
against injustice.
66
 I.C. Jarvie accuses that cultural relativism “disarms us, dehumanizes us, 
leaves us unable to enter into communicative interaction; that is to say, unable to criticize 
cross-culturally, cross-sub-culturally; intimately, relativism leaves no room for criticism at all 
… behind relativism nihilism looms.”67  
In response to the charge that cultural relativism may breed tolerance of injustice, Alison D. 
Renteln admits that the association of cultural relativism with tolerance by early cultural 
relativists “has left cultural relativists in dire straits.”68 However, she argues that such 
criticism is “biased from the start” as the term tolerance it used “implies that there is 
something objectionable in the other society and that the person observing it must suppress 
his feelings of revulsion.”69 For her, the theory of relativism does not prevent criticising 
activities and beliefs of other cultures, it only reminds that such criticism is based on our own 
ethnocentric standards.
70
 Thus, cultural relativism “points to the degree to which self-
righteous attitudes toward internal moral standards are ingrained. Insofar as individuals adopt 
moral categories uncritically, conflict between cultures will be exceedingly difficult to 
resolve.”71 However, Renteln has not elaborated further on how such self-righteous attitudes 
and uncritical adoption of one’s own cultural values could obstruct cross-cultural mutual 
understandings. 
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Neither have other proponents of cultural relativism pushed this idea further. Adamantia 
Pollis calls for clarifying and differentiating “legitimate cultural specificity that is deeply 
imbedded in diverse belief systems and values, and the state's exploitation of this contention” 
in any human rights discourse.
72
 Likewise, Christina M. Cerna turns to the theory main 
contention that “different norms occupy different places” and suggests that reaching universal 
acceptance of human rights norms is a ongoing process, and the “[c]hange and acceptance of 
these norms must ultimately come from within the region and cannot be imposed by outside 
forces.”73 
In short, the foundation of Donnelly and An-Na’im’ dialogue models, the current 
international human rights regime, is challenged by cultural relativists on its claim to 
universalism. A weakness of these models, a cultural relativist may point out, is that they do 
not pay due attention to the impacts of cultural differences and ethnocentrism.
74
 
 
2. The classical objections against the theory of natural rights 
Before turning to alternative approaches by John Rawls and Chris Brown, it is necessary to 
discuss another unresolved challenge against the current human rights regime, from which 
alternative approaches start. The development of the current regime, as Tim Dunne and 
Nicholas J. Wheeler observe, has been underpinned by liberal natural rights thinking.
75
 Put 
simply, a liberal natural theorist claim that we have certain natural and universal rights by 
virtue of our common humanity, despite our belongings to different communities. What is 
common to all is our inherent human nature, which is rational. For example, although we may 
come from different traditions and societies, we all know to differentiate right from wrong, 
i.e. it is wrong to kill and right to preserve life. If Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler’s 
observation is right, then the classical objections against the theory of natural rights of 
Edmund Burke, Hegel, Marx, and Bentham below can also be applied to the current 
international human rights regime. 
Natural rights, Burke charges, are foreign to the complex nature of politics as they "admit no 
temperament and no compromise; anything withheld from their full demand is so much of 
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fraud and injustice" and are also among the pretexts behind which “many disorderly appetites 
hide.”76 Thus, for Burke, the language of natural rights “deepened the antagonism of political 
opponents while raising their expectations,” which can lead down a path to anarchy. Rights, 
according to Burke, mean particular rights in particular locations, and they are inherited from 
the previous generations’ prejudice and latent wisdom. Rights, therefore, can only be grasped 
through the conventions and customs of a community.
77
 It is the proposition that natural 
rights are not rooted in any tradition that led to Burke’s contention that natural rights were 
just monstrous fictions.
78
 
Sharing with Burke the critics over the abstract notion of human nature, Hegel explains the 
matter differently. For him, human identity exists via the recognition of others: one cannot be 
conscious of one’s self as a person unless one is aware of, and mutually recognised by, other 
persons. Under this logic, the concept of human being separate from all social ties would 
"make little or no sense." In other words, only within the context of existing society, can the 
human person be.
79
 As Hegel puts it, "it is only as one of its [the state] members that the 
individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life.”80 Thus, in line 
of this argument, the abstractness and universality of human nature cannot be justified. 
Marx’s account of human nature is, to a degree, similar to Hegel’s. Marx contends that, “the 
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual” but “in reality, it is the 
ensemble of the social relations.”81 Furthermore, for Marx, human rights are economically 
and historically contingent; he argues that the rights of man are nothing but the rights of a 
member of bourgeois civil society and are part of the ideology of that society. The dominant 
class in capitalist society use legally instituted civil rights to facilitate exploitation which is 
hidden and legitimized through rights. Tore Lindholm explains that in Marxism, “the rights 
of man are characteristic social forms of a capitalist mode of production to make exploitation 
invisible to social actors, legitimate class relations in the eyes of the actors, and thus 
stabili[ze] the economic structure as a basis of a self-reproductive exploitative economic 
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system.”82 It follows that the relations between class, ownership, power, and material 
interests, which are all historically contingent, decide the real meaning of rights. Hence, 
Lindholm concludes, natural rights “tell us virtually nothing substantive about a society or 
about the nature of rights per se.”83 
Unlike the other three philosophers, Jeremy Bentham does not criticize natural rights for their 
lack of sociological contingency: for the founder of utilitarianism, humans essentially try to 
maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Our rejection or acceptance of rights depends on 
whether this goal, or in his word “the principle of utility” is met. He argues that, “only the 
principle of utility provided any rational ground for resolving moral, and hence political and 
legal, disputes, while talk of justice, injustice, natural rights, or moral sense is merely a 
veneer to give respectability to, or to endow with persuasive force, the likes and dislikes of 
the speaker.”84 In other words, the speaker persuasively projects her own subjectivity as an 
objective truth via the language of justice, morality, and natural rights. This is why, in his 
much cited phrase, Jeremy Bentham strongly charges the concept of natural rights as “simply 
nonsense… rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.” And even if the Benthamian view 
means that it is still possible to make out a case for natural rights on the basis of 
utilitarianism, as Andrew Vincent argues, those rights would not necessarily be universal but 
depend on human utility, preferences, and interests.
85
 
The common thread among those criticisms is the charge of generalisation and 
oversimplification of human beings. Beyond the proposition that an individual is a member of 
the human race, human beings are different in their interests, preferences, and belong to 
different communities and societies. Deprived of these features, the concept of human beings 
as thought of in the natural liberal school is purely abstract. This abstractness, R.J. Vincent 
admits, is "perhaps the central difficulty with the theory of human rights" of that school.
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3. Alternatives to the liberal concept of human nature by John Rawls and Chris Brown 
Recognising the controversies associated with human nature, John Rawls attempts to avoid 
“any particular comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophical conception” of this concept by 
developing the laws of the peoples from his idea of justice as fairness. While there is not 
enough space to elaborate in details his arguments here, they can be summarised as follows: 
Rawls divides the peoples in the world into three types of society: liberal, hierarchical, and 
outlawed ones. Tyrannical and dictatorial regimes and expansionist states conducting wars 
fall into the last category. The first two belong to well-ordered society of the just peoples of 
the world with conditions set for the hierarchical one. To be members in good standing of 
that world society, well-ordered hierarchical society must satisfy three necessary conditions – 
“that it respects the principles of peace and not expansionism, that its system of law meet the 
essentials of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people, and that it honours basic human 
rights.”87 Should these essential requirements not be met by well-ordered societies, economic 
sanctions or military pressure can justifiably applied.
88
 And Rawls argues that the peoples in 
liberal and particularly hierarchical societies can reasonably and rationally endorse his list of 
human rights proper that includes only the right to life, liberty, property, and formal 
equality.
89
 For these rights to hold, Rawls claims, “does not require the liberal idea that 
persons are first citizens and as such free and equal members of society who have those basic 
rights as the rights of citizens;”90 these rights hold simply through principles of justice in their 
fair and equal relation with all other societies. In this way, Rawls claims, the charge that the 
liberal law of peoples including this human rights list is “ethnocentric and merely Western” 
can be refuted. 
The Rawlsian approach has been under attacks, even from liberals. Thus, Pogge and 
Buchanan attack Rawls’ list of basic rights. Pogge charges that “Rawls shrinks the received 
list of human rights” while Buchanan claims the Law of peoples is “a betrayal of liberalism” 
because such important rights for women as the right to education and to equal opportunity in 
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employment are not in the list.
91
 Parekh also criticises Rawls on the basis that requirements 
entail “a distinctly social democratic view of society.”92 
Chris Brown starts his approach with the main thesis of cultural relativism. Rights, for 
Brown, are contextualised and “best seen as a by-product of a functioning ethical 
community.”93 Drawing on the postmodern philosopher Richard Rorty’s idea of a shared 
moral identity, Brown argues that an American and European “human rights culture” since 
the Enlightment is based and reinforced by security and sympathy. Security here means a 
risk-free condition that allows for respecting the others regardless of their differences; 
whereas sympathy is the “ability to put one’s self in another’s shoes” and perceive him/her 
“as a fellow human-being.” For Brown, Bosnian Serbs killed Bosnian Muslims because the 
former cannot see the latter as fellow human beings. Therefore, according to Brown, it would 
be futile to suggest that these people are wrong or irrational or that they had not understood 
the nature of human beings; as “[t]here is no such nature; there are no general moral 
standards that apply here.”94 The best way, for Brown, is to see that the Bosnian Serbs are 
“deprived of the security and sympathy that have allowed us to create a culture in which they 
can reflect on these matters in relative safety.”95 Accordingly, what can be counted as 
universal for Brown is not human nature but sympathetic feeling. And Brown suggests 
‘sentimental education’ might be the only response to human wrongs though this approach 
may be “inadequate” and “does not solve all the problems of relativism.”96  
At issue with this approach is that by rejecting rationality as a way to settle human rights 
disputes, how can Chris Brown and Richard Rorty substantiate sentimental education. For 
example, what does the sympathy of perceiving the other as a fellow human being entail? 
How can this become universal? Another objection to this model is that “it implies that 
human beings can be persuaded to care for each other only by emphasising their similarities.” 
“Such a view,” as Bhikhu Parekh observes, could breed “intolerance of differences, and 
requires that unless others become like us we cannot share solidarity with them.”97 
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To conclude at this juncture, attempts to bridge differences on human rights understandings 
by securing a common ground remains controversial and unconvincing. Donnelly’s and An-
Na’im’s models invoke the cultural relativists’ criticisms against ethnocentrism and values 
imposition. The alternatives provided by John Rawls and Chris Brown do not satisfactorily 
refute the charge of ethnocentrism. Perhaps the common weakness in all these approaches is 
that the others are presumed and constructed, not listened to. In the Rawlsian approach, the 
others are assumed to meet Rawl’s requirements to be capable of accepting Rawl’s list of 
basic rights or otherwise be catergorised into outlawed ones who could be subjected to 
coercive measures. To a lesser extent, in Rorty’s and Brown’s dialogue models, the others are 
supposed to share some similarities and sympathetic feelings with the self before a dialogue 
may occur. The next sub-section is a reflection about dialogical approach to human rights 
differences. 
 
4. Dialogical approaches by Charles Taylor and Richard Shapcott 
Charles Taylor shares with Brown the conviction that it is not possible to reach universal 
values on human rights, and he offers an alternative. Using Rawls’ concept of overlapping 
consensus, he argues that we can converge on certain norms of conduct without agreeing on 
their underlying philosophical foundations and legal forms. Drawing from the case of 
Buddhism and royal charisma in Thai tradition, he observes that Thai and Western traditions 
share similar human rights related patterns: the expansion of privileges to all, once reserved 
for minorities only. In this light, universal human rights values could be forged through a 
process of mutual learning, from certain “observable” consensus on norms, we can move 
toward a ‘fusion of horizons’ in Gadamer’s terms, in which “the moral universe of the other 
becomes less strange” and what follow are “further borrowings and the creation of new 
hybrid forms.”98 World consensus on human rights can thus be attained, he argues, when 
“greater sympathetic understanding of the situation of each party by the other” (he was 
speaking about the unequal treatments against women) can lead to agreement on norms of 
conduct on that issue.
99
 This resembles Brown’s and Rorty’s claim for universal sympathetic 
feelings mentioned above but Taylor’s model does not abandon rational arguments as a way 
to reach mutual agreements. 
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Taylor also provides some sketches on what this process of mutual learning can look like. He 
envisages that consensus would always be renewed and “never complete,” because both sides 
would come to some compromise in different practical contexts. For such dialogues to be 
successful, each side must understand “what moves the other,” respect each other, and 
possess some degree of sympathetic feelings.
100
 Taylor also warns that such a consensus may 
lead to “a redefinition of identity”101 and ventures into how ethnocentrism may prevent 
Westerners from reaching human rights consensus,  
An obstacle in the path to this mutual understanding comes from the inability of 
many Westerners to see their culture as one among many.... they will tend to 
think that the path to convergence requires that others too cast off their 
traditional ideas, that they even reject their religious heritage, and become 
“unmarked” moderns like us.102 
While Taylor borrows Gadamer’s terms, Shapcott draws exclusively on Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics to suggest a way towards a non-foundational universalism for 
solving differences within the international community. He argues that the impacts of 
ethnocentrism can be addressed by a commitment to “communicative inclusion” and the 
understanding that shared commitments to, and definitions of, universal human rights are 
socially constructed. In this sense, the meaning of human rights and their universality is no 
longer a “truth” of which one side tries to convince the other, but the common subject of a 
dialogue. In such dialogue, for Shapcott, participants are required, among other things, to 
recognise that the other “may have something different to say and that [..] be open to the 
possibility of learning.”103 And the question whether we can achieve universal human rights 
can only answered once “dialogue has taken place.”104 It should be noted here that while 
Taylor’s and Shapcott’s models are promising, neither intends to build in a detailed and 
systematic way the conditions for, and indications of, a genuine dialogue on human rights. 
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5. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Actions 
as theoretical frameworks of this thesis 
Gadamer also did not intend to build a criteria for genuine understanding in his Truth and 
Method. As he claims, the hermeneutics developed in that work is not “a methodology of the 
human sciences, but an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their 
methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our 
experience of the world.”105 His aim is neither to develop an alternative procedure of 
understanding like the preceding hermeneutic theorists nor to “offer a general theory of 
interpetation and a differential account of its methods;” his primary aim is to “discover what 
is common to all modes of understanding” or put it simply, to clarify the conditions in which 
understanding takes place.
106
 In pursuing this aim, as Shapcott observes, Gadamer criticises 
that technical instrumental rationality in the forms of historicism and objectivism stands in 
the way of ‘genuine’ understanding.107 Although he does not directly or intentionally focus 
on developing a model of a genuine dialogue,
108
 one can draw from Gadamer specific 
conditions for, and indications of, mutual understanding. For genuine understanding to occur, 
Gadamerian interlocutors and dialogue outcome must meet certain criteria under these 
conditions and indications. The satisfaction or failure to meet these criteria will shed light 
into the obstacles to genuine understanding between the Americans and the Vietnamese on 
the issue of human rights. 
Another possible framework is Habermas’s theory of communicative action [henceforth 
TCA], that suggests that it is not up to the scholars to determine what count as rational, but 
this is left to be decided by the speaking and acting subjects themselves. What could 
constitute the basis of the TCA is Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality, which is 
“tied to … subject-subject relation between communicating and interacting individuals.”109 
This procedural view of rationality does not guarantee our conclusions but a right manner to 
come to conclusion.
110
 Although like Gadamer, Habermas does not aim at building the 
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criteria for genuine understanding in his TCA, it is still possible to extract from this theory 
another set of conditions for, and indications of, genuine understanding. 
These conditions and indications from Habermas’s and Gadamer’s works will serve both as a 
search light and a lens into explaining U.S. – Vietnam human rights dialogues. As search 
lights, they show this writer that at which he needs to focus his attention in front of relevant 
information and data and how to build the right questions for his interviews. As focus lenses, 
they provide the means to explain the nature and the extent of agreement achieved in the 
dialogue. Further, as the case study is a diplomatic dialogue, this necessitates a discussion on 
diplomacy and its possible impacts on mutual understanding on human rights. 
 
III. Diplomacy and its use in the U.S. – Vietnam mutual understanding on human rights 
This section first justifies the selection of diplomatic dialogue as the research object of this 
thesis. It then provides a brief overview of the history of, literature on, and a grasp of, 
diplomacy. Finally, it discusses the features of diplomacy that may hinder and/or support 
mutual understanding in diplomatic dialogues. 
 
1. Why diplomatic dialogue 
The diplomatic dialogues are primarily used for practical reasons. The human rights 
viewpoints of diplomats and other representatives are considered, at least by the involved 
states, the official and legitimate voice of that country. Moreover, so far only the yearly 
exchange between the U.S. and Vietnam constitute their diplomatic human rights dialogue. 
Given the subject of this thesis is about the human rights issue within the U.S. – Vietnam 
relationship and their encounter on human rights, diplomatic dialogues are thus a valid and 
unavoidable choice. Another practical concern is that there is a dearth of research on 
dialogues among nations on human rights in diplomatic channels as well as of empirical 
research on actual cross-cultural human rights dialogues.
111
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2. A brief overview of diplomacy 
Diplomacy has a long history, including a history of demands for changing its nature. 
Recorded diplomatic practices can be found in the exchanges of correspondence between the 
Egyptian king and neighboring courts in the fourteenth century BC.
112
 There have been a 
great number of calls for changing the nature of diplomacy at important turns of the worlds’ 
history. Following the religious wars in Europe and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648), the new diplomacy was under the exclusive control of the state, instead of the 
Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire.” After the French revolution, there were calls 
for diplomacy to represent not the aristocrats but “to be popularized and conducted in the 
name and interests of the ‘people.’”113 By the end of the World War I, Woodrow Wilson 
challenged the secret, imperial, and megaphone diplomacy and called for open diplomacy. 
And the recent years witness the rise of public diplomacy and other stakeholders, such as 
non-governmental organizations and civil society.
114
 
Despite this long history, the traditional literature on diplomacy, Neumann remarks, is 
characterized by “a combination of history, practitioners’ reflections, and a proliferation of 
typologies, with a relative dearth of theoretically informed analysis.”115 According to Christer 
Jönsson and Martin Hall, this is because the practitioners or diplomatic historians only 
accounted for particular experiences or particular historical period, respectively.
116
 Thus, 
there has not been due attentions to diplomacy by theorists or put in another way, diplomacy 
has not been provided with a satisfactory theoretical basis.  
Diplomacy has been defined in different ways. Realists, like Hans Morgenthau, view 
diplomacy as a technique or an asset - like “a strong fleet or nuclear capacity” that the state 
possesses, whereas for liberalist, diplomacy is “a mere channel of communication.”117 Some 
scholars from the first and second generations of the English School view diplomacy as an 
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international institution.
118
 While James Der Derian and Christian Reus-Smit of the third 
English school generation and Neumann may agree that diplomacy is a social practice and 
cannot be understood without referring to its social context.
119
 Others like G. R. Berridge 
proposes that diplomacy is “an essentially political activity” with the chief purpose of 
“enabl[ing] states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, 
propaganda, or law.”120 Adam Watson, meanwhile, regards diplomacy as communication and 
argues that the “dialogue between independent states … is the substance of diplomacy.”121 
As this thesis examines bilateral diplomatic dialogue, it takes the view of the last two scholars 
that diplomacy involves representation of, and communication between, states with its 
ultimate goal of protecting their national interest. This understanding is in accordance with 
the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations in 1961 of which both the United States and 
Vietnam are signatories.
122
 
 
3. The diplomatic features that might be influential to mutual understanding on human rights 
At this stage, it is difficult to identify the diplomatic features that can facilitate or hinder 
mutual understanding on human rights. A review of the literature on diplomacy suggest the 
following hypotheses. 
A first possible obstacle to agreement on human rights is the purpose of diplomats: in the 
Vienna Convention, diplomats are supposed to protect their country’s interests through, 
among other functions, representing their states and communicating with the receiving states 
on behalf of their own states. With national interests as their ultimate goal, diplomats are 
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assessed only on the way they have fulfilled this task. Lord Palmerston claimed in 1856 that 
Britain would have no eternal allies or enemies; what is eternal is British national interests 
which become the guiding principle for British diplomats.
123
 In other words, furthering the 
state’s interests is the only criteria whereby to assess a diplomat, not ‘his’ morality; ‘he’ 
cannot and should not be judged for telling lies or being dishonest. As Sir Henry Wotton a 
British diplomat argued in 1604, "an Ambassador is an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the 
good of his country.”124 The use of strategies and tactics in diplomacy therefore is tolerable, 
even deemed to be professional and necessary. Accordingly, it has become conventional that 
the ultimate authority in diplomatic dialogue is neither the truth of the subject matter nor the 
force of better argument, but the national interest. And as diplomatic dialogue is a means of 
protecting and furthering this interest, it is supposed to be filled such strategic actions as lies 
or manipulations. 
A second possible obstacle is the problem-solving nature of private diplomatic meetings. As 
Adam Watson observes, in private dialogue, 
both bilateral and collective, statesmen and diplomats can get down to a practical 
discussion about interests and courses of action without the embarrassment 
caused by discussion of ideology and issues of principle. For just as public debate 
tends towards issues of principle, so private negotiation inclines towards 
compromise and understanding of the other man’s point of view, and tends to 
bring even matters of principle onto the bargaining table. This is not hypocrisy. It 
is a natural division of labour between public and private dialogue, between the 
clash of incompatible values and the search for compatible ones like peace and 
independence, between the vision of the desirable and the art – or the craft – of 
the possible.125 
What Watson argues here is that with the division of functions between public 
announcements and private dialogues, diplomats in their private meetings are supposed to put 
aside their convictions and to focus exclusively on possible compromises and concessions. In 
this light, it is presumed that in their private human rights dialogues, the Americans and the 
Vietnamese are supposed not to discuss the incompatible differences on their human rights 
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values. Instead, they are supposed to get down to practical compromises on human rights-
related issues, such as those regarding political dissidents. 
A third possible obstacle to human rights agreement is the restrictions on diplomats to change 
their views or opinions. Jönsson and Hall argues that diplomats pursue their countries’ 
interests by acting somewhere between strictly abiding to instructions and mandates from 
their higher chain of command and operating more creatively as they see fit.
126
 In all cases, 
diplomats are instructed to speak and behave on behalf of others: they only represent the 
position and viewpoint of their countries. Their inherent and ultimate constraint is the 
determining voice of their superiors on their positions and actions in the field. The diplomats’ 
private views cannot interfere in the process of their interactions with local counterparts; they 
should not translate their personal views into concrete actions beyond their mandates, either 
strict or flexible.
127
 In case a diplomat disagrees with a policy of his government, he can 
express his reasons within the system, but in the end, he must defend that policy loyally; 
otherwise he must request a transfer or resign.
128
 Thus, even if diplomats change their views 
in meeting their counterparts, they are not allowed to reveal such changes to the other side. 
This is still true even if the relation between the resident diplomat and his superiors is viewed 
not as uni-directional, but as a “process of mutual interaction between principals and 
agents.”129 Given the credits of their first-hand accounts and expertise in the field, resident 
diplomats could exert influence back to their superiors. In fact, it has been codified into the 
American Foreign Service Act that diplomats are supposed to participate in the foreign policy 
formulation process, “members of the Service under the direction of the Secretary … provide 
                                                          
126
 Jönsson and Hall describe this as the substantial representation function of diplomats. Another aspect of 
diplomats’ representation is “symbolic,” meaning “the diplomat is then a representative in the same way that a 
flag represents a nation.” Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, op. cit., p. 114. Another vital function of diplomacy 
is communication. Constantinou argues that “at its basic level, diplomacy is a regulated process of 
communication between at least two subjects, conducted by their representative agents over a particular object.” 
Costas M. Constantinou, On the way to diplomacy, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 25. 
While Tran Van Dinh compares communication as the flow of blood in the human body, “whenever 
communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead, and the result is 
violent conflict or atrophy.” Tran Van Dinh, Communication and Diplomacy in a Changing World, Norwood, 
NJ, Alblex, 1987, p. 8, cited in Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, op. cit., p. 67. Freeman explains the 
importance of communication as follows, “lack of active dialogue deprives states of real knowledge of each 
other. It leaves intentions to be deduced by a priori reasoning and feeds suspicion,” “fosters miscalculation and 
perpetuates animosity between states that are adversaries” and perilously “bring[s] a state to base its strategy on 
illusion.” Charles W. Freeman, Arts of Power: statecraft and diplomacy, Washington DC, United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 123. 
127
 Jönsson and Hall give examples of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young in 1970s and 
British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Craig Murray who were forced to resign for acting beyond their instructions. 
Ibid., p. 103. 
128
 Ibid., pp. 103-4. 
129
 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, op. cit., p. 117. Italics as original. 
39 
 
guidance for the formulation and conduct of programs and activities of the Department and 
other agencies which relate to the foreign relations of the United States.”130 However, the 
extent of resident diplomats’ influence on policy planning back home is contingent to a 
number of factors, such as the capability of those diplomats, the power struggle within policy 
planning actors, and the resistance to changes within the diplomatic circle.
131
 Besides, a 
resident diplomat is only one adviser, among a number of others.
132
 In this light, it could be a 
futile effort to search for indications for changes of the diplomats’ convictions within a 
diplomatic dialogue. It could also be very hard to determine if and to what extent the result of 
a particular diplomatic dialogue can be attributed to the subsequent changes in the positions 
and policies of the involved parties. 
To make this ontological change-tracking more difficult, diplomats are warned not to 
sympathise with or accommodate the views of their posting country. This is considered as an 
unavoidable and “inherent danger of the diplomatic profession” as “the person who explains 
glides easily into the role of the person who justifies and advocates.”133 Berridge explains the 
inevitability of this risk that a resident diplomat who is “ideally in constant touch with local 
officials and other influential persons” may find it difficult not to show “a certain sympathy 
for their point of view.”134 Such sympathy, Bailey would argue, is substantial because long 
posting diplomats can become too attached to, and assumed “the perspectives of their host 
country.”135 Consequently, to deal with this occupational hazard, it has become a normal 
practice that diplomats are rotated every three or four years between their postings, “despite 
the costly sacrifice of hard-won area expertise that this involved.”136 A draw back to this 
practice, however, is that this mechanism of posting rotations can hinder or even foreclose the 
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possibility of having a diplomat who possesses extensive and intensive knowledge about the 
prejudgments and convictions of her local counterparts. 
Courtesy and “constructive ambiguity” are also prominent features of diplomatic 
communication.
137
 Courtesy or politeness in diplomacy could refer to, in the words of Caskie 
Stinnett, “a person who can tell you to go to hell in such a way that you actually look forward 
to the trip.”138 As for “constructive ambiguity,” Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall explain that 
diplomats deliberately use ambiguity in their speech so as to conceal vital information or 
retain flexibility in confirming or denying their own signals.
139
 As intentional ambiguity thus 
become necessary, it could be expected that diplomats may not clearly state their assessments 
of their counterparts’ arguments or claims. Exclusiveness and secrecy in diplomatic dialogues 
mean that the diplomatic meetings are often held behind close doors, and reserved for 
government representatives only, whereas other interested parties such as “political 
dissidents” are not allowed to participate. And as their countries are equal sovereign in 
international relations (at least in theory), diplomats are supposed to treat their counterparts as 
equal partners. The effects of these features on the U.S. – Vietnam human rights dialogues 
are not determiable at this stage: does ambiguity make it more difficult or easier for the 
Americans and the Vietnamese to agree on human rights? Likewise, would the principle of 
equality lead to a genuine mutual understanding on human rights between the U.S. and 
Vietnam? And could mutual understanding on human rights be achieved in secret and 
exclusive meetings or in a more open and inclusive dialogues? 
In sum, a review of diplomacy as a framework indicates that the diplomatic constraints to the 
U.S. – Vietnam mutual understanding on human rights might be greater than the enabling 
features for such understanding. The diplomats’ ultimate purpose of serving their national 
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interest and the problem-solving nature of their dialogues suggests that reaching agreement 
on human rights approaches may not be the real concern of their dialogues. Besides, the 
sanction against diplomats’ changing their viewpoints and revealing such changes to those on 
the other side may prevent any narrowing of differences in the American and Vietnamese 
human rights understandings.  
A number of scholars have thus assumed that there there can be no genuine understanding in 
official diplomatic dialogues, such as that between the U.S. – Vietnam on the issue of human 
rights. For Daniel Wehrenfennig, “state diplomacy leaves little room for Habermasian 
communication theory and could count as another example of the inapplicability of his 
ideas;” he suggests to apply the theory to second track diplomacy in the area of conflict 
management.
140
 Jennifer Mitzen and Marc Lynch meanwhile attempt to apply the TCA to 
global or international public spheres, and Thomas Risse looks into domestic public spheres 
and global governance.
141
 The common assumption of these authors is the contention that 
there can exist no genuine understanding in official diplomatic dialogues. This thesis is thus 
an empirical study to shed light into these assumptions. It investigates whether there is 
evidence for genuine communication in diplomatic dialgues, from both an Habermasian 
perspective and a Gadamerian one. 
In conclusion, the above review of diplomacy and the earlier reviews of the human rights 
debates in international politics point to three factors that may determine the outcome of the 
U.S. – Vietnam human rights dialogues: (1) the incommensurabilities of their human rights 
understandings; (2) diplomacy as both facilitator for, and obstacle to, mutual understanding; 
and (3) the balance of power and other contextual factors (i.e. material successes, the ontime 
collapse of one side). Whereas the discussion on narrowing the human right differences 
appear to suggest that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action constitute valid theoretical frameworks for this thesis. 
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IV. Chapters Outline 
Chapter One examines American understanding of human rights. Influenced by the natural 
liberal rights advocated and popularised among others by John Locke and Thomas Paine, 
Americans hold that rights are individual, universal, and defined in civil and political fields. 
In connection with rights, the state is defined as a necessary evil and legitimised by the 
consent of the people and by its adherence to natural law. Americans also hold that in speech, 
press, and religious freedoms, strict regulations are imposed upon the state. They also reject 
alternative international human rights understanding in the name of conviction on the 
superiority of their own stance. The denial of social and economic rights as human rights can 
be explained in reference to domestic fears of communism in the 1950s. Conversations on the 
topic are thus uni-directional; others are expected to learn and emulate American values. The 
belief in a Manifest Destiny and in the U.S. as a land of liberty and religious freedom 
motivate Americans to a mission of helping others to adopt and enjoy similar human rights 
values. From the 1970s onwards, as a direct result of the power struggle between the 
legislative and executive branches, this mission has been institutionalised as an independent 
American foreign policy interest. 
Chapter Two analyses Vietnamese understanding of human rights and simultaneously 
compares it with American human rights understanding. Like the Americans who responded 
to social and economic rights at the height of the fear of communism, the Vietnamese 
communists conceptualized human rights in the early 1990s amidst the collapse of socialism 
worldwide. However, unlike the Americans, the Vietnamese do not reject political and civil 
rights but attempt to frame those rights and other human rights in a combination of selected 
ideas from natural rights, Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh thoughts, and traditional values. 
For the Vietnamese, human rights reflect a class struggle of the oppressed against the 
exploiters. Accordingly, freedoms are both inherent rights and result from oppression and 
exploitation. The Vietnamese also hold that human rights are contingent on historical, 
traditional, and cultural values and that their implementation also depends on the levels of 
development. Moreover, the Vietnamese human rights conceptualisation entails the unity 
between individual rights and responsibilities, and between individual rights and national 
interests. As far as human rights exchange, the Vietnamese do not reject the possibility to 
learn from others but such exchange is based on their pride of the superiority of socialism 
over capitalism and on the fears of peaceful evolution towards the latter. The chapter suggests 
that although human rights differences between the U.S. and Vietnam are overwhelming and 
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at times to the point of incommensurability, there remains proximities or similarities upon 
which the two countries can build. 
Chapters Three draws a number of conditions for, and indications of, mutual understanding 
based upon Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics [henceforth PH]. At the same time, it 
applies these conditions and indications into a particular U.S. – Vietnam human rights 
dialogue. According to Gadamer, for genuine mutual understanding to occur, interlocutors 
must satisfy a number of conditions: not to find out other’s position or out-argue the other; to 
be led by the truth of the subject matter; be aware that they carry along their own prejudices 
and be ready to suspend their prejudgements when encountering something new and 
different; to put oneself into the other’s perspective; and to be open to the new meaning 
provided by the other. The indications of mutual understanding are categorised into three 
levels, from substantial agreement, to familiarisation with (human right) differences, and to 
attempt to try to understand the other. The application of these conditions and indications to 
the 2006 human rights dialogue [henceforth 2006 HRD] between the U.S and Vietnam shows 
that almost all Gadamerian conditions were not met. It also reveals that the absence of 
substantial mutual understanding on human rights can be explained by interlocutors’ evasive 
and ignorant attitudes and by certain features of diplomacy. However, what the use of 
Gadamer’s PH does not reveal is the impact of power relations and why the interlocutors 
adopted such attitudes in the first place.  
In a similar pattern, Chapter Four extracts genuine understanding conditions and indications 
from Habermas’s TCA and applies them to the 2006 HRD. The Habermasian conditions are 
of double layers. In the first and comprehensive layer, interlocutors adopt not an objectivating 
but a performative attitude; they possess certain knowledge about the objective, social, and 
subjective worlds of the other; they understand certain linguistic expressions in the same 
way; they recognise the other as an equally rational subject, and their dialogue must adhere to 
the principles of equality, inclusiveness, truthfulness, and be free from power constraints. On 
a more specific layer, the speech acts in the dialogue must satisfy three validity claims to 
truth, rightness, and truthfulness so that their conversations are communicative and genuine 
agreement occur. The analysis from a Habermasian perspective brings about more specific 
dialogue results but none of them help to narrow the gap of human rights differences between 
the two countries. It also points to strategic actions as the main reason for that outcome and 
sheds light into diplomacy as both obstacle to, and facilitator of, genuine agreement. The 
analysis in this chapter also suggests that power and developmental asymmetries and the lack 
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of trust are contributing factors to the dialogue outcome. However, like the analysis from 
Gadamer’s perspective, what is unclear is why interlocutors turned to strategic actions in their 
conversation. 
The last chapter sheds light into what remained unclear in the previous chapters. It first 
argues that certain features of diplomacy are conducive to genuine understanding, namely the 
principles of mutual respect, courtesy, and equality whereas some other features prevent the 
interlocutors from reaching genuine agreement. Thus, diplomacy, like the 
incommensurabilities of the U.S. – Vietnam human rights understanding, should not be 
blamed as immediate and direct obstacles to genuine understanding. It then comes to the 
primary argument of the thesis, that is the underlying obstacles are fears and suspicions, 
ethnocentrism, and power imbalances and the gaps in development levels. Combined 
together, these three obstacles distort how each side views the other’s arguments and 
justifications. Any attempt to narrow the differences on human rights understanding between 
the U.S. and Vietnam must take these obstacles into considerations. The chapter then 
articulates this thesis’ theoretical and practical contributions for cross-cultural human rights 
dialogues. 
The main argument of this thesis is that fears and suspicions, ethnocentrism, and imbalances 
of power and developmental level constitute underlying and immediate obstacles to 
American and Vietnamese mutual understanding on human rights. As for the first obstacle, 
Vietnamese fears and American suspicions originated from the Vietnam war legacies and the 
two opposing political systems. The Vietnamese communists are concerned that human rights 
constitute a new battle field for the Americans to undermine socialism in their country, a goal 
that the latter failed to accomplish in the war. Whereas the Americans hold what the 
Vietnamese deem as legitimate restrictions on freedoms of press and religion as cynical 
attempts to cling to power. These fears and suspicions undermine the necessary basic trust 
and goodwill required for a meaningful outcome to eventuate, which are the cause of the 
interlocutors’ evasive and ignorant attitudes and their use of strategic actions in the 2006 
HRD. 
As for the second obstacle, with their convictions on the superiority of their human rights 
values and what the U.S. hold to be their unspoken Manifest Destiny, the Americans judge 
the Vietnamese by their standards, and dictate what Vietnam should and should not do, from 
general advices to specific requests. These advices and requests are interpreted by the 
Vietnamese as interferences into their internal affairs or worse, attempts to subvert the 
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communist regime. And under the impression of being dictated and lectured, the Vietnamese 
again opted for the attitudes of ignorance and disengagement. Finally, while the difference in 
development level dictates that the Vietnamese side has to change, power imbalance provides 
the Americans with the discretion to opt for strategic actions. At the same time, the 
Vietnamese took the U.S. material strength into their appreciation of American values, thus 
they may not appreciate American human rights understanding on its own merits. 
These three obstacles reinforce each other. The power imbalance consolidates Vietnamese 
fears and suspicions whereas the gap of development justifies American ethnocentric 
thinking and determines whose values are deemed superior. At the same time, the 
manifestations of American ethnocentric prejudices further feed Vietnamese fear of an 
unfinished Vietnam war. Consequently, these factors limit the interlocutors’ appreciation on 
any possible valid rationality and truth in the others’ arguments and human rights 
understanding. In this sense, the interlocutors allowed the three obstacles to distort their 
perceptions and understanding of the other. 
Before moving on to the concrete arguments of this thesis, it is necessary to mention what the 
thesis does not cover. This thesis restricts itself to exploring the nature of human rights 
exchanges between the Americans and the Vietnamese. It refrains from investigating whether 
the American or the Vietnamese human rights position is rational or mere propaganda: it is 
up to the parties to agree on what can be counted as rational. Nor does the thesis discuss the 
agents of, and dynamics for, improvements of human rights conditions in Vietnam, although 
its findings are relevant to such improvements. The advocacy networks of human rights 
organisations, which several authors consider agents of changes in human rights, are not yet 
present in Vietnam.
142
 If there are such networks in Vietnam that are unknown to the author 
of this thesis, they are probably closely scrutinised by the security in that country. 
Furthermore, as the thesis discusses human rights dialogues between the two states, only the 
official view and perception of human rights of the U.S. government and those of the 
Vietnamese government will be analysed. The discussion of perceptions of human rights 
advocated by different social groups within the American and Vietnamese societies though 
desirable, does not directly serve the purpose of this thesis. And finally, although Habermas’s 
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and Gadamer’s works are analysed in depth here, the thesis does not aim at testing their 
approaches to understanding inter-state dialogues. To serve its primary goal of studying U.S. 
- Vietnam human rights dialogue, it is necessary to extract from their works the two models 
for a genuine dialogues and analysing U.S. – Vietnam interactions on human rights through 
the prism that these two models provide. 
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Chapter One 
American Understanding of Human Rights 
 
This Chapter has three parts; it first examines the philosophical and historical foundations of 
rights in the U.S. and how liberal ideas have become embedded in the American conception 
of rights. American leading and founding thinkers had well established that rights were 
individualistic, inherent, and universal; defined in the political and civil domain; and upheld 
as individual protections against a necessary but evil state. The chapter then presents the 
exceptional features in the American understanding of rights, focusing on strong protections 
for individuals in the rights to freedom of speech, of press, and religious freedom. It also 
provides an account for the failure to incorporate social and economic rights into American 
human rights understanding. In the second part, the chapter explores American views of 
exchanges on rights with others. On one hand, the Americans believe in their superiority in 
terms of rights: the others are expected to learn from the U.S. model. On the other hand, with 
convictions in their manifest destiny Americans want others to enjoy the same liberties and 
freedoms as they do, by a “leading by example” approach and from the 1970s onwards by 
regarding human rights as an independent interest in planning American foreign policy. The 
third part discusses the instrumentalisation of human rights issue into American foreign 
policy. 
It should be noted here that the chapter does not intend to present all American 
understandings of rights, but only those that seem to be of the most obvious differences to the 
Vietnamese understanding of human rights. The chapter will also not discuss the evolution of 
American understandings of rights in U.S. history. Chronological explanations are used for 
the periods when American perception of rights was most strongly formulated, that is in their 
early days, Revolutionary period, the 1950s, and the 1970s. 
 
I. American understanding of rights 
1. Understandings of rights in American classical liberalism 
Early American understanding of rights was influenced by the adepts of classic liberalism, 
most notably are John Locke and Thomas Paine. The former was one of the most influential 
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thinkers among American intellectuals in the revolutionary period and beyond. The latter 
popularized liberal ideas among the American people. Before discussing their ideas on rights, 
the justifications for the selection of these two thinkers are as followed. 
 
1.1 Why John Locke and Thomas Paine: 
The work of the British philosopher John Locke, one of the most influential thinkers in the 
Enlightenment period, penetrated America in the early 17
th
 century.
143
 The U.S. founding 
father Thomas Jefferson considered Locke one of the three greatest men that had “laid the 
foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and Moral 
sciences.”144 Not only was Jefferson under an “especially strong and extensive” influence of 
Locke, but according to Kevin L. Cope, “most of American intellectuals and self-made men 
at that time, including Benjamin Franklin, were not far behind Jefferson in applauding the 
polymeric Locke.”145 
Tracing back the marks of Locke on American history, one may find his direct involvement 
in the U.S. in colonial time.
146
 But it is his social contract theory in the Two Treatises on Civil 
Government in 1689 that had the most influence on the American revolutionary movement 
and their understanding of human rights. This work, as developed below, had an enormous 
impact on political thought in the colonies and became the main source of reference for the 
revolutionaries’ ideological response to British rule.147 Locke’s theory, as Anne Brown 
observes, continues to be influential in the U.S.; it provides a fundamental point of theoretical 
reference for the writings of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin or Jack Donnelly on rights and 
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“provides a persistent, powerful and deeply embedded set of conceptual linkages for Western 
constructions of human rights and ideals and the rhetoric of political community.”148 
It should be noted that John Locke was not the only proponent of social contract theory. In 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this theory was also developed by Hugo Grotius, 
Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. All of 
them argued that political authority should no longer be the divine right of kings mandated 
from God, but based on an agreement among people. Apart from this, their respective 
versions of social contract theory were distinctively variant.
149
  
However, John Locke’s story of social contract was the most appealing to the early 
Americans, as other versions seem to be incompatible with the needs of American colonists 
at that time. Grotius had equated natural rights with life, body, freedom, and honor, a list that 
according to Lynn Hunt, “seemed to call slavery, in particular, into question.” Pufendorf did 
not advocate so much “rights of man but those social duties ‘which render him capable of 
society (sociabilis) with other men.’”150 And Thomas Hobbes whose work was also well 
known in the British North American colonies would suggest that the Americans surrender 
all their natural rights except that of self-defense in return for the protection of the sovereign, 
in order to avoid the “war of all against all.”151 On his part, Locke defined natural rights as 
life, liberty, and estate; thus he did not challenge slavery. He even justified slavery for 
captives taken in a just war and proposed legislation to ensure that “every freeman of 
Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves.”152 And Locke’s idea 
of universal rights brought change in American discourse of rights from focusing on 
particular rights of freeborn English-man in the first half of the eighteenth century to 
universally applicable rights in the 1770s.
153
 This change, as Lynn Hunt explains, is because 
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in their attempt to establish a new, separate country, the colonists could not rely on the 
particular rights of freeborn Englishmen, “otherwise, they were looking at reform, not 
independence” whereas Locke’s theory promoted the image of breaking with British 
sovereignty.”154 It could be argued that Locke’s social contract was the right political theory 
for the advocates of independence in America: it justifies their war for independence from 
Britain, and allows them to leave the slavery issue aside.
155
 
Early in 1776, Thomas Paine wrote the pamphlet Common Sense that criticized Britain’s 
Constitution, the royal powers and hereditary succession, and was an enthusiastic call for 
American independence. Echoing Locke, Paine argued that it was an American natural right 
to form their own government, “[a] government of our own is our natural right.”156 And this 
government, for Paine, is founded by reasoning the common interest of society and the 
common rights of man. This type of government, for Paine, is in sharp contrast to the other 
two types of government: priest craft founded by superstition and conquerors by power. He 
also argued that the first “is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and 
the only principle on which they have a right to exist.”157 As Craig Nelson observes, a “key to 
the great popularity and influence” of Common Sense was Paine’s insistence that the 
legitimacy of this last mode of government would ensure a final victory for the Americans 
against the greatest military power of that time.
158
 Combined with his plain arguments and a 
straight forward manner, Paine had popularized ideas associated with social contract theory 
among the average readers.
159
 His pamphlet sold over 100,000 copies in only a few months 
and “helped build support for the idea of independence in the early months of 1776.”160 Paine 
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may have died in poverty because he relinquished the rights to his publications,
161
 but his 
writings had helped to bring these ideas to the general public in early America. 
 
1.2 The philosophy and conceptualization of American rights understanding 
The social contract theory of Locke and Paine starts with a state of nature where people are 
born and live in freedom and equality. In this state, Locke argues that everyone is free to 
“order their actions,” “dispose of his person or possessions … without asking leave, or 
depending upon the will of any other man.”162 Paine categorizes rights into the rights to 
“liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression” (the “intellectual rights or rights of 
the mind” and religious freedom might be within the scope of the right to liberty) and 
contends that these rights “are those which appertain to man in right of his existence.”163 Yet 
freedom and liberty, Locke argues, are not totally out of control as people live “within the 
bounds of the law of nature;” for example, no one has “the liberty to destroy himself” or the 
right to harm another in his “life, health, liberty or possessions.”164 This law, Locke explains, 
is a law of reason, thus intelligible and plain to a rational creature, as people have reason so 
they can consult it.  
The problem with the state of nature, Locke points out, is its insecure environment. 
Following his theory, in the state of nature, as everyone is rational and equal, everyone can 
punish and seek reparation from those who transgressed his rights.
165
 Consequently, man is 
exposed to the “irregular and uncertain exercise of the power everyman has of punishing the 
transgressions of others,” and his enjoyment of natural rights “is very uncertain, and 
constantly exposed to the invasion of others.” Such inconveniencies, Locke argues, force man 
to seek and join some form of society to preserve his life, liberty, and estate.
166
  
In joining a society or political community, man signs a ‘contract’ in which he consents to 
give up part of his state of nature’s liberty in exchange for security and protection from that 
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society or state. For Locke, both the legislative and executive power of governments originate 
from this contract, “no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not 
freely consented to it.”167 In other words, a government maintains its legitimacy by the 
consent of the people. It follows that if a government cannot fulfill the obligations that its 
people expect, it will lose their trust and they will have the right to rebel against it. And in 
rebellions, a strict reading of Locke’s social contract theory would state that “it is not the 
people who rebel against the government, because those who formerly had authority are no 
longer the people’s government, rather, it is the former governors who rebel against the 
people, in that they attempt to retain by force power which is no longer rightfully theirs.”168 
Paine adds that the source of all sovereignty comes not from “any Individual, or Any Body 
Of Men” but from the whole nation and that “the end of all political associations is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.”169 
In the process of forming a political society, Locke acknowledges that unanimous consent 
cannot always be attained as a minority may have different views. In such case, for Locke the 
majority rules as “by the law of nature and reason” the majority has “the power of the 
whole.”170 Following Locke, those in minority then have two choices: either stay in that 
political society and accept the will of the majority or leave it and return to the state of nature. 
Several implications can be derived from this social contract theory. First, it starts with and 
centers on the individual. As Anne Brown observes, Lockean theory leads to “a radical 
assertion of individuality,” as it imagines an idealized subject who is “individual, 
autonomous, and disembodied from social context.” The subject is autonomous because “his 
interest, value, and rationality” are “naturally equipped” and “cast as prior to and independent 
of questions of power and political community.”171 Thus, people’s being and accordingly 
their rights are independent of their particular environment and circumstance. At the same 
time, it is the individuals who form and are able to break up a society thanks to all their 
naturally endowed rationality. As such, society is nothing but a collection of individuals who 
agree to live with each other under an imagined social contract. Conceptualizing the relation 
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between individual and society in this way, the former has no responsibility towards the 
latter. As Paine contends, “society grants him [man after entering a society] nothing … [as] 
every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual.”172 
Second, it follows that in this theory human rights become universal. Brown rightly observes 
that “for the story of the contract, human rights are rooted in the citizen’s universal nature. 
They are given shape or articulated, however, by the process by which he enters the 
sovereign state and which binds him to his fellows…. Thus rights are the definition and 
expression of the universal subject as he enters the political order.”173 In other words, people 
everywhere form their communities in the same pattern: their natural inherent rights are all 
that they have to enter or form their own societies. 
Third, this narration of how society forms allows rights to be defined within civil and 
political domain only. As Brown argues, in Locke’s theory, economic and power relations 
(i.e. rich-poor gap, or the way the economy is organized) are excluded from the zone of the 
state, resulting the priority of political rights over economic rights and the irrelevance of 
economic issues when discussing about rights.”174 Perhaps Locke and Paine’ only economic 
related concerns are property right and the freedom from state’s economic intervention. 
Accordingly, social and economic rights as stipulated in the ICESCR cannot be counted as 
rights in the American traditional conceptualization of human rights. I will return to the 
American response to these rights in the final section of this part. 
Fourth and drawing from the previous point, state is a necessary evil and subjected to natural 
law. With no responsibility to the wellbeing of its people, a Lockean state is depicted in a 
negative sense, for example as something to prevent men from exercising excessive 
punishment against the transgressors of their rights. Paine makes clear this depiction in his 
Common Sense. Society and government, he wrote: 
are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our 
wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our 
happiness POSITIVELY by uniting our affections, the latter NEGATIVELY 
by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates 
distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher. Society in every state is 
a blessing, but Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil.
175
 
                                                          
172
 Thomas Paine, op. cit., It should be noted that for Paine, the distinction between natural right and civil right 
is not very clear. What Paine wanted to emphasize here was that natural rights were the origin of all civil rights. 
173
 Ibid., p. 28. 
174
 M. Anne Brown, op. cit., p. 29. 
175
 Thomas Paine, The Common Sense, this can be found at 
http://www.ushistory.org/paine/commonsense/singlehtml.htm, accessed on 10 October, 2012. 
54 
 
For Paine, the state is necessary because it is required to punish those who violate others’ 
legitimate rights. In this way, the state’s function is only to ensure security and order whereas 
the provisions of other human needs, i.e. subsistence is beyond its responsibility.
176
 
Translated this into modern terms, the state should only provide political and civil rights, 
whereas the provisions of social, economic, and cultural rights should be the responsibility of 
the citizens themselves. At the same time, the state is evil because by restraining and 
punishing people’s vices, it has already violated people’s natural rights. This is why the state 
should act within the mandates given to it by the people. And this is why the state should 
always be guarded against potential abuse of its mandated power. 
Besides the limitations of not exceeding the power granted by its citizens, a Lockean state is 
also limited by the law of nature. For Locke “the obligations of the law of nature cease not in 
society,” but “the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as 
others,”177 and “nobody, no power, can exempt from the obligations of that eternal law.”178 
Accordingly, the state cannot just do as it pleases and its positive laws must be “conformable 
to the laws of nature.”179 If Locke joined the contemporary debate on the relation between 
individual rights and state’s sovereign rights, he would definitely be a steady advocate for the 
supremacy of the former over the latter. A Lockean view would argue that whoever violated 
natural human rights in the name of sovereign rights have already violated the ultimate law of 
nature; if they are the rulers, the legitimacy of their rulings must be challenged. 
In summary, John Locke’s social contract theory provides appealing “truths” for the 
Americans: human rights are individual rights, and inherent in human beings, natural and 
universal; the state is a necessary evil that acts within the authorities mandated by its citizen 
and the law of nature; and rights political and civil while social and economic rights are not 
human rights. The next section examines how these ideas were codified and institutionalized. 
 
1.3 The codification of U.S. understanding of rights into her historical documents: 
The Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights 
are among those that laid the foundation of the nation, and are the bedrock of American 
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conception of rights. The Virginia Declaration of Rights was drafted by the delegate from 
Fairfax County George Mason and submitted to the Virginia Fifth Convention in May 1776 
when the sentiment toward independence in the colonies grew high. The Declaration for 
Independence was drafted by Thomas Jefferson, who mainly drew from his own draft 
preamble to the Virginia Constitution and George Mason’s draft of Declaration of Rights.180 
And the Bill of Rights was introduced as a compromise for the adoption of the constitution by 
all the thirteen states. Although the American Constitution was signed in September 1787, its 
critics including well-established characters such as George Mason, Samuel Adams, and 
Patrick Henry
181
 who were worried that the Constitution “seemed interested solely in 
safeguarding the rights of property,” made no reference to the natural rights of the people, 
and would “wield dictatorial powers, favor the ‘well born’ over the common people, and 
abolish individual liberty.”182 These concerns brought seven out of thirteen states to adopt the 
Constitution in May 1790 “only on the virtual promise that it would be amended to protect 
the ‘rights of man.”183 The first Congress submitted twelve amendments to the states, ten of 
which were ratified by the states by the end of 1791, becoming known as the Bill of Rights. 
In meeting these concerns, the Bill of Rights officially codifies and safeguards fundamental 
individual rights against the infringement of the state. 
The radical philosophy of John Locke and Thomas Paine was eloquently present in the first 
two documents. Consider these lines: 
On natural rights 
All men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent 
rights, of which, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; 
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and 
possessing property. (Virginia’s Declaration of Rights) 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. (Declaration for Independence) 
On the origin and power of government 
Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and 
security, of the people. (Virginia’s Declaration of Rights) 
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That to secure these [unalienable] rights, Governments are instituted among Men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed (Declaration for 
Independence) 
All power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people. All power of 
suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority without consent of the 
representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be 
exercised. (Virginia’s Declaration of Rights) 
On the justification for revolution 
Whenever any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, 
a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible 
right, to reform, alter, or abolish it. (Virginia’s Declaration of Rights)184  
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, 
laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as 
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. (Declaration 
for Independence)
185
 
In the Bill of Rights, the rights appear in the following order: the right to enjoy freedom of 
religion, speech, press, and assembly; keep and bear arms; refuse to house soldiers in private 
homes; be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures; refuse to testify against oneself, 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; enjoy a fair, speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury; and be protected against excessive fines or cruel and unusual 
punishment.
186
 Among these rights, the freedoms of speech, press freedom and religious 
freedom are discussed in details below for two reasons: they are obvious American 
divergences from other democracies and have always remained the contested issues in U.S. – 
Vietnam human rights encounters. 
 
2. The exceptional features of American understanding of rights 
2.1 Freedom of speech 
The U.S. differs from other liberal democracies and “an emerging multinational consensus” 
in their understanding of the entire domain of freedom of expression, most notably in hate 
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speech, racial insults, and defamation.
187
 American courts establish strict conditions for 
prohibiting those acts and are more protective of speakers’ rights and a typical case for this is 
the Brandenburg v. Ohio. In a rally with Ku Klux Klan members in southern Ohio in 1969, 
local leader Clarence Brandenburg made speeches conveying racist and anti-Semitic 
statements and warned of taking “revengeance” acts against African Americans and Jews, “if 
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian 
race.”188 Ohio’s courts convicted him of violating the state’s criminal syndicalism statute, 
which prohibited advocating “the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, 
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing…political reform.”189 
However, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed this conviction by holding that a 
state can only forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation when “such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”190 The Brandenburg case, as Schauer explained,  
stands for the proposition that restrictions on the incitement of racial hatred can be 
countenanced… only when they are incitements to violent racial hatred, and even then 
only under the rare circumstances in which the incitements unmistakably call for 
immediate violent action, and even then only under the more rare still circumstances in 
which members of the listening audience are in fact likely immediately to act upon the 
speaker’s suggestion.191  
In other words, for a hate speech or racial insult to be outlawed, it should meet all three strict 
conditions: inciting violent racial hatred, producing imminent lawless action, and the 
audience’s likeliness to act immediately upon the speaker’s suggestion. Brandenburg 
therefore could not be convicted because his speech, though advocating the use of force, was 
not deemed to produce imminent lawless action and his audience to be unlikely to produce 
such action. In a similar vein, for Americans, a person calling for political reforms or even 
regime change can only be outlawed if her speech incites violence, produces lawless action, 
and her audience acting immediately at her suggestions. If one of these conditions is not met, 
any state action against her because of her speech is a violation of her freedom of expression.  
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As for defamation, American courts also make it very difficult, even impossible to sanction 
the speakers. Since the case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964, the Supreme Court has 
been of the view that actions for libel (written) and slander (spoken) “could succeed only 
upon proof by clear and convincing evidence….of intentional falsity.”192 For example, in 
order to win a law suit against a publisher for libel or slander, a plaintiff in the U.S. needs to 
prove that the information publicized by the publisher is both false and despite having known 
beforehand the falsity of that information, the defendant still intentionally published it - a 
burden of proof, as Schauer assesses, “almost impossible to meet.”193 Schauer also notes that 
this case marks the American departure from the common law world tradition, in which the 
plaintiff only needs to prove that the defendant had uttered or published words “tending to 
injure the alleged victim’s reputation” “by a bare preponderance of the evidence.”194 
Consequently, several acts sanctioned in other liberal countries could not be prohibited in the 
U.S. There are abundant examples for those acts, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s accusing Jews 
of exaggerating the Holocaust, Brigitte Bardot’s crusading against Islam and urging the 
deportation of those of Arab ethnicity in France, or Ernst Zundel and James Keegstra’s 
denying the Holocaust in Canada;
195
 or in a more recent case, an anti-Islam movie posted in 
YouTube in September 2012 causing violent protests against the U.S. in so many Muslim 
countries that the Obama’s administration had to condemn the film.196 However, the film 
alleged producer Nakoula Basseley Nakoula could not be prosecuted for defaming Allah and 
was only investigated for violating his terms of release after pleading guilty to bank fraud in 
2010.
197
 No charge could be brought against him on the film only. 
According to Schauer, there are several reasons for the lack of practical restrictions on 
freedom of expression. Among them is the preference for liberty over community values: on 
issues “in which the preferences of individuals may be in tension with the needs of the 
collective,” Schauer argues, “the United States, increasingly alone, stands as a symbol for a 
certain kind of preference for liberty even when it conflicts with values of equality and 
…important community values.” Another reason is a libertarian culture of distrusting the 
government “reliably to distinguish the good from the bad, the true from the false, and the 
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sound from the unsounds… It is for neither the government nor the courts, for example, to 
decide that Nazi ideas are dangerous or that the views of the Ku Klux Klan are as wrong as 
they are pernicious.” Therefore, in a defamation case the Supreme Court had ruled that 
“under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea.”198 Schauer also observes 
that in other constitutional democracies the inquiry for sanctioning speakers’ rights will 
question whether a restriction is reasonable, necessary, or most commonly, “proportional in 
light of the importance of the restriction and the extent of the free expression interest that is 
restricted.” An American inquiry of this kind, however, will first consider if the act is within 
the First Amendment’s purview, and if it is, then a number of First Amendment rules will be 
selected to apply for that particular case.
199
 A judicial inquiry would thus focus on whether 
such a restriction is a violation of the First Amendment and ignore any discussion of the 
proportional importance or necessity of such a restriction.  
Some observations are drawn from the above discussion. For the Americans a call for 
political change or even subversion or a defamation of highly dignified individuals (such as 
American founding fathers) cannot be punished. At the same time, restrictions on freedom of 
expression for reasons of advocating wrong ideas, or going against the traditional and cultural 
values, or for proportional necessity cannot be justified in American view. This strong 
support for freedom of speech at the expense of the common good is in sharp contrast to 
Vietnamese view on this freedom.
200
 
 
2.2 Press freedom 
With the limited restraints on freedom of expression, it can be expected that freedom of the 
press would also be well protected in the U.S. According to Lee C. Bollinger, the “central 
image” that was confirmed by the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in the New York Times v. 
Sullivan case is as follows: 
In the United States the government is forbidden by virtue of the First 
Amendment from censoring or punishing the press for what it chooses to say. The 
press is not licensed, as it was in seventeenth-century England. It need not clear 
with the government what it proposes to publish. And, except under very limited 
circumstances, the government may not punish the press for what it has said. 
Libel, invasions of privacy, extraordinary threats to national security, and a few 
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other justifications may permit government to limit press freedom, but these 
circumstances are limited and crutinized closely by the courts. It is, indeed, the 
function of the courts to protect press freedom against government interference 
and to decide when those rare instances arise. The principal justification for this 
manner of organizing society is the necessity of a free press in a democratic 
political system. Without it the public cannot receive all the information it needs – 
about government actions or public issues – to exercise its sovereign press.201 
In other words, in the U.S. press is free and independent from the state; it does not need to 
register with the state to operate nor state’s approval for what it proposes to publish, except 
for certain rare exceptions for prior restraints.
202
 And this freedom is crystallized in the 
Constitution and protected by the Supreme Court, in order to provide the people with all 
information about government actions and any other issues. Under this understanding, press 
is conceptualized as a tool of the people to keep the government in check. Although Bollinger 
points out that although there had been “extensive government intervention through a 
regulatory system” during most of the XXth century, the dominating idea in the U.S. is that 
American press enjoy an autonomous position to watch over the government for the sake of 
the people.
203
 
 
2.3 Religious freedom 
In a similar vein, there is a dominating narration on American religious freedom. What has 
been “so ingrained in American consciousness” and becomes “an orthodoxy of sorts,” as 
Sehat observes, is the narration that the United States is “a land of liberty born from a desire 
for religious freedom;” and “religious liberty … is a hallmark of American democracy.” 
Having been separated from the state, the story goes, “religion has flourished in the United 
States [and] [i]t became central to reform movements … that sought to perfect the American 
project by expanding democracy.”204 In other words, even though there has always been a 
wall of separation between church and state along American history, liberty of conscience is 
well respected and protected in the U.S. 
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Evidence abounds to support this understanding: religious freedom is protected in both the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, even though, as Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore 
note, “God and Christianity are nowhere to be found in the American Constitution.”205 It was 
the American founding fathers Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, according to Eisgruber 
and Sager, who set themselves against religious persecution and intolerance. And religious 
freedom receives a “lavish treatment in the Constitution” when it makes room for declaring 
unconstitutional “prohibitions on the free exercise of religion” as well as laws “respecting the 
establishment of religion” and “requiring religious oaths as a condition of public office.”206 
Mitt Romney, in a speech at the 2008 presidential primaries, claimed that the U.S. has a 
grand tradition of religious tolerance and liberty which is “fundamental to America's 
greatness.” Freedom and religion required each other, he argues, the two “endure together, or 
perish alone.”207 And the current American President Barack Obama recently proclaimed 
January 16, 2014 as American Religious Freedom day to celebrated the American legacy of 
religious liberty which, for him, was affirmed by the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom 
in 1786.
208
 
However, others argue that this understanding ignores certain facts and thus rests more on 
myths.
209
 Sehat points out that for nearly one century and a half following its ratifications, the 
First Amendment “had no effect on the protection of religious belief or non-belief,” given the 
Supreme Court consistent ruling since 1833 that the Bill did not apply to the states, leaving 
the states “free to prosecute for blasphemy and otherwise constrain religious belief in any 
way they saw fit” and “enormous reservoir of power to regulate …. the morals of its 
residents, and religious partisans drew from this source to imprint their moral ideals onto 
state constitutions and judicial opinions.”210 Thus, behind the myth of religious freedom as an 
exceptional liberty, “stood the reality of religious control, which worked through much of 
U.S. history to coerce rather than to persuade citizens to behave according to religious 
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norms.”211 Craycraft goes as far as claiming that the belief in religious freedom in the U.S. is 
like that in witches and unicorns.
212
 
What is important, in terms of American understanding of their rights, is not much the factual 
inadequacies of these founding myths, but how the myths are used. Internally, they provide 
the grounding for American values and how the U.S. as a political community came into 
being; in other words, they “provide the foundation of the civic identity of the American 
people.”213 Moreover, they also generate domestic expectations of American exceptionalism 
– the “self-image of an exceptional people who stand for freedom around the world” – which 
any President must factor in when formulating U.S. foreign policy.
214
 The three freedoms 
discussed on this sub-section are the items that the U.S. strongly emphasizes in its human 
rights agenda for Vietnam. The next section examines American views on exchanges on 
rights understanding with others. 
 
3. The failure to incorporate economic and social rights into American understanding of 
rights 
The economic rights discussed in this section means those rights that have been crystalized in 
the ICESCR, not American rights to property and to be free of government interventions. 
Unlike many other rights in international laws that have been rejected or nullified by the U.S. 
governments, economic and social rights stand out as a curious case as they were advocated 
to American public by president Franklin D. Roosevelt. Taking office in March 1933, 
Roosevelt faced with the nation’s “utter collapse of the economic life” and social unrest.215 
Roosevelt’s administration quickly proposed and enforced the New Deal, a number of 
legislative acts that greatly extended government’s intervention and participation in the 
economy, strengthened and protected labor rights to bargain collectively, and provided 
economic and social benefits and public assistance for the neediest citizens. The New Deal 
                                                          
211
 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
212
 Craycraft, op. cit., p. 27. 
213
 Sehat, op. cit., p. 7. 
214
 Forsythe, David P., “Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Two Levels, Two Worlds,” Political Studies, 
Volume 43, Issue 1, 01/1995, p. 111. 
215
 Faulkner, op. cit., p. 857. As Faulkner describes, “Business had sunk to 60 per cent of normal; exports were 
close to the lowest point in thirty years; unemployment was estimated at from 13,000,000 to 17,000,000. Over 
1400 banks had failed during 1932…”, Ibid. The economic hardships affected all American social strata, 
especially the socially marginalized and racially discriminated. Separate protests by farmers and veterans broke 
out in summer 1932 and in the second incident, the military was called in to quell tens of thousands of World 
War I veterans demanding for their immediate bonus payments out of Washington D.C, see Brinkley, Allan, op. 
cit., pp. 651-76 for more details. 
63 
 
won popular support and earned Roosevelt a second term in office.
216
 But it was not without 
criticism; as Faulkner observed, many vehemently charged that “the general philosophy and 
tendency of the New Deal was considered foreign to American traditions,” in other words, it 
was “breaking down free enterprise and moving toward socialism.”217 
In defending the spirit of the New Deal at the Democratic convention that nominated 
Roosevelt as the party’s presidential candidate in 1936, Roosevelt argued that although the 
constitutional framers were concerned only with political rights, new circumstances required 
the recognition of economic rights as “freedom is no half-and-half affair.”218 Later, in 
addressing Congress on January 6, 1941, Roosevelt discussed “four essential human 
freedoms” namely freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom 
from fear of foreign aggression.
219
 The first two freedoms were traditional individual rights in 
the U.S. whereas the two remaining ones were new in two senses. First, freedom from want 
falls into the economic sphere; second, both the last two freedoms are the responsibility of 
nations, not individuals. It is here that he extended the American concept of rights beyond 
traditional rights; for Roosevelt, economic and collective rights were also essential human 
rights. The expected goals for American internal human rights policy, Roosevelt specified, 
were “a wider and constantly rising standard of living,” “old-age pensions and unemployment 
insurance,” and “adequate medical care.”220 
Three years later, Roosevelt attempted to get his economic and social rights implemented by 
the Congress in his State of the Union Address. Reminding American Congressmen and 
Senators of “certain inalienable political rights” under which the U.S. “had its beginning, and 
grew to its present strength”, Roosevelt persuasively argued, “[w]e have come to a clearer 
realization of the fact, however, that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not free men.’ People who are hungry, 
people who are out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.” He then suggested, 
“we have accepted, so to speak, a Second Bill of Rights” and named a series of rights which 
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can be categorized into today’s social and economic rights.221 Arguing that implementing 
these rights was the continuation of the war effort, Roosevelt asked Congress to explore the 
means for realizing this economic bill of rights. In the event that Congress failed to do so, 
Roosevelt expressed his conviction that the American people would be “conscious of the 
fact” about these rights.222 
Such consciousness of social and economic rights lasted for some time in the U.S., as 
evidenced at least in the Supreme Court’s interpretations. In reviewing several cases by the 
Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s, Sunstein observed that the Court had signaled a 
“willingness to consider the possibility that some constitutional provision would grant a right 
to subsistence;” however, this “serious and partially successful effort…to interpret the 
existing Constitution to create social and economic guarantees” was cut off in early 1970s 
after Nixon won the presidential election.
223
 
The Americans came close to the recognition of social and economic rights again when 
President Carter signed both the ICCPR and the ICESCR in October 1977 and sent them to 
the Senate for approval.
224
 His Directive in February 1978 stated that the last objectives of the 
U.S. human rights policy, in the order of priority, was to “promote basic economic and social 
rights.”225 In line with this Directive, later in that year US Ambassador to the United Nations 
Andrew Young stated at the UN General Assembly that civil and political rights were of 
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secondary importance to people threatened by starvation, thus poverty was the gravest 
obstacle to the global protection of human rights.
226
 
But the venture for economic rights stopped there. In the second half of Carter’s term, his 
administration “generally shied away from an evaluation of the socio-economic background 
of human rights violations.”227 This is partly because objections to social and economic rights 
existed even at the beginning of Carter’s term. In the drafting process of the President’s Notre 
Dame speech in 1977, his speech writer Griffin commented that the line “[n]o one forced to 
live in poverty, hunger and sickness can be really free” was “an unapproved broadening of 
the administration’s human rights concept.” Employment, shelter, and health, in his words, 
“are human needs, but they are not thereby human rights” and “to lump them together is 
muddled thinking;” thus “let’s keep human rights to mean human rights, and find another 
label for economic and social progress.”228 
The Reagan administration flatly denied social and economic rights as human rights. In the 
early days of Reagan’s administration, a leaked internal memorandum of the Department of 
State on human rights policy defined human rights as “meaning political rights and civil 
liberties” and urged the administration to move away from human rights as a term and instead 
to speak of individual rights, political rights and civil liberties. This strategy of simply 
defining economic rights out of existence, observed Alston, led to the deletion of sections 
dealing with “economic and social rights” in the first draft of the State Department’s annual 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. According to Alston, “after 1986, the language 
of rejection became even more straightforward and unquestionably consistent;” officials from 
the State Department often inserted “so-called” in front of the full phrase, and stated that the 
claim that economic and social rights constituted human rights was the first among a number 
of “myths” about human rights.229 
The question is, why the second generation of human rights, ratified by almost all nations, 
has been rejected in the U.S.
230
 There is not enough space to answer this question here and 
doing so is not the main purpose of this Chapter. However, a brief review of the arguments 
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against those rights and the debate on this issue is necessary to shed light into American 
understandings of social and economic rights. 
Opposition to social and economic rights and in fact international human rights treaties in 
general was led by members of the American Bar Association (ABA), an influential 
association of American lawyers. According to Kaufman, the ABA played a crucial role in 
the story of the opposition to human rights treaties: its reports were widely quoted as 
authoritative during Senate hearings on the treaties, and major arguments against the treaties 
were first outlined in its addressing to the public.
231
 The typology of its arguments against the 
treaties, Kaufman argues, can be categorized as fears of the dangers at home and abroad. 
Domestically, opponents of international human rights treaties raised the threats of 
weakening the constitutional system, including the loss of basic American rights, of 
deteriorating U.S. sovereignty, and of abrogating the states’ rights by the federal government. 
Internationally, they elaborated the dangers of the advancement of communism and the 
increase of Soviet influence, and the promotion of world government.
232
 
For example, ABA President Frank Holman argued in 1948 that, “the basic theory and 
language of a bill of rights, as heretofore recognized by Americans, is to impose a restraint 
upon government from denying to the citizens certain basic rights.” The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, he charged, “constitute[d] an agreement to adopt the ‘New 
Deal’ on an international scale” and “imposed so-called economic and social duties upon 
government, the fulfillment of which will require a planned economy and a control by 
government of individual action. This program, if adopted and approved by the member 
nation, will promote state socialism, if not communism, throughout the world.”233 Another 
example is the 1979 Senate hearings on ICESCR. Ideological opponents of the Covenant 
portrayed it as an “intrinsically un-American enterprise.” The Covenant, one witness argued, 
“is largely a document of collectivist inspiration, alien in spirit and philosophy to the 
principles of a free economy.” Other stated that the “Covenant is a socialist blue-print that 
encourages open-ended unlimited government meddling of the sort on which dictatorships 
thrive.”234 
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Several scholars now refute the validity of these arguments and argue that the underlying 
reasons are contextual. Philip Alston wrote in 1990 that, “it is now generally agreed that there 
is no fundamental incompatibility between the latter [ICESCR] and the U.S. law.”235 The 
concept of economic, social and cultural right is not necessarily incompatible with the 
philosophy of the American people, he concludes, rather the rejection of such a concept was 
“largely motivated by the desire to ensure consistency with a compatible domestic 
agenda.”236 Likewise, Sunstein argues that the absence of economic and social rights in 
American constitution cannot be satisfactorily explained by chronological, institutional, and 
cultural reasons. For Sustein, the correct explanation is a realist one: the victory of Nixon in 
1968 “reflected large-scale social forces” that “included antipathy to social and economic 
guarantees.”237 Whereas Kaufman argues that the Senate’s opposition to social and economic 
rights originated from fears in the 1950s - the fear of communism abroad and at home, and 
the general fear of change in the American political, economic systems and traditional way of 
life.
238
 
Indeed, subsequent events after the Second World War nourished this fear. Abroad, the 
success of Soviet nuclear test and the “loss” of China in 1949, and the stalemate of Korean 
War (1950 - 1953) all increased the sense of insecurity about America’s position in the world. 
At home, the investigations of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Loyalty 
Program initiated by the Truman administration, the trial of Alger Hiss, the McCarran Act, 
the Rosenberg case, and the rise of McCarthyism, all combined to a growing fear of internal 
communist subversion that “reached the point of near hysteria” by the early 1950s.239 The 
American administration and Congress in the 1950s made use of those fears to promote their 
own agendas. In order to win over supports for American economic and military 
commitments abroad, especially from conservatives with their traditional position of 
isolationism, the Truman administration raised the fear of Soviet threat.
240
 In Congress, 
Senator John W. Bricker proposed a series of amendments to the United States Constitution 
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that would have placed restrictions on the President’s power to conclude executive 
agreements with his openly stated purpose of “bury[ing] the so-called covenant on human 
rights so deep that no one holding high public office will ever dare to attempt its 
resurrection.”241 The fate of ICESCR was thus politicized and marginalized. 
In summary, fear of communism in the Cold War had distorted American understanding of 
rights and led, without legitimate justifications, to the rejection of American home-made 
product: social and economic rights. This fear also helped to establish the belief that 
international understandings of human rights were dangerous to the U.S. The second part of 
this Chapter discusses American views on human rights exchanges with the other.  
 
II. American views of self-other relations in terms of rights 
1. External influence on American human rights understanding 
In their encounters with human rights understandings in other countries and in international 
human rights treaties, the Americans hold an attitude of resistance or even rejection. This can 
be demonstrated in the U.S. consistent rejection of these treaties. It has not ratified many 
important treaties, such as CEDAW (discrimination against women), CROC (the rights of a 
child), and ICESCR.
242
 For the few that the U.S. has signed and ratified, it has made many 
reservations, understandings and declarations (RUD) to make its participation in those 
treaties, as Kenneth Roth describes, “a purely cosmetic gesture.”243 For example, in ratifying 
the ICCPR, the U.S. attached an unprecedented number of RUDs,
244
 among which are those 
on capital punishment for crimes committed by persons under eighteen years of age. This has 
been criticized by several Covenant parties and the Human Rights Commission as 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant and invalid to the point of 
jeopardizing the American status as a signatory to the Covenant.
245
 Likewise, the U.S. has 
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signed the Race Convention with reservations that seems “designed ... to resist change in 
United States law.”246 
According to Louis Henkin, these RUDs are guided by the following “principles:” the U.S. 
will not undertake any treaty obligation if it is inconsistent with the United States 
Constitution; U.S. adherence to an international human rights should not modify existing U.S. 
law or practice; the U.S. will not submit to the jurisdiction of external tribunals; the U.S. will 
exclude any international obligation as to matters subject to the jurisdiction of the states; and 
every international human rights convention is non-self-executing. This last principle means 
that after Senate consent and the U.S. ratification, a treaty will not automatically become law 
but is required to go to the Senate again and the House for implementing legislation.
247
 After 
being signed by the U.S. government and before being sent to the Congress, a treaty will be 
sent to Justice Department lawyers who would then look for and draft RUDs to negate any 
additional rights protection by that treaty. And yet, implementing legislations are unnecessary 
as all rights in such treaty with RUDs are already protected by U.S. law.
248
 These principles 
and procedures thus are created to ensure that no changes shall be expected from the 
American side in their human rights interaction with the others. 
There have been several explanations for this rejection of international human rights treaties. 
From the case study of the social and economic rights above, one may think of the fears of 
communist threats in the 1950s. However, this kind of fear cannot be used to justify for 
American objection of almost all other international human rights documents. Other possible 
concerns are for sovereignty and for the “integrity” of American legal system in terms of 
stability, continuity, and legitimacy before too liberal an international understanding of 
human rights.
249
 There was also the view that the U.S. Constitution and political institutions 
are “sacred symbols” of the nation, or a long-standing American belief in “popular 
sovereignty” and “local governments” resulting in opposition to centralized judicial norms, or 
an American rights culture of negative individual liberties with a limited government.
250
 
Others like Andrew Moravcsik seek answers in a combination of empirical factors: the status 
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of a great power, a stable democracy and judicial review, the opposition of conservative 
constituents, and the fragmented nature of American political institutions resulting in a great 
number of those who can impede or block a particular government action.
251
 
In a way, all other signatories of international human rights covenants or treaties have their 
own distinctive legal systems and cultures and the conservative forces that are dynamics in 
preserving their traditional values. The question is why the U.S. stands out in the rejection of 
human rights treaties. Besides its status of a super power, there is another possible reason. 
What seem to underlie many, if not all, of American justifications for its rejections of 
international human rights covenants is the assumption in the superiority of American values 
over the others’. A good example here is the resistance to the Genocide Convention. Consider 
Senator George’s comments on the Genocide Convention, 
I don’t think the peoples of the earth are in any position where they can tell this great 
people on morals, politics and religion, how they should live. I still feel that we are ahead 
of them in that respect, and I would hate to bind ourselves… I am not in favor of leaving 
it [mass murder] to the interpretation of nations who have been indulging for centuries in 
just such a thing, and they have been occurring at every drop of the hat.252  
What Senator George claims here is that the U.S. is well “ahead” of those who signed this 
convention on the issue of genocide; therefore it is unquestionably absurd for the latter to tell 
the Americans how they should live. Kaufman observes that conservatives’ criticisms against 
this Convention were founded on a “strong belief in the superiority of the United States.”253  
Indeed, American superiority and exceptionalism have been used by several Americans to 
justify American noncompliance with other international human rights treaties. For example, 
Jack Goldsmith argues that the incorporation of ICCPR “would bring significant costs and 
very few benefits,” adding that, those who claim that “the United States’ resistance to 
incorporation of human rights treaties has the same significance as similar practices by China 
and Iran,” have been “falling into absurd legal formalisms.”254 For him, the U.S. cannot be 
compared with such countries as China and Iran as the former is far ahead of the latter, 
notably on the issue of human rights. Further, American judges, Ignatieff observes, are 
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resistant to using foreign human rights precedents to guide them in their domestic opinions. 
And this judicial attitude “is anchored in a broad popular sentiment that the land of Jefferson 
and Lincoln has nothing to learn about rights from any other country;” consequently, “the 
legal trade in understanding continues to be mostly one-way, with the U.S. legal tradition 
teaching others but not learning much itself.”255  
In sum, many Americans hold the conviction that the U.S. has nothing to learn from ‘the 
other’ as it is morally superior and well ahead of others, both authoritarian and democratic 
countries alike, in terms of human rights understanding and practice. This conviction would 
obstruct the Americans to seriously seek for any rationality or legitimacy in the others’ 
arguments and to change their views in their dialogues with the other. This is more likely the 
case when ‘the other’ is Vietnam, an authoritarian and socialist regime like those in Eastern 
Europe and Russia whom the U.S. defeated in the Cold War. Moreover, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, diplomats are supposed not to change their views unless instructed to do so 
and prohibited from sympathizing with local viewpoints. Expectations for changes in 
convictions of an American diplomat are thus even gloomier: for such a change to occur, she 
must overcome both her professional limitation and her own feelings of superiority. This 
belief heralds American thoughts about their influence on the others on human rights issue. 
 
2. American influence on others’ human rights understanding 
As David Golove observes, Americans  
are accustomed to thinking that our legal system, especially our constitutional 
commitment to fundamental rights, provides a model that other countries would be well 
advised to emulate. This confident, perhaps arrogant, self-conception as a moral beacon 
for the rest of the world has deep roots in U.S. history and seems as strong today as it has 
ever been. In contrast, many Americans are apt to be far less comfortable with the notion 
that when it comes to justice, we may have something to learn from other nations – that 
we may benefit from the importation, not just the exportation, of rights.256 
In other words, for many Americans given the superiority of their values, others should only 
learn from the U.S. As President Carter stated in his inaugural address in January 1977, “the 
best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our [American] 
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democratic system is worthy of emulation.”257 To explain this belief, some “deep roots in 
U.S. history” must be unearthed, among them are the ideas encompassed in Manifest Destiny. 
The following reviews the appearance and evolution of this concept. 
The term Manifest Destiny was first coined by journalist John L. O’Sullivan in 1845 to 
justify the American annexation of Texas.
258
 However, O’Sullivan’s ideas were not merely 
on land acquisition. The U.S. had been chosen by God, he claimed, to “manifest to mankind 
the excellence of divine principles; to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to 
the worship of the Most High - the Sacred and the True.” These divine principles, as he 
explained, were found in American ideas of freedom, namely the “freedom of conscience, 
freedom of person, freedom of trade and business pursuits, universality of freedom and 
equality.” O’Sullivan also claimed that it was her “unparalleled glory” that the U.S. must 
fulfill the Godly mission of defending “the rights of conscience, the rights of personal 
enfranchisement” of the “oppressed of all nations.”259 This mission thus has two fronts: 
demonstrating the excellence of American liberties to other nations and defending the 
political rights of human rights victims worldwide. And the absolute excellence of American 
freedoms, the fact that the U.S. is destined to carry out this mission, and the good results of 
its preordained mission are all beyond doubt and unquestionable. Who would dare to 
challenge divinity and fate? 
In fact, the linking of American goals with the working of divine providence was attributed to 
the Puritan settler John Winthrop, who, in 1631, told the settlers on the ship Arbella heading 
to Massachusetts Bay that 
for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eies of all 
people are uppon us; soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our god in this worke 
wee have undertaken and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, 
wee shall … open the mouthes of enemies to speake evill of the wayes of god and 
all professours for Gods sake; wee shall shame the faces of many of gods worthy 
servants, and cause theire prayers to be turned into Cursses upon us till wee be 
consumed out of the good land whether wee are going.260 
Winthrop warned that although their upcoming settlement was an extension of God’s promise 
for a new world, this blessing was not unconditional; their failure would not only doom them 
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but take a toll on God as well. Therefore, the early Americans considered themselves as a city 
upon a hill, a spotlight closely and perhaps harshly watched by God and all people. It should 
be noted that in Winthrop’s sermon, there was nothing about the colony as a model. For him, 
the eyes of other people who looked at the colony were not those of admiration but of the 
same purpose as God’s eyes, that is scrutiny. O’Sullivan thus had sustained the religious 
aspect of manifest destiny and developed it into the superiority of American values. As God 
is universal, so are his values. American values were thus naturally universal. Again, like 
religious freedom, it was not the factual accuracy that matters, but how the story of 
Winthrop’s warnings was interpreted and spread. 
Thomas Paine was among those who popularized Manifest Destiny to the American people. 
Referring to the days of Noah in the Bible, Paine told Americans that they were like Noah, 
with a mission to “form the noblest, purest constitution on the face of the earth” in the New 
World and “begin the world over again” in their power. “Every spot of the old world,” he 
declared, “is overrun with oppression. Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia, and 
Africa, have long expelled her. Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given 
her warning to depart.” The New World should then serve as Noah’s Ark, Paine exclaimed, 
“O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind.”261 Again, Paine was 
calling Americans to realize their unparalleled glory of defending humankind into concrete 
actions. On one hand, it was building the U.S. as the noblest temple, as O’Sullivan suggested 
earlier. On the other hand, it was receiving the fugitives and asylum seekers whose freedoms 
were oppressed worldwide and even remake the world over again. And in terms of rights, 
Paine would contend that true freedom only exist in American soil just as Noah’s Ark which 
was built in a context of evil oppressions. 
The ideas of manifest destiny have been confirmed by the successes of American territorial 
acquisition. The U.S. victory over Mexico in 1847 “marked the zenith of U.S. claims of its 
Manifest Destiny.”262 Frederick Merk criticizes that the concept of Manifest Destiny had 
been used as propaganda and “harnessed to the cause of continentalism in the 1840s” like 
many other crusading ideologies in world history.
263
 In advocating the annexation of Hawaii 
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in 1898, President William McKinley told his personal secretary George Cortelyou that “we 
need Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than we did California. It is manifest 
destiny.”264 
The influence is also operative beyond continental territory: Manifest Destiny had been used 
to justify American involvements around the world. As William Pfaff observed, with 
Woodrow Wilson, Manifest Destiny “ceased to be continental expansion and national power 
and progress, and was reimagined as a divinely ordained mission to humanity.”265 On July 
10, 1919 Wilson persuaded the U.S. Senate to ratify the Versailles peace treaty after the First 
World War with the following concluding words: 
The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It [American world role] has come about 
by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way ... 
It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way.266 
Manifest Destiny has continued to be used in the contemporary U.S. William Pfaff argues 
that, there had been increasing abuses, and the arbitrary use, of power in the Cold War, the 
Vietnam War, and the eight years of the George W. Bush administration that are justified by 
a universally relevant and valid Manifest Destiny.”267 While Samuels observes that “[e]choes 
of John O'Sullivan's original beliefs still can be heard in the latest ambition of the United 
States to promote democracy in turbulent regions of the world, such as the Middle East, 
Africa, and central Asia.”268 To cite but one example: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
under the George W. Bush administration wrote in 2008 that the U.S. could fulfill its “unique 
role in the world” in the twenty-first century because Americans can imagine that the world 
“can always be better-not perfect, but better-than others have consistently thought 
possible.”269 She continues, “we have never accepted that we are powerless to change the 
world. Indeed, we have shown that by marrying American power and American values, we 
could help friends and allies expand the boundaries of what most thought realistic at the 
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time.” Therefore, she argues that Americans recognizes that “freedom and democracy are the 
only ideas that can, over time, lead to just and lasting stability, especially in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.”270 
To sum up at this stage, for the Americans there is only a one way trade-off between the U.S. 
and others in terms of rights. On one hand, they have always been skeptical of incorporating 
other’s human rights understandings in their own legal system, even if from international 
treaties. This is because they do not believe that anything could be learnt from outsiders in 
terms of rights. On the other hand, they are convinced that the others would only benefit by 
embracing the American superior rights model. This conviction has been consolidated by an 
embedded idea of a destined American mission to spread its model worldwide and continued 
to exist in the contemporary U.S. Consequently, a human rights dialogue with the Americans 
thus is likely to be premised upon the two inequalities. The first is that the U.S. model is 
unquestionably described in absolute terms compared to the others’ less than perfect 
understandings and practices of human rights. This lead to the second one: changes in human 
rights understandings and practices should be expected from the other sides only. And these 
inequalities would be even greater in the encounter of American diplomats with the 
Vietnamese communists. And given the conviction on the superiority of the American model, 
in such a human rights dialogue, the discussion of human rights in the U.S should be out of 
the table and if human right is an issue, it should be for the others, or in other words, a matter 
of American foreign policy. In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Americans have agreed 
since 1776 that the United States must be the beacon of human rights to an unregenerate[d] 
world. The question has always been how America is to execute this mission.”271 The next 
sub-section offers an answer to this question. 
 
III. The instrumentalisation of human rights issue in American foreign policy 
To fulfill its human rights mission, the U.S. has opted for two ways: either through leading 
the world by example without intervening into others’ internal affairs or by making human 
rights an interest and a concern in American foreign policy. The first path was the main 
choice of the U.S. until the mid-1970s when the human rights issue was institutionalized into 
American foreign policy. 
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Leading the world by a benign and moral influence had become a tradition in American 
foreign policies for a long time, despite certain attempts to break with it. In 1821, Secretary 
of State John Quincy Adams who later became the sixth American President warned that the 
U.S. “goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy” as she [the U.S.] will commend the 
general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her 
example.”272 In December 1849, Senator Cass of Michigan attempted to break this tradition 
by introducing a resolution to consider suspending diplomatic relations with Austria in 
response to the bloody suppression by Austrian and Russian troops of the Hungarian 
revolution one year earlier. His attempt was supported by Hungarian President Louis Kossuth 
who publicly stated in his visit to the U.S. that the Americans talked endlessly about their 
mission of liberty and “really believe they will make their way throughout the world by their 
moral influence… I have never yet heard of a despot who had yielded to the moral influence 
of liberty.”273 Despite this, Cass’s resolution failed as its opponents in the Senate quickly 
raised difficult questions that the U.S. had to answer if it went down that road. John Parker 
Hale from New Hampshire questioned the impartiality of Cass’s ideas, “why we were not to 
try Russian empire first and then England, France, and Spain?” While Henry Clay from 
Kentucky questioned the justifications for American authority to judge other nations on “our 
notion and judgment of what it is right and proper in the administration of human affairs” 
and to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign nations. Such judgments, Hale concluded, 
ought to be on the slavery issue at home, where “men are to be bought, and women are to be 
bought, and kept at twenty-five cents per day, until ready to be transported to some other 
market.”274 
In the decades that follows, the tradition of doing good by example was upheld by the same 
rationales. After the Civil War, President Grant justified American non-involvement in the 
Cuban struggle for independence from Spain that “as the United States is the freest of all 
nations… [and] sympathize[s] with all people struggling for liberty and self-government … it 
is due to our honor that we should abstain from enforcing our views upon unwilling nations 
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and from taking an interested part, without invitation, in the quarrels between different 
nations or between governments and their subjects.”275 Then in 1904 President Theodore 
Roosevelt warned that only for extreme cases where crimes were “committed on so vast a 
scale and of such peculiar horror,” could the U.S. show its disapproval and sympathy with the 
sufferers: American military interventions like that in Cuba, he added, “are necessarily very 
few.” What could be “very much wiser and more useful” for the U.S., President Roosevelt 
continued, was to “striv[e] for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to 
concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have 
plenty of sins of our own to war against, and under ordinary circumstances we can do more 
… to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race prejudices here at 
home than by passing resolutions about wrongdoing elsewhere.” 276 Consequently, as 
Apodaca observes, although both Congress and the executive continued to condemn 
violations of human rights abroad, no practical action was taken.
277
 
In the 1970s, the Nixon and Ford administrations chose to ignore human rights violations, but 
this time for more pragmatic reasons: Realpolitik. Both president Nixon and his secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger advanced an American foreign policy that was based on practical 
politics and interests and devoid of any moral component. In 1973, Nixon stated that “the 
only proper concern” for American foreign policy was “national interests” that “should be 
narrowly constructed to exclude moral commitments or “cause” that do not promise a clear, 
direct, predictable payoff in increased security or prosperity for the nation.”278 Henry 
Kissinger flatly denied any interventions in the name of human rights when he said that “I 
believe it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a 
direct objective of American foreign policy …[as] the protection of basic human rights is a 
very sensitive aspect of the domestic jurisdiction of … governments.” Consequently, the 
American administrations during the Nixon-Ford years did not make any drastic actions 
dealing with human rights violations abroad.
279
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Alarmed by this, and in an attempt to gain power over the executive branch on foreign policy, 
Congress in the early 1970s took a more assertive role in human rights issue. It conducted 
hearings, made recommendations to the administration, and issued legislations related to 
human rights violations, thus “keeping human rights concerns in the forefront of U.S. foreign 
policy.”280 As de Neufville observes, faced with rejections and resistance from the executive 
branch, Congress increasingly asserted the position of human rights in American foreign 
policy, from “modest” legislations in 1973 and 1974 expressing “sense of Congress” that 
“U.S. security assistance and weapons may have been used for repression in the client 
nations” and “suggesting the President curtail assistance to governments seriously violating 
human right” to putting in place “the major components for implementing human rights 
criteria in foreign policy.” Thus, the Harkin amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 
1975 “specifically prohibited U.S. development assistance to ‘any government which engages 
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.’” In 
another amendment, Congress declared that “a principal goal of the foreign policy of the 
United States shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized 
human rights by all countries,” thus establishing human rights requirements as a “general 
principle for all foreign policy.” In the following years Congress was “actively involved in 
building the growing list of legislation limiting foreign assistance and other activities for 
nations where human rights abuses are significant.”281 Still, these good intentions were 
contemporaneous with Nixon and Kissinger’ logic that the enemy of our enemy is our friend, 
regardless of its domestic dealings with human rights. 
In terms of organization, it was also Congress who established annual Country Reports on 
human rights practices, the position of Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs in the Department of State (which was later upgraded to Assistant Secretary), and 
“oversight systems in the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations in the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee” in the second half of 1970s.282 Indeed, Secretary Kissinger had been 
warned in 1974 by one of his deputies that “Congress is beginning to insist that military and 
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economic aid be reduced when authoritarian regimes with which we are identified commit 
violations … [and] if the Department did not place itself ahead of the curve on this issue, 
Congress would take the matter out of the Department’s hands.”283 
Subsequent administrations, from Presidents Carter to George W. Bush, upheld human rights 
as a priority in their foreign policies, though their commitments to human rights differ. In his 
inaugural address in January 1977, President Carter declared that American commitments to 
human rights “must be absolute.”284 Carter signed both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in October that year, and signed a directive in February 1978 that 
declared it were American objective to “reduce worldwide governmental violations of the 
integrity of the person”, “enhance civil and political liberties,” and “promote basic economic 
and social rights.”285 Julie Mertus pointed out that Carter had made “unprecedented 
presidential commitment” to the issue of human rights and was the first president to make the 
institutionalization of human rights a central concern.
286
 However, his moral commitments to 
human rights, according to Apodaca, were victimized by the bureaucratic and ideological 
fightings within the administration and the realities of power politics in the world.
287
 For 
example, the initial claim on a single human rights standards for both friends and foe alike of 
his administration soon turned into a case-by-case principle due to, in the words of his 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, “the limits of our power and of our wisdom … [in] a matter 
for informed and careful judgement.”288 
His successor President Reagan unsuccessfully dismissed human rights as a foreign policy 
objective because human rights had become institutionalized to the point of being 
uneradicable. As Mower explained, “the existence of human rights legislation, the presence 
in the State Department of a Human Rights Bureau, and other institutional arrangements 
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seemed to ensure the survival of this foreign policy element.”289 In the second Reagan 
administration, human rights were redefined “very narrowly to exclusively mean democracy 
and anti-communism” and put “to the service of condemning the Soviet Union.”290 The 
combination of human rights with anti-communism brought about a double-standard that was 
sustained during the Reagan’s years. Apodaca concludes that “[w]ith friendly countries that 
abused the human rights of their citizens the Reagan strategy was quiet diplomacy and 
persuasion, while with communist countries it was public denoucenments and isolation, if not 
outright military intervention.”291 
The inconsistencies between human rights rhetoric and actions were evident in subsequent 
U.S. administrations. President W.H. Bush continued the trend set by Reagan: human rights 
were defined as political and civil rights and applied “in a selective and self-serving 
manner.”292 Under Bush’s administration, American responses to human rights violations 
were contigent on whether economic and strategic interests were involved or absent.
293
 
Likewise, depsite his declaration that human rights and democracy would serve as a corner-
stone of his foreign policy, President Bill Clinton “only supported human rights when they 
were compatible with other, mostly economic, foreign policy preferences.”294 And President 
George W. Bush while claimed to extend democracy globally and lead the world by 
“defending liberty and justice,” violated human rights in the U.S. and “eliminated any hope 
of incoporating a principle of morality and human rights in U.S. foreign policy.”295 
The underlying reason for all these inconsistencies, as Mertus explains, is that: 
[B]oth Republican and Democratic administrations …[have] employed human 
rights selectively, condemning the human rights abuses of its enemies while 
overlooking those of its allies…. [U]pon careful examination, the differences 
between the presidencies [after the Cold War] are eclipsed by one overriding 
similarity: the belief in American exceptionalism, with the United States 
applying one standard of human rights to itself and another to the rest of the 
world…. In all administrations, national interests trump the consistent 
application of a single standard for human rights. Furthermore, despite rhetoric 
to the contrary, each president has acted as if the United States is first among 
states that are less than equal. Human rights are envisioned as something 
applied to others in line with U.S. national interests…. In no presidency to date 
can we say that human rights norms have been pervasively or consistently 
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embedded in thought and action. Human rights have to some extent become 
institutionalized, but they do not have an automatic influence over identities, 
interests, and expectations.296 
Here, Mertus points to three common themes in American human rights policy. First, it is 
justified through consolidating the self-image, though via different rhetoric, that the U.S. is 
an exceptional nation, born out of freedom with a ordained mission to spread its superior 
values worldwide. Second, it is precisely because of this exceptionalism that the U.S. views 
others as less equal and human rights are only to be “exported” to others. This is the first 
double-standard on American human rights practice. A clear evidence of this is American 
usage of different wordings for human rights: “civil liberties” at home, and “human rights” 
for the rest of the world. Forsythe reaches the same conclusion when he observes that, “rights 
for Americans was one thing. US action on behalf of the human rights for foreigners was 
another.”297 Third, Mertus highlights the limit of the institutionalization of human rights into 
American foreign policy: human rights has been recognized as an independent means to 
realise the national interest, but not an imperative. It is at American governments’ discretions 
to raise or ignore human rights issue, in their considerations with other competing interests, 
such as security or trade. And this leads to a second double-standard in American human 
rights practice: human rights requirements have never been applied uniformly to different 
countries, or even to any country at different circumstances. 
It is interesting to note that the Americans themselves seems not to accept that others will see 
all these complexities and double-standards associated with the U.S. human rights policy. As 
Jack Donnelly, a leading human rights scholars in the U.S. states, 
as an American, I must again admit (with considerable embarrassment) that both 
individuals and government officials in the United States seem unusually prone to 
a misplaced self-righteousness that stubbornly refuses to consider the possibility 
that men and women of good will could possibly seen anything but the purest 
motives in American actions.298  
In other words, Donnelly comes to the conclusion that American officials do not realise that 
others may view the motives of American human rights action as well beyond their sincere 
and benign wishes for the betterments of the others. 
In short, human rights have always been a matter of concern for the Americans whose 
freedoms are both factually and mythologically established as one of the founding values of 
an exceptional nation. Prior to the mid-1970s, human rights were considered secondary in 
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terms of policy by disconnecting morality from calculations of national interests. The 
struggles for power between the executive and legislative branches in the late 1970s brought 
the human rights issue to the fore and institutionalized it as an independent foreign policy 
interest. By the 1980s, this institutionalisation had reached a point at which a reversal of 
human rights interest proved impossible. However, as human rights is an interest among 
many others rather than an authoritatively embedded values, an option rather than a necessity, 
there have been two double-standards in American foreign policy: liberties for the self and 
human rights for others, and different human rights standards for others. The ideas of 
exceptionalism that are used by all American authorities help to naturalize the first double-
standard while the extent of human rights domestic institutionalization ensures the second 
one. These double-standards herald suspicions from other countries on American human 
rights statements and actions. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have traced the historical foundation of American human rights 
understandings in classical liberalism and how liberal ideas had been legally codified and 
conceptualized in American rights understanding. Among other rights, freedom of speech and 
press freedom have become a practically unrestrained supervising tool for the people against 
a necessary evil state. Together with religious freedom, Americans regard these libeties as 
exceptional and superior and believe in a manifest destiny to help others enjoy the same 
liberties as they are. On one hand, the self-evident and lofty ideas of ensuring others to adopt 
American rights model make it not easy or even surprising for the Americans to realise that 
others may see more than just sincere goodwills from the American human rights statements, 
but may be suspicious of being forced to turning into American or the like. On the other 
hand, this has exerted great impact on their views of the self-other relations in terms of rights. 
Accordingly, the influence in rights understanding for Americans is uni-directional, where 
the self has nothing to learn from the other and where the other can only benefit, and should 
learn, from the self. Based on these views and as a result of the power struggle within 
American government, human rights has become an independent reference in planning 
American foreign policy. And the realisation of U.S. human rights goals, however, suffers 
from two inevitable double-standards that the Americans themselves are not willing or even 
able to admit. Moreover, besides the convictions on the superiority of their rights 
understanding, American human rights exchanges in the 1950s were also affected by the U.S. 
fears of external threats of communism.  
These features of American human rights understanding can be used to justify the U.S. 
position in their human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese. Moreover, American 
exceptionalism and the inequalities and double-standards associated with it raises the 
suspicions of Vietnam, as any other countries that are criticised by the U.S. for its human 
rights record. And the American uni-directional exchange of rights is indicative of the natures 
and outcomes of those dialogues, at least the changes from the American participants. The 
next chapter, in a similar way, explores Vietnamese understanding of human rights that 
justifies Vietnam’s human rights position. At the same time, it compares American and 
Vietnamese human rights understanding in order to assess the level of incommensurability 
and incompatibility of the two understandings as an obstacle to their human rights mutual 
understanding.
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Chapter Two  
Vietnamese Understanding of Human Rights 
 
This chapter presents an overall Vietnamese understanding of human rights. In a similar 
structure to that of the previous chapter, it examines the philosophical, ideological and 
historical foundations of rights in Vietnam. While Americans look to natural liberalism as a 
source of their human rights justifications, Vietnamese scholars and researchers in the early 
1990s have grounded the theoretical frameworks of their understanding of human rights in 
Marxism, Leninism, Ho Chi Minh thought, and Vietnamese traditions. With strong 
convictions on the communist mission of liberating the toiling people from oppression and 
injustice, the Vietnamese communists hold that human rights are common values of 
humankind and shaped as a result of the struggles between societal classes. At the same time, 
human rights differ between cultural groups because of the differences in the levels of socio-
economic developments and cultures among nations. Further, the legacy of Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and the tradition of resistance to foreign domination have consolidated the 
Vietnamese view on the unity between human rights and national rights for independence and 
self-determination, the importance of social and economic rights with the state as caretaker, 
and the balancing of individual rights and collective interests in the socialist society. In sharp 
constrast to American views on religous, speech, and press freedoms, the Vietnamese hold 
that these same freedoms cannot supersede citizens’ obligations and responsibilities in 
maintaining social order and the revolutionary cause of moving towards socialism. And while 
Americans do not feel the need to learn from the human rights experiences as practised by 
others, the Vietnamese acknowledge the differences in human rights understandings among 
societies and their own need of improving human rights conditions in the country. This 
acknowledgement drives the Vietnamese to deem human rights dialogues and cooperation 
both legitimate and necessary. And finally, the Vietnamese communists are concerned about 
the infiltration of capitalist elements under the cover of human rights reforms that could lead 
to socialism derailment.  
This chapter has three sections. It first examines the Party and State understandings of the 
concept of human rights and its main features. The second section elaborates on the origins of 
the Vietnamese human rights understanding. The last section examines Vietnamese view of 
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human rights dialogues and cooperation. Comparisons with American human rights 
understanding are observed along the chapter. 
 
I. The Vietnamese reaction to Western human rights pressure and the main features of 
the Vietnamese human rights understanding 
1. The Vietnamese reaction to Western human rights pressure 
The issue of human rights did not significantly reach the CPV and Vietnamese scholars’ 
attention until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Like many other communist countries at the 
time, the concept of “human rights” was considered a Western concept, used by capitalist 
countries for interfering into the internal affairs of the socialist states. As Đặng Dũng Chí 
noted,  
in the 1970s, as in other socialist countries of the time, the concept of human 
rights was rarely used in Vietnam, even not fully grasped theoretically. This 
limited the general knowledge on human rights, and reactionary forces to 
Vietnam made use of this situation to distort [human rights conditions in 
Vietnam] and undermine [the revolutionary cause][my translation].299  
In an effort to defend against the capitalist bloc’s accusations of human rights violations, 
particularly the redefining human rights with anti-communism of the Reagan administration 
in his second term, several communist parties decided to conduct a joint research project 
titled “Socialism and Human Rights” in the late 1980s, and the CPV also took part in this 
research.
300
 Although the political turmoil in many socialist countries in late 1980s and early 
1990s halted this joint research, the CPV still conducted their assigned part. This initial 
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research was the first step in developing indigenous knowledge about human rights in 
Vietnam.
301
 
The collapse of the socialist bloc in the late 1990s forced the CPV to search for a new path of 
development for the country. The renewal process (đổi mới) started from the Sixth Plenum of 
the Party Central Committee in 1986 and accelerated at the Seventh Plenum in 1991. As part 
of đổi mới, over 200 scientists and scholars from various disciplines were mobilized to 
participate in a research project titled “Humans - the Goal and the Driving Force for 
Development.” Part of this was a “branch project” focusing on human rights and conditions 
to guarantee human rights and citizen rights.
302
 In 1993 and 1994, the Ho Chi Minh National 
Academy of Politics (the national center for theoretical study and training of the Party) 
organized three workshops to present the findings of this research.
303
 Although this branch 
research was attributed to the participating scholars, it was also considered a product of the 
Academy and thus the source of reference for the Party’s human rights understanding. 
Many important Party and State documents in the early 1990s started to mention the phrase 
‘human rights,’ such as the Program for national building in the transition period towards 
socialism of the Seventh Plenum and the 1992 Constitution of Vietnam.
304
 However, the 
document that focused most on human rights was the Directive 12/CT/TW issued on 12 July 
1992, of the Party’s Secretariat “On Human Rights Issue and our Party’s Viewpoints and 
Policies.” Based on these documents and the Vietnamese literature on human rights in the 
1990s, the following part details the official Vietnamese understanding of human rights. 
Human rights, according to then Vice-President of the State Nguyễn Thị Bình, “briefly, is the 
right to live as a HUMAN BEING. It is the basic right of everyone in all nations and states at 
all times.”305 This rather vague definition reflects the lack of a solid theoretical foundation for 
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Vietnamese concept of human rights. Two scholars Hoàng Văn Hảo and Chu Thành wrote in 
Project KX-07 that the collapse of socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries was partly due to the lack of democracy, human rights and freedom there. 
This forced the Vietnamese to revisit two main arguments of the socialist bloc on human 
rights. First, against the Western idea that human rights originate from natural law, socialist 
countries argued that humans had rights only as citizens of a nation state and only those rights 
that were defined by laws of that state. Second, the socialist countries’ emphasis on economic 
determinants of growth led to the logic that only once economic and social rights had been 
guaranteed, could political and civil rights be practically realizable. These scholars then 
argued that although citizen rights originated from natural right, they could not escape the 
state and the law, as rights can only be ensured within the limitations of certain socio-
economic conditions.
306
 
The Vietnamese human rights concept is not grounded exclusively in a particular ideology 
like the Americans or the Soviet communists. As previously discussed, the U.S. views human 
rights from classical liberalism and the Soviet mainly from a Marxist viewpoint. Instead, the 
Vietnamese communists chose not to abide by Marxism ideology but extracted what they 
deemed valid in human rights arguments from the two opposing socialist and capitalist 
camps. For the Vietnamese, human rights stem from natural right and are dependent on the 
level of social and economic developments. In this way, both sets of rights (political and 
civil; social, economic and cultural) are human rights, though the realisation of those rights is 
circumstantial. 
The problem with this human rights understanding, these scholars continued, “is whether the 
level of rights that a person is enjoying is sufficient and in accordance with the specific 
historical conditions in which that person is living.”307 They also argued that despite these 
circumstantial limitations, the overemphasis of economic rights often led to the lack of 
adequate attention to political rights and liberties; thus, both economic and political rights 
should be afforded equal importance.
308
 Accordingly, these scholars put forth an initial 
definition of human rights which was also vague, “human rights firstly are understood as the 
special rights reserved only for human beings. These are the ability to consciously act to 
demand, reject or gain something for self-preservation and development. [my translation]”309 
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Or as stated in the Party’s daily newspaper Nhân Dân, “human rights are the rights to live a 
deserved life as a human being.”310 
At this stage, two short observations can be made in comparing Vietnamese experiences of 
human rights with American ones. First, the Americans have encountered and developed the 
concept of human rights more than two centuries before the Vietnamese started to 
conceptualise it. And in a way similar to American conceptualisation of economic and social 
rights, the Vietnamese conceptualisation of human rights occurred at the time of big fear for 
the threat of capitalism. The collapse of the socialist regimes worldwide in the early 1990s, 
from the CPV’s perspective, was partly due to the “democracy” and “freedom” campaigns of 
the U.S. and other hostile forces to socialism. Second, while the U.S. bases her human rights 
understanding on the solid philosophical ground laid by John Locke and Thomas Paine’s 
natural right and social contract theory, among others, the Vietnamese communists choose to 
adopt certain ideas both from natural liberalism and Marxism; accordingly, they share with 
the Americans on the idea that civil and political rights are human rights. 
 
2. The main features of the Vietnamese human rights understanding 
The absence of a clear definition of human rights did not stop the Vietnamese from 
elaborating on their contents and features. On 12 July, 1992, the CPV’s Secretariat issued a 
directive on human rights which has become an official synthesis of the Vietnamese view on 
the issue. The following discussion presents the main features of Vietnamese human rights 
and compares them with those of the Americans. 
A first feature for the Vietnamese is that human rights reflect the struggle of the oppressed 
people and is a common value of mankind. Directive 1992 stated that, “human rights is a fruit 
of a long struggle of the toiling peoples and oppressed nations in the world; it is also a fruit of 
the struggle of the human race in mastering nature; thus, human rights become a common 
value of mankind.”311 In this regard, though the Vietnamese may agree with the Americans 
that human rights is inherent in human beings, it is not something that can be taken for 
granted. It takes more than the fact that one is a human being to enjoy one’s rights, as one has 
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to fight against oppression and injustice to claim them. Those who need to fight against 
oppression, logically, are the oppressed at both national and international levels. At the 
national level, they are the working majority struggling against exploitation and social 
injustice. At the international level, they are the nations resisting foreign interference and 
domination. Under this logic, throughout mankind’s history, the enemies of human rights of 
the majority are, in the order of appearance in history, the kings and aristocrats, and then the 
capitalists or other oppressors of the working class.
312
 
Under this logic, the capitalists’ credits in siding with the toiling people to fight against 
feudalism are not denied; yet, the main author of human rights is still the toiling people.
313
 
This enables the Vietnamese to contend that human rights are a “common value of mankind.” 
In so doing, the concept is not an ‘invention’ by capitalism, though it is the capitalist bloc that 
raised the human rights issue to the socialist camp. It should be noted that during the Cold 
War it became common prejudice on both camps that whatever related to the other camp was 
‘bad’ while whatever related to one’s own camp was ‘good’. The Vietnamese communists’ 
ascription of human rights to the mass made it more convenient for them to adopt the concept 
not from their class enemies. The phrase “human rights” thus became acceptable in their 
language.
314
 
What is more, viewing human rights as the result of a historical struggle allows the 
Vietnamese to affirm that only under socialism, where all toiling people are liberated, can 
true human rights be realized. “In terms of the essence of class and society in socialism,” 
Bình argued, “socialist society is a humane society, a society of human rights. Only under 
socialism, could conditions and possibilities in terms of economics, politics, society, and 
culture be generated to fulfill most adequately and thoroughly true human rights.”315 Whereas 
in capitalist society, only a minority of the rich and the powerful have their human rights 
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guaranteed, in socialist society the rights of the majority are realised. This is the foundation 
for the Vietnamese claim that human rights under socialism are better protected than under 
capitalism. 
Indeed, this liberating and humane nature of socialism became the Vietnamese pride of their 
stated goal. Speaking at a conference of leaders of provinces, cities, ministries and other 
central ministerial bodies, former general secretary Đỗ Mười asked his comrades to be 
“clearly aware … that the protection of and strengthening the enjoyment of human rights in 
our country are the cause of our Party, our State, and our people” and “the goal of our 
revolutionary cause is to ensure each and everybody to develop freely and comprehensively. 
This cause serves our own interest, not because of outside pressure.” “Without being fully 
aware of this,” he warned, “it would easily lead to an attitude of cosmetic realization of 
human rights.”316 It is interesting to observe that both the Americans and the Vietnamese are 
proud of the superiority of their respective versions of human rights for different reasons. For 
the Americans, the U.S. was born, and has continued to serve, as a sanctuary of freedom for 
humanity. Whereas the Vietnamese communists base their pride on their perceived 
superiority of a socialist model that they are building. 
A second feature is that “in societies with opposing classes, the concept of human rights 
deeply reflects the class struggles.”317 In such societies, Bình explains, “the liberty of one’s 
class cannot avoid having an impact on the liberty of the other class.” For her, the differences 
between classes in terms of property, social status, ideologies and politics cannot guarantee 
equality. “How could there be equal human rights between millions of homeless and 
unemployed people and millionaires or billionaires?” she asked.318 For the Vietnamese, the 
starting question related to human rights is ‘by whom’ and ‘for whom’. The answer, argue 
Hoàng Văn Hảo and Chu Thành, is that “from their own interests, the ruling class always 
considers human rights as their own rights; all strategies and policies to stabilize and develop 
their social regime must focus on those rights.”319 And the ruling class, be it the capitalists or 
the proletariats, will codify their favorable and beneficiary social and political regime into 
domestic law. Further, as the issue of human rights is often politicized and used by the U.S. 
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and Western countries to interfere into internal affairs of other countries, it is necessary to 
maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to ensure and protect human rights of the 
toiling people.
320
 
It should be noted that the word ‘dictatorship’ for the Vietnamese communists does not 
contain the negative connotations that an advocate of liberalism may associate with it. 
Dictatorship is even necessary to protect the interests of the proletariat, which can only be 
realised in a socialist regime. After all, a Vietnamese communist may argue that the minority 
capitalists who are being governed without their consent would eventually dissolve 
themselves into the mass. In this vein, for the Vietnamese the word ‘dictatorship regime’ has 
positive connotations and is but a necessary means for realising the human rights of the 
people. 
A third feature is the Vietnamese stress on the relativity of human rights. Like the proponents 
of Asian values, the Vietnamese hold that human rights are contingent to history, culture and 
tradition. And like other developing countries, the Vietnamese stress on the contigency of 
rights promotion on the level of development. Directive 1992 states that “human rights are 
always related to history, tradition and depend on the level of economic development and 
culture. Thus, it is impossible to impose or mechanically copy the standards and models of 
some countries onto others.
321
  
Human rights are dependent on the level of economic development, as Bình explains, socio-
economic developments “generate conditions to fundamentally realize human rights.”322 
However, in emphasizing the relativity of the human rights concept, unlike the advocates of 
cultural relativism, the Vietnamese do not reject its universality. At the 1993 Vienna 
conference on human rights, the Vietnamese delegation stated that, “human right is a 
synthetized concept; it is both a universal standard and the synthetized product of a long 
historical process.”323 
This compromise between the universality and the relativity of human rights is the foundation 
for both the Vietnamese openness to the concept and for their refutation of human rights 
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criticism. This compromise means that the Vietnamese do not reject universal human rights, 
they indeed embrace them. If there are shortcomings in the implementation of human rights 
according to Vietnamese human rights standards, they could be explained by social and 
economic constraints and/or cultural and traditional issues in Vietnam. Such a justification 
for human rights shortcomings cannot convince the Americans who define human rights 
within civil and political domain only. However, at least the Vietnamese and the Americans 
may agree that civil and political rights are human rights and universal. 
A fourth feature is the unity between human rights and the national rights for national 
independence, freedom, and self-determination. Directive 1992 states that “The liberation of 
human beings (including the assurance of human rights) is closely linked with the liberations 
of the nation, the class, and the society; only under the precondition of national independence 
and socialism, can human rights be assured in the widest, fullest, and most complete way.”324 
A decade earlier, Trường Chinh, the Chairman of the Council of State, wrote that “for us, 
human rights are first and foremost, the right of the nation to live in independence and 
freedom, the right of the toiling people to fight against oppression and exploitation, and 
second other citizens’ rights in economic, cultural, and social fields.”325 This is because, Bình 
explains, “in a country under foreign aggression and the threat to slavery, there would be no 
human rights for the people of that country!”326 In other words, for Vietnam or other 
developing countries, the precondition for individual rights to be guaranteed is the assurance 
of the national right for independence and self-determination. 
Although invididual and collective rights are intertwined, for the Vietnamese, they are 
important in different ways. “Under socialism,” the Directive argues, “the interests of the 
individuals, the collectives, and the whole society is closely intertwined. Individual interest is 
highly valued because it is the goal and motivation of social development. At the same time, 
due attention must be paid to ensuring the interests of the collectives and of the entire 
nation.”327 In other words, while the realization and assurance of individual rights are the 
ultimate goal, in order to reach this goal, collective interests must be respected. Collective 
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interests, for the Vietnamese, interestingly, can be at times prioritised over the exercise of the 
individual rights. That is, while the former is supportive for the latter, the exercise of the 
latter should not be detrimental to collective interests. In this relation, only individual rights, 
or more specifically the first generation of human rights can bear negative meanings, as the 
majority always wins over the minority, not the other way round. Thus, such rights as 
freedom of speech or religious freedom can and should be suspended in the name of the 
common goods. This collective understanding of human rights also leads to the conviction 
that “the right to live, to develop, economic and social rights and the right to social justice 
[are]… the most basic rights for the majority of mankind.”328 
The priority of collective interests over individual ones leads to a fifth feature of Vietnamese 
human rights understanding. “Individual rights to democracy and liberty,” Directive 1992 
states, “cannot be detached from citizens’ obligations and responsibilities. Democracy must 
be in parallel with social order and law.”329 Bình explained the linkage of human rights with 
social obligations and responsibilities as follows, “man cannot be outside society. There are 
no rights without obligations; likewise there are no obligations without rights. Only the unity 
between rights and obligations could constitute true human rights.”330 She found support for 
this linkage in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration refers to 
individual “duties” to the community to which the rights holder belongs and sets limitations 
to human rights, “solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
general welfare in a democratic society.”331 These “duties”, “public order”, and “general 
welfare” are interpreted by the Vietnamese in a broader sense; they are generalised into “the 
interests of the country and the people.” 
Similar to collective and individual rights, individual responsibility is described in a negative 
sense in its relation to the state. Although “the rights of the citizens are the duties of the 
state,” Hoàng Văn Hảo argued, “citizen’s duties are state’s rights.”332 Those rights, Hảo 
argued, include “the right to force citizens to comply with their duties.” Citizens’ rights, he 
warned “are always attached to their duties to the state and the society, one cannot push 
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human rights to an absolute level where individual freedoms are detached from and are 
detrimental to state and community.”333 
The last three features of Vietnamese human rights understanding are in sharp contrast to 
those of the Americans. As rights are defined in the U.S. as political and civil rights, for the 
Americans it would be illegitimate to violate or even limit rights in terms of culture and level 
of development. The dependence of individual rights on national rights is alien to American 
rights culture whether there are no such national rights but collective needs. And whereas for 
the Vietnamese, the individual is supposed to have the responsibility of contributing to the 
common goals that are dictated by the state, the Americans hold that the individual owes 
nothing to the state but the latter must respect the former’s rights. Finally, while the 
Vietnamese seek to prevent individuals from abusing their rights to harm the state, the 
American are worried about an evil state that abuses the rights of the individuals. 
Summing up, faced with the need for national renewal, the Vietnamese in the early 1990s 
searched for a moderate understanding of human rights that avoided some of ideological 
controversies between socialism and capitalism and combined both the universality and the 
relativity of the concept. Human rights, in Party and State’ official understanding, are the 
fruits of the struggles of the majority for a more decent and better life, reflect the class 
struggle, depend on the level of economic and social development, and can only be realized 
by law and best guaranteed under socialism. With this understanding, the Vietnamese 
prioritize collective interests over individual rights, and social and economic rights over 
political and civil ones. At the same time, rights are contingent to tradition and culture and 
linked with responsibilities and obligations to social order and the revolutionary cause. These 
features differ strongly, at times to the point incommensurability, to American human rights 
understanding. Despite the differences, the Americans and the Vietnamese can still agree that 
human rights are inherent and universal. The next section explores the origins of these main 
features of Vietnamese human rights understanding. 
 
II. The foundations and influencing factors of Vietnamese human rights understanding 
1. The constant struggle for preserving national independence and identity  
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The Vietnamese history is full of sufferings from aggressions wars, of constant efforts to 
preserve their own identity and fend off foreign intervention. After a thousand year of 
unsuccessful resisting Chinese domination and assimilation, the nation under the leadership 
of Ngô Quyền regained independence in 939. Since that formal proclamation of 
independence, the small Vietnam frequently had to defend from a number of aggressions by 
various Chinese Dynasties in 981, 1076, from 1407 to 1225, and in 1789. After the 
declaration of independence in September 1945, it took the communist-led Vietnam nearly 30 
years to safeguard the nation from the French and then the Americans until 1975 when the 
U.S.-supported Saigon regime fell.
334
 These experiences have taught the Vietnamese both the 
precariousness and the preciousness of independence and freedom. This tradition, as Kenneth 
Christie and Denny Roy observe, “has played a major role in forging their [the Vietnamese] 
national identity and current perspectives.”335 Indeed, it has forged both a strong feeling for 
national independence and a sensitive attitude towards foreign intervention. Comparing this 
to the U.S. history, the American fight for independence could be understood as a fight for 
individual rights against an evil ruler. The Vietnamese struggles in a way were also for their 
rights, but the collective rights for regaining their national independence and preserving their 
national identity against foreign aggressors.  
 
2. The subordination of the individual to the collective interests 
In wartime, individuals were required to sacrifice for the survival of the nation. In peace time, 
certain natural and geographical features of Vietnam also demand this subordination. As a 
tropical country in the South, Vietnam had long been an agrarian society. The majority of 
Vietnamese people were farmers in water paddy fields. Cultivating in a country annually 
stricken by floods and droughts requires people to join forces in building the irrigation system 
and defending against natural disasters. The solidarity and collective interests was thus 
upheld by all members of the community, even at the expenses of individual desires. William 
Duiker rightly observed that, 
Vietnamese society was fundamentally agrarian. Almost nine of every ten Vietnamese 
were rice farmers, living in tiny villages scattered throughout the marshy delta of the Red 
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River…. Hard work, the subordination of the desires of the individual to the needs of the 
group, and a stable social and political hierarchy were of utmost importance.336 
Consequently, the spirit of being loyal to and ready to sacrifice for the common cause of the 
nation has been nurtured, consolidated, and considered among the most respectful social 
values in Vietnam. 
Gratitude and respect are extended to those who have made great contributions to the nation; 
some have been worshiped by the population as deities, such as Trần Hưng Đạo, a famous 
general who united the Vietnamese people to defeat the first two Mongol invasions in the 
1280s.
337
 And in each Vietnamese village today, one can easily find a temple where heroes in 
wartime or those who contributed greatly to the development of the community are 
worshiped as the safeguard spirits of the whole village (thành hoàng). A Vietnamese proverb 
states that, “for those officials who love the people, the people will build temples to worship 
them when they dies..”(thương dân dân lập đền thờ..).”338 A more recent example is the 
worshipping of a local official in 2003 as the village safeguard spirit for his contribution to 
economic development in Tam Giang area.
339
 Community interests and values have been 
traditionally prioritized to the point of prevailing over individual interests. In the past, no 
village member was allowed to act beyond the rights and interests of the community and “the 
rights and freedoms of individual could only be understood, assessed and recognized in 
accord with the village’s standards.”[my translation]340 
The story of social contract theory cannot fit in this history. The Vietnamese cannot 
appreciate those who consider their own liberty and property the highest priority. Likewise, 
the Americans may find it difficult to accept the suppression of individual rights and interests 
in the name of the common good.  
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3. Traditional values of humanity, loving kindness, and tolerance  
Other dominant traditional values of the Vietnamese are humanity, loving kindness, and 
tolerance. Humanistic concerns have taken roots in Vietnamese society and been handed 
down to generations via a number of proverbs and popular phrases. One should care for the 
unfortunate in society “whole leaves shall cover the torn leaves” (lá lành đùm lá rách) or 
those who are different from himself in the community, “Oh gourd, love the pumpkin. 
Though of different species, you share the same trellis” (Bầu ơi thương lấy bì cùng. Tuy rằng 
khác giống nhưng chung một giàn). There is a proverb similar to the Christian 
commandment, “love the others as yourself” (thương người như thể thương thân), because, 
human beings, above all, “are the flowers of the land” (người ta là hoa của đất). Compassion 
for others also extends even to those who are considered ‘bad’ in the community. Almost all 
Vietnamese people know such proverbs for tolerating the bad people as, “there are both long 
and short fingers on a hand” (năm ngón tay có ngón dài ngón ngắn) or for forgiving the 
atoned for their sins, “one should punish those who keep heading down the wrong path, not 
those who return to the way of righteousness” (đánh kẻ chạy đi, không ai đánh người chạy 
lại). History professor Trần Văn Giàu claimed that the compassion for others “is a spiritual 
value, a big characteristic in Vietnamese traditions [my translation].”341 
Buddhism has further consolidated and provided justifications for these values for more than 
a thousand years. According to Tạ Văn Tài, Buddhism came to Vietnam following the 
Chinese colonial period (111 B.C. – A.D. 939) and flourished during the dynasties of the Lý 
(1010-1225) and the Trần (1225-1400). Most Vietnamese are imbued with Buddhism’s 
teachings on causal relation, loving kindness, and gratitude. Vietnamese people are convinced 
by the Buddhist law of causality which means that one deserves or endures things as one did 
good or bad things in the past or in a previous life (Karma). Therefore, one should not 
commit evil things for fear of encountering misfortunes happening to oneself or in the next 
life; instead one should do charitable things to generate “happiness” (phúc) for one’s self and 
one’s family. Commenting on one’s own misfortune, one may lament that, “what did I do in 
my previous life that I am suffering now?” 
A kind-hearted person is often described in Vietnamese as the one who possesses a heart and 
mind of Buddha, in opposite to those of an evil snake: khẩu xà tâm phật [talking like a snake 
and having the mind of Buddha] or khẩu phật tâm xà [talking like Buddha and having the 
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mind of a snake]. Kindness, for the Vietnamese, should not only be an attribute of the mind 
but one that ought to be realized in deeds. This social virtue is extended not only to the 
subject but also the ruler, especially during the dominating time of Buddhism in the country. 
Hoàng Văn Hảo regards the humane treatments by some Lý Kings praised along the 
Vietnam’s feudal history as one of the sources for Vietnamese contemporary understanding 
of human rights.
342
 
As for gratefulness, the first and foremost acknowledgement of every Vietnamese is to her 
own parents. Parental abuse is considered the worst human crime; this seventh out of the 
fourteen teachings by Buddha hang in many Vietnamese houses. Those who mistreat their 
parents are harshly criticized by the public and have their sincerity/morality suspected; if one 
does not respect and love one’s own parents, how can one truly respect and care for others? 
To fulfill one’s piety duty (báo hiếu) is a moral obligation of every Vietnamese.343 To a 
larger extent, one should be grateful for what others have done to the common good that one 
is now enjoying. “Paying tribute to the fallen soldiers” and “remembering the source while 
drinking water” are among many other activities initiated by the CPV and the State to 
demonstrate respect and support for those who have sacrificed in the wars against the French 
and the Americans. 
Imbued with these values, for the Vietnamese, supporting and caring for the less 
advantageous other in the community is both a moral duty and a gesture of goodwill. This 
perception of a caring society makes it easy for the Vietnamese to the modern concept of 
social and economic rights. On the contrary, the Americans, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, reject this second generation of human rights in their conceptualisation of rights. 
 
4. The influence of Confucianism on the Vietnamese perceptions of leader’s qualities 
Confucianism took over Buddhism as the dominant ideology of the ruling officials during the 
Lê dynasty (1428-1778) and maintained this position until the early twentieth century. It 
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gradually became obsolete after France had completed its “pacification” of Vietnam by 1900, 
which, David Marr observes, “had the important philosophical effect of stripping 
Confucianism of most of its sacral and universalistic claims among the scholar-gentry” and 
left the Vietnamese scholars in an ideological crisis.
344
 Since Vietnam regained its 
independence in the 1945, Confucianism and also Buddhism have never reacquired a 
dominant status in the country. 
While Buddhism provides a moral foundation by which the Vietnamese are to treat each 
other, Confucianism suggests a way to manage society via ethical codes for all social 
strata.
345
 Under these codes, women and girls are placed in subordinate and dependent status: 
they must follow the lead of their fathers and husbands and limit their role in the private 
realm. Whereas the father is the undisputed master of the family, so is the ruler of the entire 
nation. Social disorder, for the Confucians, unfolds when people do not behave in accordance 
with their social status. Thus, for a society to thrive and prosper, social stability must be 
insured by maintaining this hierarchical order. Under these codes, the father is supposed to 
uphold the house discipline both in words and deeds (righteousness and ritual) whereas the 
ruler must abandon his own selfishness and private gains for common benefits and public 
interests and constantly engage in moral self-cultivation and self-improvement (tu thân). 
The Vietnamese, of course, have never adopted all of these teachings of Confucianism.
346
 
Nevertheless, lasting traces of its influence can still be found in several aspects of 
contemporary Vietnamese society. One of those traces is the expectations on the quality of 
those in power. As a populer Vietnamese saying goes, a house with a broken roof, everything 
else inside the house will be exposed to water when it rains (nhà dột từ nóc). This implies 
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that the family master fails to behave in the right way, he is to blame for the misconduct of 
any family member. Likewise, the leaders and officials are supposed to devote themselves to 
meeting the needs of the people. This is perhaps one of the most important qualifications for 
leadership that the Vietnamese people expect of their leaders. At the death of General Võ 
Nguyên Giáp in October 2013, thousands of Vietnamese across the nation came to bid final 
farewell to him. Among them a student said that, “I never heard guns or bombs but I know 
our history. After Uncle Ho and General Giap, it would be hard to find anyone like them, 
who dedicate their lives to the country without thinking of their personal interest.”347 
To observe at this stage, these historical, traditional, and cultural factors are used by the 
Vietnamese to explain for the third feature of their human rights understanding, the 
contigencies of human rights realisation on these factors. The Vietnamese communists, on 
one hand, retain and incorporate these influences into their perceptions of human rights. On 
the other hand, they adopt certain ideas of Marxism and Leninism to develop and explain for 
their human rights position. The next section discusses this in details. 
 
5. Marxism, Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought as the CPV’s official theoretical framework 
This section is not a compressive or systematic analysis of Marx, Lenin or Ho Chi Minh’ 
ideas on human rights.
348
 Rather, in reviewing the Vietnamese literature on human rights and 
Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought, it points to the traditions that the CPV has 
adopted and developed into its own ethical codes and social views. It also identifies the ideas 
from Marx, Lenin and Ho Chi Minh that the Vietnamese communists have often cited in 
explaining and defending their human rights position.  
Among other things, Ho Chi Minh had set the qualities for the communists in power that 
share many similarities with Confucian teachings. In 1926 when the CPV was yet to be 
formed, Ho Chi Minh wrote Tư cách một người cách mệnh (The Revolutionary’s Code of 
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Conduct) that lists the exemplar behaviours of the revolutionaries which are “similar in form, 
if not in entirely in content, to Confucian precepts.
349
 In 1947 two years after the communists 
were in power, he wrote Sửa đổi lối làm việc (Reforming the way we work) in which he set 
the five virtues for a revolutionary. The first two are similar in forms to Confucian ethics 
(benevolence and righteousness) and he explained “benevolence” with definite reference of 
Confucianism. 
Benevolence means genuine affection for, and complete devotion to, one’s comrades and 
fellow countrymen. Benevolence leads us to resolutely oppose people and actions that are 
harmful to the party and the masses. A benevolent person is the first to endure hardship 
and the last to enjoy happiness. He or she does not covet wealth or honor and is not afraid 
to fight people in power. Benevolent people fear nothing and will always succeed in 
doing the right thing.350 
Moreover, in a somewhat similar Confucian morality for rulers, Ho Chi Minh also contended 
that it was the Party’s responsibilities to ensure the people’s social and economic rights; if the 
people suffer from hunger, cold, illiteracy, and sickness, for each of this, the blame should be 
on the Party and the Government.
351
 
Although Ho Chi Minh ideas had always been referred to in the CPV’s documents, it was not 
until the VIIth Party Congress in 1991 that his thoughts were officially confirmed as 
“ideational foundation and guidelines for our [the CPV’s] actions” besides Marxisim and 
Lenninism.
352
 Since then, the Party has launched two big nationwide campaigns in 2002 and 
2007 for its members and cardres to learn Ho Chi Minh thoughts and follow his moral 
example as a way to rectify the Party and regain the faith and loyalty of the people.
353
 On a 
more regular basis, the Party calls for its cadres to have both personal attributes of “virtue” 
(đức) and “talent” (tài), with virtues preceding talents; cadres also practise self-criticism 
regularly to improve themselves to live up to the expectations of the people. In this way, the 
communists have set the criteria and qualities for themselves and to a larger extent the state, 
on what the people should expect from them. For the Vietnamese, individuals are supposed to 
be beneficiaries of a benevolent rule: their rights are guaranteed by the state that is expected 
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to be an order keeper, a service provider, and a care taker. In sharp contrast, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, the Americans hold that the state is formed out of the consent of the 
people; it is both evil as it has the power to violate individual’s rights, and necessary to 
maintain order. 
Another important foundational idea of Ho Chi Minh regards the linkage between individual 
and national rights. In the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, Ho Chi Minh extended 
the individual rights that he quoted from the American declaration of Independence to the 
rights of the nation.
354
 The national rights to independence and freedom related to a nation 
that had just liberated itself from colonization and to the imminent threat of being enslaved 
again. A famous statement by Ho Chi Minh that has become a slogan hung in all public 
institutions is that, “nothing is more precious than independence and freedom.” This 
statement is also often quoted by the Vietnamese today to defending the fourth feature of 
their human rights understanding, the unity between human rights and national independence. 
Indeed, the tradition of fighting for independence was used by Ho Chi Minh and his followers 
to rally people’s supports for the two wars against the French and the Americans. 
As for Marxism and Leninism, the Vietnamese scholars found in these theories the 
philosophical justifications for their combination of the particularity and the universality of 
human rights. For Hoàng Việt, Marx viewed human being not as abstract concept, but a 
social animal constituted by social relations. This he explained, “is an affirmation that the 
human being is attached to history, and belongs to different production relations, and 
different phases of human history.” As Hoàng Việt claims, “the agreement with this 
statement for long had served as a gold testing stone for a true Marxist.”355 In the same vein, 
Vũ Hoàng Công argues that  
the most important thing of the concept of the individual is to define the social 
natures of an animal called human … [which were reflected in the] level of 
spiritual growth, the absorptions of social relations, and the capacity to manage 
those relations in accordance with standards, practices, and rules of a particular 
society.356  
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However, in the view of these scholars, Marx did not argue that there was only one aspect to 
the human condition. Hoàng Việt claimed that Marx did not deny the fact that before 
becoming “the ensemble of the social relations,” a human being is an entity.357 Were the 
infants, the mentally or physically disabled people, Công asked, not human beings?
358
 And 
Hoàng Chí Bảo claimed that human rights were all about the two aspects of a human being, 
“the right to exist as a social animal and the right to create as a free individual.”359 This 
embracement of human being as both a member of a particular society and a member of the 
human species laid the foundation for the Vietnamese Marxists to justify the particularities 
and the universality of human rights. 
The thesis that the human being is both a social animal and a unique entity serves as the 
starting point for explaining several features of Vietnamese human rights understanding Part 
of the third feature discussed earlier in this chapter is the contigency of human rights 
realisation on social and economic development level. Commonly quoted by the Vietnamese 
Marxists are Marx’s two statements: the “essential character and direction [of the will of the 
ruling class] are determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class;”360 and 
“right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development 
conditioned thereby.”361 This form of economic determinism has been applied by the 
Vietnamese in prioritizing rights and justifying their limitations on their assurance and 
realisation of human rights, particularly political and civil rights. Vũ Hoàng Công stated that 
the order of priorities of human rights “depend on the economic, political, and social level, 
meaning the level and quality of life.”362 While Nguyễn Phú Trọng who is now the General 
Secretary of the CPV attributed “the limitations in implementing human rights” in early 
1990s on “the limited level of development and the weaknesses in management, and by no 
means because we do not attach importance to taking care of our people.”363 
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As for dialectical relation between rights and duties, the Vietnamese communists have quoted 
Marx that there are “no rights without duties, no duties without rights;”364 “only in 
community [with others, has each] individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all 
directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible;”365 and “the free 
development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”366 Echoing Marx in the 
last statement, Hoàng Chí Bảo contends that, “the free and complete development of each is 
the condition for the development of the whole society, and this is the goal of history [of 
human kind].”367 Accordingly, the relationship between individual rights and common 
interests of the nation becomes interdependent. These ideas fit nicely in the traditional value 
of prioritising common good over individual interests. Combining together, they serve as a 
solid background for the fifth feature of Vietnamese understanding on human rights on the 
relation between rights and duties. 
Another frequently applied feature of Marxism is the view of society as a class struggle. 
Accordingly, the human rights related concepts of law and equality have been viewed 
through this class lens. For Marx, law was just “the will of your [the ruling] class made into a 
law for all.”368 In line with this argument, Trần Hữu Tiến stated that the legal system 
reflected the ruling position of a certain class, resulting in the class nature of citizen rights.
369
 
Thus, human rights as reflected in laws always serve the interests of a certain class in society, 
i.e. the bourgeois rights in capitalist society and the rights of the proletariat in a socialist one. 
A VIIth Party Congress Document in 1991 confirms this understanding, “the State 
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promulgates laws to identify citizen rights and human rights.”370 Likewise, the Vietnamese 
Marxists take Marx’s view that equality means being equal not only in law but also in social 
and economic fields. They quoted Marx as saying that “legal equality should be 
supplemented by social equality” and “equality must mean true equality in economic and 
social field.”371 These views justify the contention in Directive 1992 that human rights reflect 
class struggle. 
To summarize at this point, the influence of Marxism-Leninism is omnipresent in all the 
features of Vietnamese human rights understanding, from the universal, particular, and class 
nature of human rights to the contigency of human rights realisations on economic 
development and culture. Certain traditional values have also been accommodated by 
Marxism-Leninism and embraced by Ho Chi Minh and his followers, such as the view of 
government as a care giver and service provider, the emphasis on positive freedoms through 
legalizing the assurances of economic and social rights, and the submission of individual 
rights to collective interests. Before discussing the Vietnamese view on human rights 
dialogue with other, the remainder of this section analyses the Vietnamese understandings of 
liberty and its constraints and compares them with those of the Americans. 
For the Vietnamese marxists, like other marxists, liberty means that the working people are 
freed from exploitation, oppression, and degradation of human beings caused by the 
capitalists in minority. To ensure this liberty, proletarian dictatorship must be implemented 
even this could entail violence and oppression if necessary against the enemies of socialism. 
Following this rationality, oppression and violence against the capitalists or others who are 
against the interests of the majority are justifiable and necessary. This understanding has been 
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crystalised into the 1959, 1980, 1992, and 2013 Constitutions.
372
 Article 38 of the 1959 
Constitution warned that “[n]o one is allowed to abuse democratic freedoms to infringe upon 
the interests of the State and the people” and this line was retained in article 67 of the 1980 
Constitution. In the same vein, article 70 of the 1992 Constitution and Article 24 of the 2013 
Constitution both prohibited any abuse of religion that violated the laws and policies of the 
State. The 2013 Constitution also repeats the same edicts as those in the 1959 and 1980 
Constitutions though in a different way, “the practice of human rights and citizens’ rights 
cannot infinge upon national interests, and the rights and lawful interests of others.”373 The 
constraint on human rights in the latest constitution contains an unmistakenly natural right 
limitation (the rights of others), but collective interests continue to be used to justify limiting 
human rights. Such constraint is in sharp contrast to American view that liberty is 
conceptualised as individual freedom to do whatever one wishes, as long as those actions do 
not violate the legitimate rights of others. 
For example, on press freedom, the Vietnamese view that all newspapers and journalists are 
supposed to carry out certain political tasks: winning the war against the French and then the 
Americans and/or building socialism in the North after 1954 and the whole nation after 1975. 
The Americans also view press as a tool. The difference is that while the Vietnamese view 
press as a tool of the state to lead the people, the Americans consider press a tool of the 
people to guard against a necessary but evil state. The following arguments are fully rational 
in Marxism-Leninism but could not be comprehensible in liberalism. In interpreting a 
directive on press in 1959 that “prohibits those who abuse that right [freedom of expression] 
to harm the struggle for peace, unification, independence, and democracy of the nation,”374 
the daily newspaper of Vietnam People Army argued that: 
Thus, press at that time, whether of the government, political parties, mass 
organisation, or private sector is the tool for the struggle of the people, must serve 
the interests of the Fatherland, protect the people’s democratic regime, support 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam]. Press has an obligation to 
conduct propaganda work for educating the masses, implement well all directions 
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and policies of the state, fight against all plots, actions and arguments that 
undermine the cause of building a strong North, the cause of unifying the 
Fatherland, peace, and solidarity and friendship with international friends.375 
 
III. The Vietnamese view on human rights dialogue with other 
Drawing on the above analysis, three main features can be drawn about how the way the 
Vietnamese view others in terms of human rights. First, there is an inherent level of pride in 
the Vietnamese view of human rights. While the Americans are proud of their “natural and 
self-evident” superiorities on the issue of human rights and that the U.S. is a land of liberty, 
the Vietnamese find the superiority of their version of human rights through a class lens. 
From a Vietnamese Marxist perspective, the implementation of human rights in Vietnam is 
superior to that in capitalist countries. This is because Vietnamese society is oriented towards 
socialism as a more advanced stage in human history, where both sets of rights (political and 
civil, and social and economic) are promised to be well ensured and protected. Political and 
civil rights in capitalist countries, a Vietnamese Marxist would argue, are exclusive bourgeois 
rights and serve as a façade for the economic exploitation of workers and the toiling people 
there. Besides, the argument goes, the realization of human rights in the U.S. is limited by an 
inherent constraint in its political system as the proletariat and the toiling people is still being 
exploited by the capitalists. While in a country moving towards socialism like Vietnam, the 
proletariat rules over the capitalists who eventually dissolve themselves into the mass; the 
oppressed is in the minority and soon will no longer exist neither will oppression. As, Vice 
President Nguyễn Thị Doan proudly claims, “[o]ur state is a socialist ruling state of the 
people, by the people, and for the people, [Our state] adopts the democratic values of ruling 
states in history and is developing to a new height, total difference in essence and tens of 
thousand times higher than capitalist democracy.” The problem for some negative depictions 
of Vietnam on human rights, she explains, is that the CPV and the State “have not 
disseminated and educated the people to correctly understand that democracy goes with order 
so that some have intentionally abused democracy for making disorder and division [in the 
society] [and this] has negative impact on social order and safety.”376  
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Second, Vietnam situates human rights within the unavoidable war between capitalism and 
communism. Directive 1992 calls for “tak[ing] the initiatives in our struggle for human rights 
in the international arena.” The Tenth Party Congress in 2006 reaffirmed this understanding; 
its political report calls for Vietnam to “proactively participate in the common struggle for 
human rights [and] stand ready for dialogue with concerned countries, and international and 
regional organisations on human rights issue.”377 Interestingly, the Americans may also frame 
human rights as an inevitable war, but in a different way. For the Americans, such war could 
be between the freeworld and the sufferers in the communist world against the authoritarian 
regimes, among them the communist regime in Vietnam. 
Third, and drawing from the second feature, there have been a constant fear that capitalist 
countries use human rights to support subversions or changes towards capitalism in Vietnam. 
This suspicion is reflected in the concept of ‘peaceful evolution’ which was first defined in 
1992 as follows: 
‘Peaceful evolution’ was a fundamental and general strategy by imperialism since 
the late 1980s, which aimed at eliminating socialism through peaceful methods. 
Its main pathway is to infiltrate capitalist elements into socialist countries through 
political, ideological, economic, cultural and social activities, at the same time to 
nurture and encourage elements negating socialism in these countries, creating 
internal transformation of socialism into capitalism.378 
On the same alert attitude, Directive 1992 demanded to “fight against plots abusing this 
[human rights] issues to undermine us [Vietnam].”379 Two years later, at a mid-term Central 
Committee’s plenum in January 1994, the CPV designated ‘peaceful evolution’ as one of the 
four immediate challenges, besides lagging behind economically, derailment from socialism 
direction, and corruption and other social vices.
380
 Obviously, the imperialism referred to 
here is that of the U.S. A number of Vietnamese scholars ague that various American 
strategies towards the socialist block during the Cold War were also peaceful evolution under 
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different names. For them, peaceful evolution appeared in the late 1940s and early 1950s and 
was called “flexible responses” and “the arrow and the olive branch” in the 1960s; “practical 
deterrence” and “stick and carrots” in the 1970s. By the 1980s, they claim, imperialism 
perfected the strategy and used it to wield a decisive blow to socialism in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.
381
 Indeed, the collapse of socialism in the 1990s was then and is 
still now attributed by the Vietnamese to “peaceful evolutions,” among other reasons.382 
In recent years, this concept has been extended to self-evolution: Party members may change 
in a direction away from socialism and forward to capitalism. Party officials were warned by 
Truong Tan Sang in 2000 about the risk of being “seduced by and have fallen into the 
economic traps of hostile forces to the point of losing faiths in socialism and degrading 
morally.”383 Sang also warned that hostile forces and imperialism use the issues of 
democracy, human rights, ethnicity, and religion to call for regime change, destroy social 
consensus, summon “dissidents who actually are anti-socialism elements” and use them as 
insiders for carrying out ‘peaceful evolution.’384 Thus, for the CPV, the Vietnamese must 
always stay vigilant to both peaceful evolution and self-evolution in such issues as 
democracy, human rights and religious freedom. 
This understanding impacts upon human rights issue and dialogue. Vietnam’s human rights 
understanding is vulnerable to being influenced by capitalist elements under the cover of 
human rights reforms. The greater such elements are present in Vietnam, the bigger the threat 
to the regime and socialism in Vietnam. Accordingly, human rights as a concept is well 
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associated with the CPV’s fears of socialism derailment. American concerns for democracy, 
human rights, religious freedom, and ethnic minority are suspected as not sincere and only 
means to topple the communist regime. The CPV indeed confirmed their determination in 
2006 to “foil plots and attempts to distort and abuse the issues of democracy, human rights, 
ethnicity, and religion to interfere into internal affairs, infringe upon independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and political stability of Vietnam.”385 Changes 
related to human rights or in the name of improving human rights conditions are thus 
suspiciously scrutinized under the ambiguous caution of being a ‘deviation from socialism 
direction.’ 
Three observations follow. First, the Vietnamese diplomats are also under two constraints 
against changes in their human rights understandings. Like the American diplomats, the 
Vietnamese diplomats are warned not to change their positions and not speak it out to their 
counterparts in case they disagree with their government policies and position. And whereas 
the Americans are also against changes due to their convictions on the superiority of their 
human rights values, the Vietnamese may think twice when they change their understanding 
on human rights, in fear of peaceful evolution and self-evolution. Second, human rights-
related fears and suspicions are not only found at the Vietnamese communists. As discussed 
in the preceding chapter, the Americans were also feared of elements of communism in their 
response to social and economic rights that were advocated by their own president in the 
1950s. Putting this in the Vietnamese term, it can be said that the Americans were afraid of 
captitalist derailment. And finally, while the Vietnamese are worried about the possible 
impacts of the other on their human rights understanding, the Americans are concerned about 
how their human rights understanding could be adopted by the other. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed Vietnamese understanding of human rights and has compared it 
with the American understanding. Responding to the concept of human rights amidst the 
fears of having to compromise on their revolutionary cause, the Vietnamese have attempted 
to frame human rights both in the natural right school and in Marxism-Leninism. For the 
Vietnamese, human rights are conceptualized as inherent and as dependent on the level of 
development. Unlike the Americans, the Vietnamese hold that human rights are products of 
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the class struggle against oppression and exploitation, and contingent to historical and 
cultural values. In sharp contrast to the American human rights understanding, the 
Vietnamese believe in the unities between individual rights and individual responsibilities, 
between individual rights and national independence and self-determination. And whereas the 
Americans find justifications for their human rights position mainly from Locke and Paine’s 
ideas on natural rights, the Vietnamese construct and justify their human rights understanding 
on selected values of their tradition, Confucianism, Buddhism, Marxism-Leninism, and Ho 
Chi Minh thought. Based on these foundations, the Vietnamese believe that the press should 
be a tool of the state to advance collective goals and that strict regulations should be put on 
the possibility of individuals abusing their human rights that would undermine the state. This 
is incommensurable with American views, in which the press sides with the people against a 
necessary evil state. Overall, besides the possible agreement that human rights are inherent 
and that political and civil rights are human rights, the two countries differ on a number of 
other aspects of human rights, even to the point of incompatibility and incommensurability. 
The chapter has also compared American and Vietnamese view on human rights exchange. 
While the Americans are convinced that such exchanges are uni-directional, and that only 
others should learn from the U.S., the Vietnamese do not reject the possibility of learning 
from others. However, such learning, if it is to occur, must occur in a climate of constant 
guard against derailment from socialism. Moreover, both Americans and Vietnamese are 
proud of their respective human rights understandings for different reasons: the superiority of 
American human rights values for the former, and for the latter, the superiority of socialism 
as their claimed lofty goal. 
The findings in this chapter help to answer the first research sub-question. It has become clear 
now that the two countries differ in many ways in their human rights understanding. These 
differences constitute a real and important obstacle to narrowing their human rights 
differences. Besides, the comparison of their views on human rights exchange suggests that 
exchanges on human rights between the two sides may not be fruitful due to a number of 
limitations. The next two chapters examine an actual encounter of the two human rights 
understandings as examined from Gadamer’s and Habermas’s perspectives. 
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Chapter Three 
The 2006 U.S. - Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue  
as examined using Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics  
 
This chapter carries out two tasks simultaneously. It extracts from Gadamer’s account of 
understanding in philosophical hermeneutics [henceforth PH] a separate model for successful 
human rights dialogues. Specifically, Gadamer’s thoughts on what constitutes understanding, 
what is involved in the process of understanding, and what are the conditions of, and 
indications for, understanding will serve as critical lenses to analyze a transcript of the 2006 
human rights dialogue [henceforth 2006 HRD] between the U.S. and Vietnam. At the same 
time, the chapter tests whether evidences of genuine understanding from a Gadamerian 
perspective can be found in the 2006 HRD. To fulfill these tasks, the chapter is divided into 
three parts. It first locates Gadamer’s overall work in PH and presents his account of mutual 
understanding. It then extrapolates a model of successful dialogue from his work and test 
whether these conditions and indications can be evidenced in the 2006 HRD. The chapter 
then reviews some critique of Gadamer’s PH relevant to this model, provides answers to the 
research questions from a Gadamerian perspective, and links its findings to the conclusions 
reached in the preceding chapters. 
Before fulfilling these tasks, it is necessary to justify for the selection of the 2006 HRD. The 
transcript of the 2006 HRD was, and still is now, the only one available and publicly 
accessible.
386
 No transcript of any of the other 15 human rights dialogues between the U.S. 
and Vietnam is available, nor any additional primary materials about the issue (such as 
Congressional hearings on American human rights dialogues with Vietnam, or the 
assessments of the Communist Party of Vietnam on such dialogues). Accordingly, this sets an 
inherent limitation of the thesis; it cannot assess the progress on the human rights issue 
between the U.S. and Vietnam over the 16 rounds of dialogues.” Nevertheless, in itself, the 
2006 HRD clearly exposes the limits inherent to each party’s position and the difficulties and 
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challenges consequently faced in the dialogue. That is where the Gadamerian and 
Habermasian prisms come into play to expose the deep reasons for the stalemate. 
I. Mutual understanding in Gadamerian PH 
1. Situating Gadamer’s project in PH 
Hermeneutics, of which PH is a branch, is concerned with the methods for interpreting 
ancient and particularly biblical texts.
387
 For early hermeneutic theorists such as Spinoza and 
Chladenius, the primary task of hermeneutics is to transmit a substantive understanding of the 
Bible, which they suggest is for the most part unproblematic. When the truth of claims is no 
longer self-evident however, such as those about miracles, they see the need for explicit 
hermeneutic procedures or methods.
388
 
F.D.E. Schleiermacher moved the focus of hermeneutics from the concerns about classical 
texts “to the general orientation of the science of understanding.”389 He contended that not 
only classical texts and the Bible but all written works and spoken utterances could be 
understood by his formulated principles of a general theory of interpretation.
390
 Unlike his 
predecessors’ idea that understanding arose of itself, Schleiermacher held that it was 
misunderstanding that “occurr[ed] as a matter of course” and thus understanding must be 
“willed and sought at every point.”391 And in order to understand a text, the interpreter 
“transform himself … into the author” to comprehend the author as an individual.392 This 
“divinatory method” as he called it allows the uniqueness of the author to be found. However, 
Schleiermacher argued that this method must be combined with a comparative one – compare 
the author with “the others of the same general type” – so that the author’s particulars can be 
confirmed.
393
 In this way, for Schleiermacher, the interpreter can understanding the author 
                                                          
387
 Shapcott, Richard, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 133, also Ringma, Charles Richard, Gadamer’s Dialogical Hermeneutic: the 
Hermeneutics of Bultmann, of the New Testament Sociologists, and of the Social Theologians in Dialogue with 
Gadamer’s Hermeneutic, Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag C. Winter, 1999, p. 9. 
388
 Warnke, Georgia, Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, p. 10. 
389
 Ibid, p. 19, quoted in Ricoeur, Paul , Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action 
and Interpretation, edited, translated and introduced by John B. Thompson, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1981, p. 19. 
390
 Warnke, op. cit., pp. 1-6. 
391
 Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E., Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscript, edited by Heinz Kimmerle and 
translated by J. Duke and J. Forstman, Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977, pp. 108-10. 
392
 Ibid., p. 150. 
393
 Ibid., pp.150-1. 
114 
 
better than she understands herself as the former has “rightly reconstruct[ed] the creative act” 
of the latter.
394
 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, particularly the need to understand the author’s intentions, 
were applied to the study of history by Ludwig von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen of the 
Historical School and developed by Wilhelm Dilthey.
395
 While Schleiermacher searches for 
the methods that would permit an objective understand of any texts and utterances, Dilthey 
extends the object of inquiry to any symbolic structures, “including actions, social practices, 
norms and values” and aims to bring about a general methodology “that would be distinct 
from, but equal in status and objectivity to, that of the natural sciences.”396 As Ringma notes, 
with the work of Dilthey, hermeneutics in the 19
th
 century became the methodological 
foundation for all human sciences.
397
 
Gadamer criticizes that these scholars had mistakenly restricted the problem of understanding 
to ascertaining only the author’s intentions.398 For Gadamer, the task of hermeneutics is not to 
penetrate “the spiritual activities of the author” but to grasp “the meaning, significance, and 
aim of what is transmitted to us”399 as “we cannot enter the horizon of the past and 
understand it on its own terms, for we cannot leave ourselves behind.”400 Gadamer also 
criticizes Dilthey’s search for the objectivity of understanding that followed the influence of 
the Cartesian theory.
401
 Developed by Descartes, this theory rejects “prejudices, tradition, or 
any authority” as the foundation of knowledge, and claims that one could reach objectivity in 
understanding by resorting to the appeal of reason that was “universal, not limited by 
historical contingencies, and shared by all rational beings.”402 This Cartesian rejection of 
authority and tradition, as Bernstein notes, is the seed for the typical Enlightenment contrasts 
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between “reason and tradition, reason and authority, reason and superstition.”403 Against this 
view, Gadamer points out that Cartesianism fails to acknowledge the dependence of human 
knowledge on tradition and prejudices because the theory is “based on a misunderstanding of 
being, and in particular upon a misunderstanding of our being-in-the-world.”404 Thus, the 
Enlightenment’s claim of overcoming all prejudices, for Gadamer, “prove[s] to be itself a 
prejudice.”405 
This ontological attack against Descartes is not only attributed to Gadamer, but also to 
Heidegger. Indeed, the latter had a great influence on the former upon whose work Gadamer 
built.
406
 Jean Grondin argues that Gadamer built on Heidegger’s notion of understanding and 
applied it to the field of the hermeneutical disciplines and the linguistic nature of 
experience.
407
 Ringma also notes that Gadamer took up Heidegger’s fore-structure of 
understanding and gave it a strong historical orientation. For Heidegger, understanding is 
interpretation and grounded in fore-having (something we have in advance), fore-sight 
(something we see in advance), and fore-conception (something we grasp in advance). 
Gadamer develops that these fore-structures are not only our personal property, but they are 
the prejudices which constitute our horizon.
408
 
While it is impossible to capture Gadamer’s hermeneutics in a few sentences, some of the 
main arguments of his hermeneutics could be summarized as followed. On one hand, 
Gadamer contends that language is not only the medium for understanding but also what 
“discloses and manifests the world for us” and conditions “the scope of our knowledge and 
experience;” and what is contained within and carried by language is history and tradition. As 
Shapcott notes, “the major argument of Truth and Method is that all knowledge is 
interpretation because all knowledge is constituted linguistically.”409 On the other hand, 
Gadamer claims that understanding is ontologically a function of our situatedness in an 
historical tradition. And history and language provide the productive prejudices with which 
one understands and engages with the world. For Gadamer, understanding corresponds to a 
dialogue between the interpreter and the text or between two interlocutors, and is possible 
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when there is a fusion of their horizons. The following section presents in more details 
Gadamer’s account of understanding and how the U.S. – Vietnam human rights 
understanding could be explained from Gadamer’s perspective. 
 
2. Gadamer’s account of understanding  
Gadamer explains understanding as follows, 
to understand means primarily for two people to understand one another. Understanding 
is primarily agreement or harmony with another person. Men generally understand each 
other directly, i.e. they are in dialogue until they reach agreement. Understanding, then, is 
always understanding about something. Understanding each other means understanding 
each other on a topic or the like.410 
What Gadamer is stating here is that understanding involves a process of a conversation 
between at least two interlocutors over a subject matter that is placed before them. They 
could be two partners in a conversation or one person and the text he/she is trying to 
understand. In the conversation, the interlocutors pose questions and seek answers from each 
other on a subject matter until they come to agreement on it. This is also true for the 
interpreter and his text. In reading the text, the interpreter is searching for answers for his 
questions about a particular topic. Furthermore, for Gadamer the subject of understanding is a 
specific topic, neither the original meaning nor the initial intentions of the speakers. 
However, the hearer should return to the intention of the speaker or the reader to the author’s 
original meaning when the understanding of the subject matter is disturbed.
411
 
As we communicate and reach agreement with one another through language, language 
becomes the medium of understanding. As Gadamer puts it clearly, “every conversation 
automatically presupposes that the two speakers speak the same language. Only when it is 
possible for two people to make themselves understood through language by talking together 
can the problem of understanding and agreement be even raised.”412 In the case where the 
two speakers are dependent on translation, Gadamer continues, the hermeneutical process of 
the conversation is duplicated: the process between the translator and the other as well as 
between oneself and the translator.
413
 In this case, the translator must translate the meaning 
into the living context of the other speaker. Since the meaning must be preserved and 
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“understood within a new linguistic world, it must be expressed within it in a new way.” As 
such, every translation, Gadamer concludes, “is at the same time an interpretation.”414 
Another aspect of Gadamerian understanding is that understanding also means interpretation 
and application. Gadamer shared the romantic recognition of the inner unity of understanding 
and interpretation when he stated that “interpretation is not an occasional additional act 
subsequent to understanding, but rather understanding is always an interpretation, and hence 
interpretation is the explicit form of understanding.”415 But he moved beyond romantic 
hermeneutics by claiming that application is also an integral element of all understanding or 
“[u]nderstanding… is always application” as a proper way of understanding a text is that it 
must be understood “at every moment, in every particular situation, in a new and different 
way.” 416 In this vein, the text will be understood differently, depending on different situations 
that the interpreter encounters. Thus, when we say we understand something, we in fact 
interpret it and apply our particular situation to make sense of it. 
The above example of a translator is a good case in point. In interpreting the meaning of the 
speaker, the translator had already applied the words that he deemed appropriate in his 
situation so as to bring the preserved meaning across the two different linguistic worlds and 
express it in one of those two languages. To put it another way, the selection of those words 
depends on the overall situation in which the translation takes place and on the knowledge of 
the two languages of the interpreter at that particular moment. This dependency of 
understanding of a text’s on the interpreter’s situation produces the text new meaning for 
different interpreters or even for the same interpreter at different times. In this regard, 
application is situational and likewise, in Gadamer’s words, “understanding itself proved to 
be an event.”417 
As understanding is situational, for Gadamer, any claim to objectivity is denied. “The very 
idea of a situation,” Gadamer points out, “means that we are not standing outside it and hence 
are unable to have any objective knowledge of it. We are always within the situation, and to 
throw light on it is a task that is never entirely completed.”418 In other words, objective 
knowledge is unattainable because of the historical situatedness of the people who seek it. 
And this incompleteness, Gadamer explains, “is not due to a lack in the reflection, but lies in 
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the essence of the historical being which is ours.”419 The essence of our being-in-the-world is 
reflected in what Heidegger called fore-havings and Gadamer developed as prejudices. 
Gadamer defines prejudices as prejudgments which are “given before all the elements that 
determine a situation have been finally examined.”420 Simply put, they are the convictions, 
ideas and opinions that one has before encountering another person or text. As they are 
prejudgments, they can be true and positive, or false and negative. While the latter “hinder 
understanding and lead to misunderstandings,” the former are “productive prejudices that 
make understanding possible.”421 The interpreter, he continues, cannot separate in advance 
these two kinds of prejudices and even is not aware of a prejudice “while it is constantly 
operating unnoticed.” She is aware of his/her own prejudices if they are stimulated by his/her 
encountering something new and valid.
422
 To put it another way, our prejudices are operating 
without being recognized by us until we are experiencing the other’s claim to truth. Only by 
accepting that the other’s claim to truth may be valid, do we notice our prejudices and tell the 
positive and true from the negative and false ones.
423
 Thus, as Ringma notes, our own 
prejudices represent an important starting point of and the foundation for our 
understanding.
424
 
Other concepts involved in the Gadamerian process of understanding are tradition and 
horizon. Similar to the concept of prejudice, tradition becomes part of us and we cannot 
distance ourselves from it. As Gadamer states: 
We stand always within tradition, and this is no objectifying process, i.e. we do 
not conceive of what tradition says as something other, something alien. It is 
always part of us, a model of exemplar, a recognition of ourselves which our 
later historical judgment would hardly see as a kind of knowledge, but as the 
simplest preservation of tradition.425  
But for Gadamer this preservation is not simply a reproduction of the old but a combination 
of the old with the new to create a new value; in other words, there are both continuity of 
what is transmitted to us from the past in the form of prejudices and creativity in any present 
situation.
426
 And tradition is a precondition for our understanding, as the latter can be defined 
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as the placing of ourselves “within a process of tradition, in which past and present are 
constantly fused.”427 However, understanding also helps to develop tradition, in Gadamer’s 
words, “we produce it ourselves, inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of 
tradition and hence further determine it ourselves.”428 
Gadamer defines the concept of horizon as “the range of vision that includes everything that 
can be seen from a particular vantage of point” that a person possesses in a particular 
situation or standpoint.
429
 For Gadamer, the possibility of vision is determined by a person’s 
attitude and limited by this particular standpoint. If that person “does not see far enough and 
hence overvalues what is nearest to him,” s/he then has no horizon; contrariwise, s/he who 
has an horizon is able to see beyond what is nearest and “knows the relative significance of 
everything within this horizon, as near or far, great or small.”430 And our horizon is always in 
motion and change with us when we change our position or acquire a new standpoint.
431
 In 
this sense, interlocutors understand each other on a subject matter, if and when their different 
perspectives on the matter or horizons “meet in a fusion.” These changes, as Shapcott notes, 
are not as radical as to the level of “annihilation or assimilation of existing positions” but 
sufficient enough for the interlocutors to share a new meaning or occupy the same territory or 
vantage point.
432
 Thus, the extent of mutual understanding among the interlocutors can be 
measured by the extent of the fusion of their horizons. 
To summarize at this point, according to Gadamer, understanding is dialogical and 
linguistical in nature. There is an inner unity between understanding with interpretation, 
translation, and application. Understanding can also be understood as an event as we are 
situated within an historical tradition which constitutes and also is constituted by our own 
prejudices.
433
 Moreover, understanding can also be regarded as a fusion of horizons, the 
extent of which depends on the interlocutors’ attitudes and positions. As all these concepts 
are relevant to a process of mutual understanding, any analysis of a genuine dialogue requires 
firstly the examinations of the prejudices, traditions and horizons of the participants. 
Applying these ideas on the 2006 HRD, mutual understanding in that dialogue means that the 
Americans and the Vietnamese agree with each other on certain perceptions of human rights 
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or human rights-related issues at that particular moment of the dialogue. Such mutual 
understanding also involves a process in which the Vietnamese and the American 
interlocutors apply their own traditional, cultural, and historical convictions into their 
interpretations of the meanings raised by the other side. This demands that before analyzing 
the 2006 HRD, it is necessary to examine both the participants’ prejudices and the particular 
context of that dialogue. 
As the participants in the 2006 HRD are diplomats who represent their respective countries, 
an analysis of their prejudices could be reduced to American and Vietnamese human rights 
understanding. This analysis has been carried out in the previous two chapters. The following 
thus is an overview of the background of the 2006 HRD. 
 
3. The bilateral context of the 2006 HRD 
Prior to the 11
th
 human rights dialogue, U.S. – Vietnam relations were in a warm and 
improving state. In June 2005, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai paid an official visit to the 
U.S., the first such visit since the end of the war in 1975.
434
 Prime Minister Khai and 
President Bush committed to bring their bilateral relations “to a higher plane by developing a 
friendly, constructive, and multi-faceted cooperative partnership on the basis of equality, 
mutual respect, and mutual benefit.” The two leaders also agreed on the importance of 
pursuing an “open and candid dialogue on issues of common concern, including human-rights 
practices and conditions for religious believers and ethnic minorities.”435 In January 2006, 
Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill visited Vietnam to reconfirm this framework and pave 
the way for President Bush’s visit later that year.436 
This framework was expected to facilitate a number of mutually-benefiting facets of the 
relations. Most notably was trade which had risen sharply year by year since the bilateral 
trade agreement took effect in 2001. In 2005, the United States was Vietnam’s largest export 
market, and U.S. firms constituted “the single largest source of foreign direct investment in 
Vietnam.”437 The two governments were also in their final phases of bilateral negotiations for 
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Vietnam’s admission to the World Trade Organization. In January 2006, a delegation of 
American negotiators led by Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Dorothy Dwoskin 
successfully concluded another round of negotiations.
438
 Joining the WTO was necessary for 
Vietnam’s development and integration into the world economy, a goal that Vietnam had 
long pursued. As a member of the WTO, Vietnam would also receive the permanent normal 
trade relation status (NTR) from the U.S., not the conditional NTR that required presidential 
waiver of Jackson-Vanik provisions and Congress’s approval of the waiver.439 
Positive developments were also observed in the human rights situation in Vietnam, 
particularly in regards to religious freedom. In the two years prior to the dialogue, the 
Vietnamese government had issued a number of ordinances and decrees on religious 
freedom, namely the Ordinance on Belief and Religion in June 2004, its Implementing 
Decree in March 2005, and the Prime Minister’s Instruction on Protestantism in February 
2005. These documents provide a legal framework for religious policies and practices in the 
country. Accordingly, the right to religious freedom is assured in Vietnam and any forced 
following or renouncing any religion is prohibited by law. At the same time, people are 
warned not to abuse religious freedom for activities that “undermine peace, national 
independence and unity.”440 On this basis, Vietnam allowed the return of the long exiled 
Buddhist leader Thich Nhat Hanh with nearly a hundred of his followers in the early months 
of 2005.
441
 Later in the year, Vietnam also welcomed Cardinal Sepe of the Vatican for a 
series of meetings with Vietnamese leaders and chairing an establishment ceremony of the 
26
th
 diocese in the country.
442
 After the visit by Ambassador-at-large for International 
Religious Freedom John Hanford in March that year, the two governments reached an 
agreement on religious freedom in which the Vietnamese government made a number of 
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commitments to advance and protect religious freedom in Vietnam,
443
 and in August, 
Vietnam issued a White Paper on the country’s human rights policies and achievements. 
The Americans, however, had a number of additional human rights concerns, among them 
were imprisonment of “political dissidents,” administrative detention, and the questions of 
the Montagnards in Central Highlands.
444
 In their views, although Vietnamese law provided 
for freedom of worship, in practice Vietnam continued to “restrict significantly organized 
activities of religious groups that it declared to be at variance with state laws and policies.”445 
One indirect way of controlling and monitoring religious activities is that all religious 
organizations must register and get the state’s approval to practice. The 2004 country report 
on human rights practice by the U.S. State Department observed that members of the Unified 
Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) continued to be harassed and prevented from 
“conducting independent religious activities, particularly outside their pagodas.... [and] 
During the year, several UBCV leaders, including Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, 
remained confined to their pagodas and had restrictions on their ability to travel and meet 
with followers.”446 As for political dissidents, the report charged that the Vietnamese 
government “continued to imprison persons for the peaceful expression of dissenting 
religious and political views;” thus activist Nguyen Khac Toan, journalist Nguyen Vu Binh 
and Dr. Pham Hong Son were all convicted of “spying” in 2002 and 2003. 
Administrative detention was another concern of the U.S. According to the 2004 country 
report, Vietnamese courts “may sentence persons to administrative detention of up to five 
years after completion of a sentence.”447 Besides, under the Decree 31/CP of 1997448 and the 
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revised Ordinance on Administrative Violations, People's Committee chairpersons at local, 
district, and provincial levels can propose "administrative measures" (including terms ranging 
from six months to two years in either juvenile reformatories or adult detention centers) on 
offenders with a record of minor offenses such as petty theft or "humiliating other persons" 
without a trial.
449
  
Lastly, on ethnic minorities, the report held that although the Vietnamese government had 
preferential treatments and policies for ethnic minorities, “the large-scale migration of ethnic 
Kinh [the majority ethnic group of Vietnam] to the Central Highlands in past years led to 
numerous land disputes between ethnic minority households and ethnic Kinh migrants.” “The 
loss of traditional ethnic minority lands to Kinh migrants,” according to the report, “was an 
important factor behind the ethnic unrest in the Central Highlands in 2001 and during the 
year.” Besides, “[Vietnamese] Government officials continued to harass some highland 
minorities, particularly .. several ethnic groups in the Central Highlands, for practicing their 
Protestant religion without official approval.” For these reasons “groups of Montagnards 
continued to flee to Cambodia to escape ethnic and religious repression in the Central 
Highlands.” However, they were caught by Vietnamese police “operating on both sides of the 
border” and returned to Vietnam, “sometimes followed by beatings and detentions.”450 
The Vietnamese government had a different accounts on these matters. On its White Paper on 
Human Rights which was released in August 2005, the Vietnamese government claimed that 
there were hostile forces who “for their own political purposes, have used and continue to use 
all means to make fabrications and false allegations against Vietnam on issues related to 
human rights, democracy, religions and ethnicity.” Among them are “a small group of 
persons who just wrap themselves in the religious cloak to serve the interests of the outside 
forces; they do not care about the life of religion followers.” The UBCV and its leaders 
would fall into this category in the White Paper. The “so-called” political dissidents, in the 
view of the Vietnamese government, were “a handful of people who are using the label of 
‘fighting for freedom and human rights’ to promote their personal ambitions and foreign 
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interests in disregard of the voice of the majority” and claimed that “in a number of cases, 
they try to mislead people as to the law violators, turning these law violators into ‘freedom 
fighters.’” In other words, the Vietnamese government held that such individuals of U.S. 
concerns as Nguyen Khac Toan, Nguyen Vu Binh and Dr. Pham Hong Son only aimed at 
pursuing their own selfish ambitions while disregarding the common interests of the nation. 
Such people were, the White Paper charged, under the “patronage of some foreign forces” 
and promoted those forces’ interests. In so doing, they had broken Vietnamese laws and 
therefore being sent to prison.
451
 
The unrest in Central Highland, the White Paper argued, was not due to land disputes 
between the ethnic minority and the Kinh people. The riots there in 2001 and 2004 were 
instigated by some “terrorist” organizations such as the one led by Nguyen Huu Chanh or the 
“Montagnard Foundation Inc.” of Ksor Kok.452 That organization, the White Paper charged, 
had been “frenziedly promoting acts of secession and, for these purposes, ha[d] been falsely 
accusing Vietnam of suppressing, arresting and coercing ethnic minority people and forcing 
Protestants to renounce their religion in the Central Highlands.”453 Under this charge, the 
information about religious repression, and harassments and beatings of ethnic minority 
people in that area was appears unclear and could have been fabricated by those “terrorist 
organizations.”  
Under this bilateral context and with their different accounts on human rights situation in 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese and American interlocutors held their 11
th
 round of human rights 
dialogue on 20 February 2006.
454
 The Chapter now discusses the conditions for, and 
indications of, true understanding and simultaneously tests each of these in the 2006 
dialogue. 
 
II. Gadamer’s conditions for, and indication of, mutual understanding and the reviews 
of these conditions and indication in the 2006 HRD 
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1. Condition One The purpose of the interlocutors is to seek mutual understanding, not out-
argue the other or learn the other’s position. 
The first Gadamerian condition for mutual understanding relates to the purposes of the 
dialogue participants. According to Gadamer, no mutual understanding can be reached if the 
participants come to the dialogue only to convince the other of the primacy of their opinion or 
to win over the other; in his words, to “talk at cross purposes,” “to out-argue the other 
person”455 or to successfully assert “one’s own point of view.”456 Moreover, no mutual 
understanding is possible if the partners in a conversation are only aiming at discovering the 
others’ positions, as such conversation, Gadamer explains, “is not a true conversation, in the 
sense that we are not seeking agreement concerning an object, but the specific contents of the 
conversation are only a means to get to know the horizon of the other person.” Gadamer 
illustrates this point by examples of a therapeutical doctor examining her patient, a teacher 
questioning her student in exam, or a policeman inquiring a suspected man. In those cases, 
the doctor, the teacher, and the policeman only aim at drawing out what the others have 
known, felt, or done whereas the patient, the student, or the suspected criminal are not trying 
to understand their interlocutors.
457
 Therefore, for Gadamer the specific contents of a true 
conversation should be the subject matter: all partners must have no other purpose but to seek 
mutual understanding about a subject matter. 
Applying this condition into the 2006 HRD, its interlocutors seemed to meet this first 
condition. Both sides did not aim at convincing the other of the primacy of their opinions. On 
their approaches to human rights, neither side attempted to establish that their approach was 
the right one or superior. Indeed, they openly acknowledged and respected their differences. 
“Given historical, political and cultural differences,” the head of the Vietnamese delegation 
claimed, “each nation's values are also different.”458 The leader of the American delegation 
agreed with this by reiterating then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice’s contention that 
“democracy by definition cannot be imposed, and that there is no single road to building 
democracy.”459 And even when their differences on the same matter - basic and fundamental 
human rights - were revealed, neither sides sought to persuade the other that their 
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understanding was right and the other was wrong. Indeed, both sides only claimed what they 
believe is right for them: 
The Vietnamese interlocutor: [freedom and independence] are the basic human rights that 
Vietnam cherishes, along with sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in its 
internal affairs. [Italics added]460 
The American interlocutor: the Secretary, the President and the American people believe 
that there are some universal human rights principles: the right for the full political 
participation of the citizens of each country; the right for the development of a robust 
civil society; and, the right to have a government that is transparent and accountable to 
the people. [Italics added]461 
Learning the other side’s positions was not the purpose of the interlocutors. Each side openly 
stated their aims: to reach concrete results (for the Americans), and to increase mutual 
understanding and remove Vietnam from the CPC list. These seem to be their real goals and 
the degree of success in achieving them would be tested at the end of the dialogue. For the 
Vietnamese, the dialogue was a “success” as it allowed the two sides to “share experiences, 
learn from each other and increase mutual understanding.”462 For the head of the American 
delegation, the dialogue was a starting point of a working process where judgments would be 
based not on “the quantity of meetings we hold, but what those meetings produce.”463 Thus, 
while the Vietnamese searched for the dialogue results in the realm of thoughts, the 
Americans located any such results in the area of actions, such as specific commitments or 
actions. 
 
2. Condition Two The interlocutors let themselves be led by the truth of the discussed matter. 
For Gadamer, “reaching understanding in conversation presupposes that both partners are 
ready for it.”464 To prepare for mutual understanding, Gadamer advises that no side should 
seek to dominate the dialogue and attempt to dominating the other. This relates to the 
pathologies of power relations where a side falls into the above situation of trying to 
‘convince’ the other. The power vacuum should be filled by the validity of the arguments on 
the subject matter. Put in another way, the authority in a true conversation, if there is any, 
should be that of the truth of the subject matter. Consequently, Gadamer argues, the partners 
do not actually “conduct” a conversation; instead they are led by it, for the conversation will 
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take “its own turnings” and reach “its own conclusion” about which the partners cannot know 
at the beginning of their conversation.
465
  
Throughout the 2006 HRD, the interlocutors took control of the dialogue and at no times 
were they led by the truth of the discussed matters. Indeed, their differences were not 
extensively discussed or even touched upon, making it difficult for any new meaning on the 
discussed matter to emerge. The following pattern of exchange can be observed in most of 
the dialogue: the interlocutors used their allocated time to state their positions, quickly 
expressed their agreements on what they could agree, and deliberately ignored the 
differences. Below is a typical example of how the interlocutors conversed on certain topics. 
The section “Approaches to Human Rights” was the only occasion in the entire dialogue 
when some of Vietnamese and American prejudices on human rights were directly exposed. 
Their differences on this were clear: the Vietnamese named independence and freedom as 
their fundamental rights while the Americans recalled the rights for “full political 
participation,” for the “development of a robust civil society,” and “transparent and 
accountable” government.”466 However, identifying the basic rights was not the concerns of 
the interlocutors. In fact, after taking turn to present their human rights approaches, neither 
side discussed their approaches any further. The Americans did not question why collective 
rights should be added to basic human rights besides the individual rights that they listed. 
Similarly, the Vietnamese did not challenge the claim that those individual rights are 
fundamental and also important for Vietnam’s development. Consequently, no explanation or 
justification appear to relativize either the American or the Vietnamese human rights 
conviction. On Gadamerian terms, American and Vietnamese human rights-related horizons 
on fundamental human rights remained untouched.  
Moreover, even when either side was directly or indirectly challenged by the other, they 
intentionally avoided the challenge, which, if accepted might put themselves in difficult and 
disadvantaged positions. Consider the following exchanges: 
The Vietnamese: 
V1: All the prisoners of American concern “have been charged, tried and convicted of 
offenses under Vietnam’s criminal code.” 
V2: A request for explanation on the contradiction between Patriot Act and American urging 
other countries to consider human rights over national security. 
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The Americans: 
A1: The criminal code and due process are problematic. 
A2: The Patriot Act was passed through “democratically” which is “the best guarantee against 
abuse by the state.”467 
(A1) responded to (V1), and (A2) to (V2). (A2) seemed not to address the Vietnamese 
concern in (V2); or it could be interpreted that if other countries follow the American way for 
reconciling national security and human rights, they will not be criticized by the U.S. In both 
cases, the Vietnamese did not elaborate further on the American responses, leaving 
Vietnamese positions on the Code or the American way of reconciling national security and 
human rights unknown. If the issues were pushed further, the dialogue might have taken 
unexpected turns. For example, further questions and answers about the Code could have led 
to more substantial results. If the Vietnamese observed that the Americans were right about 
the Code, this could have led to a Vietnamese acceptance that they had violated ICCPR and 
accordingly Vietnam may have released some prisoners of American concerns. If the 
Americans agreed that their charges against the Code were wrong, they would have dropped 
the issue of concerned prisoners after the dialogue. Any agreement on the Code by the two 
sides could not emerge because the Vietnamese did not engage in pushing the matter with the 
Americans. 
All in all, deliberately ignoring undesirable topics and reluctance to engage each other had 
kept most of the interlocutors’ differences on those topics intact. At the same time, the 
interlocutors were in total control of the dialogue, but not of the issues discussed. As little 
developments in the substance of the dialogue and no unexpected twists and turns were 
registered, no new meanings had been borne out of it. This Gadamerian condition was thus 
not satisfied. 
 
3. Condition Three Acknowledge that one’s own prejudices are operating and could be 
wrong, and be ready to suspend them when encountering something new and different. 
A third condition is that the interlocutors should acknowledge and bracket their own 
prejudices. “The primary hermeneutical condition,” Gadamer states, requires the fundamental 
suspension of our own prejudice(s) or more correctly its (their) validity “for what leads to 
understanding must be something that has already asserted itself in its own separate 
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validity.”468 In other words, understanding is possible only if we are willing to suspend those 
prejudices that have turned out to be wrong. At the same time, we only recognize that these 
prejudices are vulnerable when we encounter something new and different from the 
text/conversation. Gadamer makes the same argument when he warns an interpreter reading a 
text of the past that “it is constantly necessary to guard against over hastily assimilating the 
past to your own expectations of meaning. Only then can we listen to tradition in a way that 
permits it to make its own meaning heard.”469 Similarly, the interlocutors must be aware of 
the fact that their prejudices are always operating and tempting them to assimilate the other’s 
views into theirs. They must suspend this temptation for not only the voice of the others to be 
heard but also the meaning expressed by the others to be considered. As Shapcott puts it, 
“only when we are aware of the fact that we always bring prejudices with us” can we 
“prevent our prejudices from over-determining the content of encounter” and “understand the 
other, hear their particular voice and resist assimilation.”470 
Testing this criterion in the 2006 HRD, it can be argued that the participants were not 
challenged by a new meaning from their conversation. As previously discussed, on most 
issues of different assessments and positions, they opted for ignorance or evasion. With no 
challenging questions posed, no further clarifications, explanations and justifications were 
required. As their positions were not challenged, so were their underlying rationales and 
arguments for their positions. Under this logic, the American and Vietnamese interlocutors 
did not need to recall and apply their prejudices as they did not have to defend their positions. 
And as their prejudices were not challenged, it was difficult for the participants to 
acknowledge that their convictions were just prejudgments and might be wrong. We have 
observed this in the above analysis of their exchange on fundamental human rights. 
Nevertheless, there were moments when their prejudices were either suspended or exposed. 
Consider the following suspensions of their prejudices: 
On Decree 31, Ambassador Hanford held that the decree violated the ICCPR and this needed 
to be addressed. For the Vietnamese, the decree was justified at the time of its issuance and 
later might be changed as no legal document is permanent.
471
 By accounting for the decree in 
a general term, the Vietnamese chose not to disclose their convictions on whether the decree 
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was wrong then as the Americans charged. Likewise, the Americans suspended their 
assessments on whether the decree was acceptable when it was promulgated. Consequently, 
both sides came out of this exchange with unshaken belief in their prejudices. However, it 
was difficult for the interlocutors to question their own prejudices when the other side opted 
for not commenting on those prejudices, a long distance from challenging them. 
Another example is that after listening to the Vietnamese account on training local officials 
on the new legal framework for religious freedom, Ambassador Hanford politely 
acknowledged Vietnam’s “vigorous efforts to train local officials.” What followed put this 
acknowledgement into question. “The GVN needs to work on educating local authorities to 
properly enforce the law,” Ambassador Hanford said, as his office continues to receive 
“credible reports” of violations of religious rights in the Central and Northwest Highlands. 
This acknowledgement did not force him to look back and question his own prejudgments on 
religious freedoms before participating in the dialogue. The reports on church closings and 
religious practices obstructions that he received before the dialogue remained “credible” for 
him. His encounter with a detailed description of local official trainings did not force him to 
review that his earlier convictions on the issue might be wrong. Consequently, he suggested 
what he had thought in advance, “the need for continued efforts to educate local officials.”472 
An exposure of the interlocutors’ prejudices was found in their discussion of the charges of 
violating religious freedom by local leaders in Ha Giang province by an article in the Time 
Magazine.
473
 Encountering with this new information, the Vietnamese interlocutors had three 
different responses: 
DG Minh: “The GVN will verify, objectively and in due course the information it contains, 
and does not want to admit or reject anything in it now.”474 
Supreme People's Procuracy Deputy DG Nghiem Quang Xuyen: “If the article is true, some 
of the officials mentioned could face criminal charges.”475 
Deputy DG Nguyen Thi Bach Tuyet from the Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA): “The 
Time article needs to be verified, but based on the CRA's recent unsatisfactory visit to Ha 
Giang (where the local authorities repeated the statement to the CRA delegation that there are 
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no believers in Ha Giang, a statement the CRA acknowledges is untrue) the article's 
description of the local authorities' behavior "might be true." ...[and] Significant progress has 
been made in the Central Highlands in the past 18 months ... and now the CRA is focused on 
the Northwest Highlands provinces. The CRA hopes to be able to report significant progress 
there, too.”476 
These three reactions are different. The first two Vietnamese suspended their prejudices, but 
they did not take the next step of engaging with the new information provided by the 
Americans. DG Minh took a step back by stating that the Vietnamese government “does not 
admit or reject anything in it [the article] now,” though he made a promise to investigate in 
the case. Xuyen’s response was in a hypothetical sentence, implying a strict punishment if the 
information was correct. In both responses, we can not know what Minh and Xuyen really 
thought about the new information or whether they had any precise position on religious 
freedom in that province. Their suspension of prejudices, thus, was not sufficient for any 
newness in the discussed issue to emerge. 
Tuyet, however, openly revealed her thoughts. She recalled that her recent visit to the 
province was unsatisfactory. Although she did not elaborate further on her visit, her 
experience with the province’s officials points to a conclusion similar to American 
assessments. In this case, she exposed her thoughts on local officials in Ha Giang and a 
common ground between Tuyet’s and American horizons appear. In this very utterance, a 
certain territory of agreement was occupied by both the Americans and the Vietnamese 
(Tuyet at least): that Ha Giang officials were wrong to deny the existence of religious 
followers in that province. It is also the last time in the dialogue that we could observe the 
interlocutors’ prejudices to be recalled and compared when dealing with new information. 
However, it should be noted that what Tuyet learned from the article was neither new nor 
different to her experience. Tuyet’s response thus was close to Gadamer’s third condition for 
mutual understanding but not fully met it. 
 
4. Condition Four Putting oneself into the other’s horizon without objectifying the other and 
relating the new truth provided by the other to his/her particularity. 
After satisfying a third condition of acknowledging the impacts of their own prejudices, the 
interlocutors in the Gadamer’s model must then place themselves into the others’ horizons. 
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As discussed earlier, this does not mean trying to grasp the initial intentions of the other, but 
means that “becom[ing] aware of the otherness, indissoluble individuality of the other 
person.”477 For Gadamer, then, putting oneself to the other’s position means respecting the 
other’s as a separate subject who does not require our empathy and cannot be imposed by our 
own standards.
478
 The purpose of this action is that in seeing things as the other does, the 
interlocutors are able to see the respective validity of each other’s opinions and arguments. 
The acknowledgement of this otherness, Gadamer warns, should not mean objectifying the 
other. For the interlocutors whose purpose is only to know the other’s positions, the efforts to 
understand stop when the other’s ideas become intelligible. It also does not mean totally 
replacing one’s own horizon by the viewpoints of the others. Gadamer illustrates this by the 
following example: 
We think we understand when we see the past from a historical standpoint, i.e. 
place ourselves in the historical situation and seek to reconstruct the historical 
horizon. In fact, however, we have given up the claim to find, in the past, any 
truth valid and intelligible for ourselves. Thus this acknowledgement of the 
otherness of the other, which makes him the object of objective knowledge, 
involves the fundamental suspension of his claim to truth.479 
In other words, although the historian has put herself into the horizons of the past, she still 
fails to critically assess it. The reason is that she has attached the tag named “belonging to the 
past” to any valid truth that she has found in it. For her, if the past is right on something, it is 
right only in the past. Any connection of this rightness to her present situation cannot be 
reached because she had already adopted a historical standpoint while studying the past. 
Similarly, the dialogical partners should not hold that any valid point that they have found 
from the others’ arguments is likely to be valid only for the other and in the other’s situation. 
In this vein, to reach mutual understanding, the self shall not quarantine any new truth 
provided by the other within the other’s particularity; instead s/he should let his/her 
prejudices be exposed, disturbed, and challenged by this possible new truth. 
Applying this condition into the 2006 HRD, it can be observed that neither the Vietnamese 
nor the Americans truly attempted to examine human rights issues from the other side’s 
perspective, despite the fact that their approaches to human rights had been presented at the 
beginning of the dialogue. For example, the Vietnamese interlocutors did not look at the 
American allegation that Decree 31 violated ICCPR and the related American view that 
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individual political rights were fundamental. The Vietnamese justification for the Decree 
started with a collective viewpoint, “Vietnam is currently attempting” and “Vietnam needs 
legal documents to...”480 The only moment when the Vietnamese admitted political rights as 
fundamental was when a member of the Vietnamese delegation read a prepared text. As 
observed by the American side, Deputy Director Nguyen Tri Dung ... read the official GVN 
response from a roughly mimeographed sheaf of papers: “The GVN attaches great 
importance to freedom of the press and freedom of speech, he intoned, which are 
fundamental rights of the Vietnamese people and guaranteed under Article 69 of the 
Constitution.”481 
It was quite unlikely that in preparing this text, Mr. Dung took into consideration how 
fundamental the freedoms of press and speech were, as seen from the American perspective. 
The encounter with the American account on fundamental political rights had not prevented 
Mr. Dung from reading out loud his prejudgments before the dialogue. Besides, the subject 
of political rights in his remark was again collective, “the Vietnamese people” not an 
individual Vietnamese. 
While refusing to view the issues from the American perspective, the Vietnamese invited 
their counterparts three times to view human rights situation in Vietnam from their 
perspective. In the section “approaches to human rights,” DG Minh warned that “to 
understand Vietnam's perspective on human rights, one had to understand Vietnam's 
historical circumstances, particularly its over thousand-year struggle for freedom and 
independence.” Later on, a Vietnamese delegate asked the Americans to understand Decree 
31 from a particular context: Vietnam was transforming into a law-based nation and needed 
legal documents to “manage society, protect national security and promote human rights.” 
Finally, in the human rights and national security session, DG Minh made “a plea for the 
USG to make a special effort to understand Vietnam's particular historical context when 
evaluating its human rights record.”482 
The American response to the invitations was predictable, they rejected them by drawing the 
Vietnamese attention to the present and future. At the first invitation, A/S Lowenkron 
bypassed Vietnam’s history of struggling for independence and freedom and paid attention to 
Vietnam’s current renewal policy and to the prospect of a future international role for 
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Vietnam. At the second invitation, A/S Lowenkron openly refused to consider the decree 
from the Vietnamese context in a diplomatic manner, “it is not for the United States to 
discuss Vietnam's history.” A/S Lowenkron continued, “but Vietnam is resilient, independent 
and strong[,] Decree 31 does not reflect a Vietnam that is now more open and 
confident.”(Italics added). And at the last invitation, A/S Lowenkron did not answer the plea, 
he simply ignored it.
483
 
Interestingly, unlike A/S Lowenkron, Ambassador Hanford seemed to put himself into the 
horizon of the Vietnamese twice without invitation. At the session on religious freedom and 
ethnic minority, Ambassador Hanford expressed his sympathy with the Vietnamese concerns 
over religious and minority groups. He seemed to view religious freedom from the 
Vietnamese position of prioritizing collective interest over individual rights. In his words, 
The USG respects the territorial integrity of Vietnam and does not defend groups who 
lack peaceful intentions. The USG's concern is for sincere religious believers who simply 
seek to practise their faith and in the past have been suppressed;484  
The USG understands that the issue of ethnic minority relations is sensitive for the GVN, 
and that Vietnam has more than 50 ethnic groups.485 
Hanford’s first claim acknowledged an earlier Vietnamese statement that the country 
“cherishes sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal affairs.”486 
However, his understanding of Vietnamese concern for the religious groups aiming at 
secession neither led him to see religious freedom as the Vietnamese might see it nor were his 
convictions on religious freedom disturbed. Ambassador Hanford also did not elaborate on 
the “peaceful intentions” of the persons whom the Vietnamese government should end “travel 
restrictions and surveillance.”487 His second claim was even more disconnected with what he 
later said. He did not specify his understanding of the sensitivity that GVN attaches to ethnic 
minority issue. He also gave no explanation why the U.S. paid special interest to the 
Montagnards, nor any of the 49 other ethnic groups. It can thus be argued that Ambassador 
Hanford’s acknowledgements of the concerns of his interlocutors were far from an effort to 
view religious freedom from the Vietnamese position. Rather, his sympathetic expressions 
were to assure the other side that his requests were not harmful to the government of Vietnam 
so that the Vietnamese could accept and implement them. 
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In short, neither the Vietnamese nor the Americans put themselves into the other side’s 
perspective, even when they were invited to do so. This failure, in turn, makes it difficult for 
new or different meaning to emerge from their dialogue and consequently the failure to 
suspend their negative prejudices. Both the conditions three and four are thus not met. 
 
5. Condition Five Openness to the new truth provided by the others 
A final condition is the interlocutors’ openness to the new truth provided by the others. “All 
that is asked,” Gadamer states, “is that we[they] remain open to the meaning of the other 
person or text.”488 This openness is reflected in listening to the other as “anyone who listens 
is fundamentally open.”489 It involves the hearer’s sensitivity to the “quality of newness” of 
the text or other’s arguments and the former’s disposition for the latter “to tell him 
something.”490 It also requires the acceptance of “some things that are against me, even 
though there is no one else who asks this of me.”491 
But how could the interlocutors be open to the new truth when their prejudices are always 
operating and tempting them to assimilate the other’s views and/or to dominate the others? 
Gadamer believes that with the awareness of the impacts of prejudices and an attitude of 
openness, the interlocutor can recognize the logics of the subject matter and change 
themselves accordingly.
492
 “If a person is trying to understand something,” Gadamer argues, 
“he will not be able to rely from the start on his own chance previous ideas, missing as 
logically and stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so 
persistently audible that it breaks through the imagined understanding of it.”493 In other 
words, the reader should starts reading the text with his prejudgments about it (as this is all 
that he has in encountering it). However, in encountering new ideas emerging out of the text, 
he should not stubbornly hold his prior prejudices that have turned out to be wrong. Instead, 
he should change his prejudices accordingly with the newness that he has found from the text. 
Likewise, dialogue partners should not rely only on the convictions they had before the 
dialogue. Instead, they should be open to the rationality and possible truth provided by the 
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other to the point of looking back and changing their own prejudices. This implies that 
interlocutors must recognize their own finitude because of their historical situatedness. Being 
open thus means being aware of the limitations of one’s own knowledge and one’s need for 
new knowledge and experience. This openness, Gadamer contends, allows the experience of 
the other as truly other and renders the partners’ relation as “genuine human relationship.”494 
Early in the 2006 HRD, the American and Vietnamese interlocutors openly acknowledged 
their limitations on human rights issue. Both sides agreed that their country was not perfect in 
the area of human rights. DG Minh’s claim that “no nation should consider itself perfect in 
the area of human rights” was well agreed by A/S Lowenkron who stated that “Indeed, no 
country is perfect in human rights; in fact, no country is perfect.”495 Did this 
acknowledgement of the finitude of one’s knowledge lead to an openness to the new meaning 
provided by the other? And did the admittance of the shortcomings in one’s realization of 
human rights lead to a willingness to learn from the other side’s experiences? 
The Vietnamese side did express a desire to learn from the U.S. when DG Minh stated that 
“Vietnam stands ready to use the dialogue to learn from the United States.” During the 
dialogue, the head of the Vietnamese delegation again spoke out the need for Vietnam to 
learn new experience. “The Vietnamese side listened carefully to the U.S. delegation's legal 
and judicial reform recommendations,” he noted and promised that “some of these views may 
be reflected in future legislation and legal revisions.”496 (Italics added) At face value, the 
message is consistent and clear: Vietnam is willing to and ready to learn and implement 
American legislative and legal experiences. 
However, they were not as open to any new truth as they claimed to be. As discussed earlier, 
neither sides applied the other side’s approach to human rights in assessing their 
counterpart’s human rights situation. Responding to their counterpart’s information and 
assessments, in most cases they did not reveal their thoughts on them and instead talked about 
the information they planned to convey. The reading of a prepared text on speech and press 
freedoms above was an example. Another example is how the Vietnamese responded to 
American sharing of their experiences in dealing with human rights-related problems. Twice 
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in the dialogue, the American interlocutors elaborated on the way to prevent human rights 
abuse by the state and deal with cases of human rights violations. The Vietnamese neither 
showed any interest in these experiences, nor posed any questions for clarification or further 
information on that experience. They either ignored the points or changed subject. Below is 
the illustration of the second case: 
A/S Lowenkron: In short, no country is perfect, but the fundamental freedom of debate, 
rule of law and listening to the people through the electoral process can help to discover 
and address problems. 
DG Minh: EU Ambassadors and the Swiss Ambassador have been able to visit prisons. 
While the GVN had arranged for A/S Lowenkron to visit a prison in Ho Chi Minh City, 
the delegation decided against it.497 
To summarize at this point, according to Gadamer, the claim for mutual understanding can be 
‘tested’ by satisfying all the following five conditions: the purpose of seeking mutual 
understanding, not out-arguing or winning over the others; the commitment to be led by the 
truth of the subject matter; the acknowledgment and suspension of one’s own prejudices; the 
putting of oneself into the other’s horizon without objectifying the other and relating the new 
truth provided by the other to his/her particularity; and the openness to the new meaning 
provided by the other.  
Out of these five conditions, only the first condition is met in the 2006 HRD. The American 
and Vietnamese interlocutors came to the dialogue not to out-argue each other that their 
understanding of human rights was superior or more rational. And what underlies the failures 
to meet other criteria are attitudes of disengagement and ignorance: the interlocutors avoided 
unpleasant topics of differences, ignored new information and knowledge in the dialogue, and 
stepped away from discursive reasoning. With most of Gadamer’s conditions for a genuine 
dialogue not satisfied, the thesis now turns to Gadamer’s signs of successful dialogue and 
searches for their evidence in the 2006 HRD. 
 
6. Indication of mutual understanding 
Based on the above analysis, Gadamer would consider the changes in the interlocutors as 
indications of successful dialogues. Specifically, the interlocutors’ horizons will have fused 
with each other, and accordingly their positions will also have changed. There will emerge 
some similarities in their positions after the dialogues; these similarities would be either a 
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new meaning to both of them or one that belonged to one of them prior to their dialogue. It 
seems that Gadamer does not rule out the possibility of embracing some of the other’s 
position.
498
 However, in Gadamerian sense, this adopting must be done by a change from 
within the partners and free of any coercion. As the interlocutors’ positions are moving to 
occupy the same place, they are accordingly “bound to one another in a new community” and 
transform themselves “into a communion, in which [they] do not remain what [they] 
were.”499 According to Shapcott, the indications of mutual understanding in a Gadamerian 
genuine dialogue are defined at different extents, from substantive agreement on the concrete 
subject matter, to “merely the coming to inhabit a similar frame of reference, or coming 
better to understand the differences between the respective horizon” or even “the act of trying 
to understand or engage with the other in conversation towards understanding.”500 However, 
as discussed in the Introduction, diplomats are sanctioned against changes. It should not be 
expected that they may change their position and disclose such change to their counterpart. 
Accordingly, the mutual understanding at the highest level might not be present in the 2006 
HRD. 
Indeed, no new substantive agreements were reached in that dialogue. It can be observed that 
the two sides had agreed on a number of important matters, which are the status of their 
bilateral relations, the fact that no country is perfect in human rights issue, the principles of 
human rights dialogue, and the positive steps in religious freedom that the government of 
Vietnam had taken. Besides the second agreement which seems to be obvious, the rest are 
what the two sides had agreed on well before the dialogue. The assessment that bilateral 
relations were “strong, cooperative and productive” had been confirmed on several occasions. 
In the joint statement of June 2005, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and President Bush 
agreed that their bilateral relations were characterized by “growing economic and commercial 
ties,” they also agreed to develop a “friendly, constructive, and multi-faceted cooperative 
partnership.” And only a month prior to the dialogue, in his visit to Vietnam, Assistant 
Secretary Christopher Hill agreed with Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang that the U.S. – 
Vietnam relations were very positive and promising.
501
 And the last two matters had also 
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been agreed prior to the dialogue. In their Joint Statement, the two leaders agreed “on the 
importance of continuing an open and candid dialogue on issues of common concern, 
including human-rights practices.” In the same statement, President Bush “welcomed 
Vietnam's efforts to date” on the issues of human rights practices, religious freedoms, and 
ethnic minorities. Earlier, in a meeting with Politburo member Phan Dien in August 2005, 
then American Ambassador Marine stated that “the USG recognizes fully the progress that 
Vietnam has made in recent years” in dealing with these matters. “The Party and GVN,” he 
specified, “deserve credit for improving Vietnam's standard of living, expanding the space 
available for religious believers and creating social and economic opportunities for ethnic 
minorities.” The interlocutors in the dialogue under scrutiny thus only reconfirmed already 
reached agreements. However, if we follow strictly Gadamer’s point that understanding is 
situational, these agreements could still be regarded new at the time of the dialogue. That is, 
after the annual human rights dialogue in February 2006, both sides continued to agree that 
their relationship was positive, that religious freedoms in Vietnam had been improved, and 
that dialogues on human rights issue should be carried out in a open and frank manner. 
As for the familiarization with the differences in each other’s positions, this dialogue had 
helped to expose and compare differences over some specific matters, namely fundamental 
human rights and the case of Pham Hong Son. As concluded by the leader of the Vietnamese 
delegation at the end of the dialogue, “we agree on a number of issues, and remain in 
disagreement on some others.”502 As for the least result, there were few attempts to try to 
understand or engaging with the other towards understanding. The Vietnamese twice asked 
for the U.S. attention to their history in order to understand its human rights policies. The 
Americans, on their part, raised the case of Pham Hong Son six times during the dialogue. 
Though neither the Americans agreed to take Vietnamese history into their judgments of 
Vietnam policies nor the Vietnamese engaged in the reasons for Pham Hong Son’s 
imprisonment, their respective insistence at least conveyed important messages: history plays 
a part in Vietnamese human rights understanding and Pham Hong Son is a high priority for 
the U.S. in their list of concerned prisoners. 
 
III. The critique against Gadamer’s account of successful dialogues and preliminary 
answers to the research questions from his perspective 
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1. The critique against Gadamer’s account of successful dialogues 
Although Gadamer’s Truth and Method has been criticized on a number of points,503 this sub-
section focuses only on the critics that challenge Gadamer’s above account of mutual 
understanding and a genuine dialogue. Among Gadamer’s opponents, Habermas and Hans 
Herbert Kögler seem to pose the most serious challenges to his account. First, Habermas 
argues that Gadamer failed to appreciate the power of reflection in favor of tradition. Second, 
Habermas claims that Gadamer’s hermeneutics could not be aware of certain constraints that 
are ideology, domination, and social power that can lead to distorted understanding among 
the interlocutors. Moreover, Kögler criticizes both Habermas and Gadamer for not adequately 
addressing the impacts of power relations on mutual understanding. Each of these challenges 
will be addressed in turn. 
 
a Tradition and the power of reflection 
Habermas criticizes Gadamer, among other things, for failing to appreciate the power of 
reflection in understanding. Put simply, Habermas claims that Gadamer was wrong to 
confirm that reflection could only move within the limits of tradition. Indeed, although 
“knowledge is rooted in actual tradition,” Habermas argues that reflection can bypass 
tradition as we are able to “turn back upon internalized norms” and strip away “the element 
of authority that was simply domination” which we follow blindly.504 Thus, Habermas claims 
that Gadamer “defend[s] tradition over reason and den[ies] reason its emancipatory 
power.”505 Put it another way, while Gadamer holds that prejudices and tradition are 
inescapable, for Habermas, we can criticize our own prejudices through self-reflection. 
Habermas also contends that in linking tradition with authority and projecting tradition as a 
natural-like substance, Gadamer has given his hermeneutic a conservative structure.
506
 
In his response, Gadamer suggests that Habermas’s concept of reflection is “itself 
encumbered with dogmatism,” and as such is a misinterpretation of reflection.507 Habermas’s 
concept of reflection is dogmatic because for Gadamer, one cannot at the same time call into 
question all of one’s “concepts, judgments, principles, and standards;” this is idealistic. In 
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fact, one can only criticize or thematize a particular issue and from a particular point of view. 
Therefore, “[r]eflection is no less historically situated, context-dependent, than other modes 
of thought.”508 Furthermore, Gadamer argues that “reflection is not always and unavoidably a 
step towards dissolving prior convictions. Authority is not always wrong.”509 According to 
Gadamer, authority exists because it is accepted and this acceptance is not by force 
(otherwise it only pretends to be). It is accepted as “one concedes superiority in knowledge 
and insight to the authority, and for this reason one believes that authority is right.” Thus, for 
Gadamer authority is not followed as blindly or slavishly as Habermas suggests.
510
 
For the relation between reflection and tradition, Shapcott explains that Gadamer did neither 
deny the desirability or power of reflection, nor “presuppose the inherent legitimacy of any 
particular aspect of tradition;” instead, Gadamer merely sought to counter the 
Enlightenment’s claim that we can see through our own prejudices by our reasons. Therefore, 
Shapcott contends that Gadamer’s PH does not reject “the use of reason to understand and 
engage with prejudices;” and philosophical hermeneutics “is not necessarily conservative.”511 
Accordingly, Gadamer would not advise the Vietnamese and American interlocutors to have 
uncritical approaches to their respective traditions, but would remind them that they start 
from, and are limited by, their own traditions in interpreting the other’s ideas and opinions. 
Moreover, exposing the hidden influences of traditions on participants’ thinking has the 
potential for them to engage critically with their own prejudices related to traditions. 
Therefore, Gadamer’s model of understanding and successful dialogues demounts this critics 
by Habermas.
512
 
This debate provides the author of this thesis with a right attitude towards tradition and 
authority. On one hand, in order to understand American and Vietnamese positions on human 
rights, it is necessary to explore their respective human rights-related histories and traditions. 
This have been done in the two preceding chapters. On the other hand, although American 
and Vietnamese prejudices are limited by their own traditions, this does not mean that their 
traditions cannot be critically reflected upon. Following Gadamer, the more the Vietnamese 
                                                          
508
 In Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, MIT, Polity Press, 1979, p. 188. 
509
 Ibid., pp. 32-3. 
510
 Gadamer, Hans Georg, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated and edited by David E. Linger, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1976, pp. 33-4. 
511
 Shapcott, op. cit., pp. 183-4. 
512
 It should be noted that Habermas moved away from this view of Gadamer and chose psychoanalysis as a 
model for his critical theory that would eradicate unnecessary oppression and maximize human emancipation, 
see Holub, Robert C., Jurgen Habermas: critic in the public sphere, Routledge, London, 1991. 
142 
 
and American interlocutors are exposed to their human rights-related traditions and 
prejudices, the greater opportunities they can reach a mutual understanding on human rights. 
 
b The distortions of ideology, domination and social power on understanding  
Habermas also criticizes that Gadamer’s hermeneutics is unaware of ideology, domination, 
and social power that are carried by language. Language, for Habermas, is not only “the 
happening of tradition” but  
is also a medium of domination and social power; it serves to legitimate relations 
of organised force. Insofar as the legitimations do not articulate the power 
relations whose institutionalization they make possible, insofar as these relations 
merely manifest themselves in the legitimation, language is also ideological. Here 
it is a question not of deceptions within a language but of deception with language 
as such.513 
Habermas argues here that, as a medium for domination and social power, language 
inherently carries the legitimations in favor of the dominant forces and ideology. In this way, 
language has already deceived us in our search for true understanding by hiding the effects of 
domination and social power within it. Accordingly, for Habermas, language and tradition are 
not sufficient to understand social actions which “can only be comprehended in an objective 
framework that is constituted conjointly by language, labor, and domination.”514 In other 
words, besides “intersubjectively intended and symbolically transmitted meaning,” to be 
effective a conversation also requires a “reference system” that links tradition with “other 
aspects of the complex social life.”515 Therefore, following Habermas, Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics would fail to acknowledge the systematic distortions in language and tradition; 
and even if Gadamer’s hermeneutics could factor in such distortions, it would still be 
insufficient to address them. 
Warnke illustrates this point by referring to Marx’s analysis of the buying and selling of labor 
power. In this exchange of labor for money, the principle of freedom and equality has been 
upheld: freedom as “both buyer and seller … are constrained only by their free will. They 
contract as free agents;” equally, as “each enters into relation with the other as with simple 
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owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent.”516 The problem, 
according to Warnke, is what have been concealed in the characterization of freedom and 
equality,  
The talk of freedom obscures the coercion that one partner suffers in as much as 
he or she must sell his or her labour power in order to survive; likewise, the talk 
of equality obscures the inequality contained in the economic dependence of one 
class on the other.517 
In Habermas’s view, a hermeneutical focus only on the “truth” of freedom and equality fails 
to account for the societal conditions in which the exchange occurs. Thus, it would seem that 
referring to these societal conditions in which a dialogue happens would help to identify the 
distortions or deformations carried by language as untruth, even those that have been agreed 
by both sides in conversation.
518
 Under the same logic, an analysis of U.S. – Vietnam human 
rights dialogues require not only examinations of the issues discussed but also references to 
the broad contexts in which those dialogues are taken. Revealing these distortions, Habermas 
may argue, would help determine the true nature of American and Vietnamese understanding 
of human rights. 
Gadamer counter-argues that these “so-called real factors” are not outside the realm of 
hermeneutics, as “the principle of hermeneutics simply means that we should try to 
understand everything that can be understood.”519 Following Gadamer, it would seem that 
there is no need of a “reference system” to social conditions for genuine understanding 
because these realities have already been included in language. In his words, “there is no 
societal reality, with all its concrete forces, that does not bring itself to representation in a 
consciousness that is linguistically articulated. Reality does not happen ‘behind the back’ of 
language.... reality happens precisely within language.”520 In other words, ideological 
differences and power relations find their expression in language, and PH does cover these 
elements in understanding. For Gadamer, all these outside factors indeed could therefore be 
founded rooted in the prejudices of the interlocutors. 
Kögler agrees with Gadamer on this response when he argues that it is illusory to have an 
“objective” critique of power from a power-free standpoint or an ideology-critical view 
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which “imagines itself capable of insight superior to historically-situated knowledge.” 
However, Kögler argues that it is an equal illusion in Gadamer’s claim that structures of 
domination “can already qualify as legitimate precisely because they belong to tradition.”521 
This is because as Kögler observes, Gadamer takes every social order including power 
structure to be constituted through “a fundamental and substantial agreement;” accordingly, 
the “true” conception of authority is “exclusively grounded in knowledge.” For Kögler, this 
understanding fails to recognize the complex interplay between power and knowledge 
whereby power “inconspicuously shapes the natural disclosure of meaning.” 522 In short, 
Kögler criticizes that in addressing the correlation between the symbolic horizon of subjects 
and social institutions and power relations, Gadamer takes an “affirmative position” whereas 
Habermas’ position takes itself “to be outside the historical situation.”523 
The critiques by Habermas and Kögler discussed above have an important implication for 
analyzing the 2006 HRD. That is, in order to gain a true and comprehensive account of its 
nature and outcome, due attention must be paid to power relations between the U.S. and 
Vietnam that are operative at the time of the dialogue. The failure to grasp the U.S. – 
Vietnam power relations and their possible distorting effects on the dialogue outcome is thus 
a limitation of the Gadamer’s model. 
 
2. The answers to the research questions from Gadamer’s perspective, in relations to the 
findings in the previous chapters. 
Based on the preceding testing of Gadamer’s conditions of, and indications for, mutual 
understanding on the 2006 HRD and the critiques against the Gadamer’s model, the chapter 
now turns to how applying Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics could answer the core and 
the second-subsidiary research questions. 
Can diplomatic dialogues narrow the differences on human rights understanding between 
Vietnam and the U.S.? 
As for Gadamer, understanding is always about something. It can be observed that both the 
practical and theoretical aspects of human rights understanding were discussed in this 
dialogue. The interlocutors discussed a number of practical issues, namely the principles that 
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were to guide their human rights dialogue, human rights related laws and regulations, and 
particular human right cases. As discussed above, no new mutual understanding was found in 
practical issues as they had been agreed at advance even in a higher level of authority before 
the dialogue. 
Theoretically, the interlocutors conversed on their respective human rights tenets. However, 
the theoretical and philosophical differences on human rights understanding between the 
Americans and the Vietnamese remained mostly unaffected after the dialogue. The 
interlocutors came out of this dialogue with no common agreement on the definition and 
meanings of fundamental rights, the relativity of human rights, the relation between human 
rights and collective interests and national developments. The only exception was their 
agreement that no country is perfect in the area of human rights. In Gadamerian term, this 
truth on human rights constituted the common territory where the Vietnamese and the 
Americans human rights horizons could be fused. It should be observed that this fusion of 
horizons was achieved rather quickly and easily by the interlocutors. The abstract and non-
controversial nature of this truth, however, makes this mutual understanding less substantial. 
Thus, a concise Gadamerian answer to the question above is that the 2006 diplomatic human 
rights dialogue did not help to narrow the differences on human rights understanding between 
Vietnam and the U.S. Overall, the dialogue was not productive and yielded only a trivial 
result. 
These findings shed light into two of the possible diplomatic obstacles raised in the 
Introduction. They serve as an evidence against Adam Watson’s contention that private 
diplomatic meetings are exclusively for problem-solving purposes, not for discussing 
incompatible values. In the 2006 HRD, an entire and first session was reserved for American 
and Vietnamese human rights approaches. Nevertheless, Watson’s idea is not totally wrong; 
although the diplomats presented their human rights understanding, neither side embarked on 
discussing further and debating on the differences in their human rights understanding. 
Another hypothetical obstacle, however, is clearly correct. American and Vietnamese 
diplomats did not change their positions or viewpoints. Indeed, they failed to embark on 
several steps that according to Gadamer are necessary for such changes to occur. What is not 
yet clear at this stage whether such American and Vietnamese diplomats’ resistance to 
changes is because of their professional limitation or due to other constraints raised in 
Chapter One and Two, namely American conviction on the superiority of their values and the 
Vietnamese fear of peaceful evolution. 
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What are the obstacles for the American and Vietnamese diplomats to their mutual 
understanding on human rights? 
The reason for the failure to narrow the human rights understanding gap, as measured from a 
Gadamerian perspective, is that the interlocutors in this dialogue could not pass most of 
Gadamer’s conditions for mutual understanding. This failure points to the interlocutors’ 
attitudes of disengagement and ignorance and their lack of openness. In the greater part of the 
dialogue, both Vietnamese and Americans chose to avoid unpleasant topics that could give 
the other side the upper hand. They also tried not to disclose their opinions on issues of 
different assessments or even to engage in discussing them.
524
 We have seen in the dialogue 
how their differences on assessing the case of Pham Hong Son accumulated the tension 
between them and forced them to admit openly that they disagreed on that issue. The case of 
Pham Hong Son was raised six times by the American interlocutors but no mutual agreement 
was attained. Unless that the dialogue partners adopted a different attitude, Pham Hong Son 
remained a victim of the violation of freedom of speech for the Americans; for the 
Vietnamese, he was a law breaker who had been properly charged and imprisoned. 
As the interlocutors did not seriously engage in their differences, few assessments from the 
other side’s perspective and new truths emerged in the dialogue. And even the few truths that 
came forth from obscurity were not appreciated by the interlocutors: they were unwilling to 
view from the other side’s perspective, and even rejected invitations to do so. And among 
these shortcomings, the reluctance to address their differences appears to be the main obstacle 
that prevents any potential truth to emerge. In Gadamerian standards, the dialogue was thus 
not “open and candid” as the parties claimed, and as in the American assessment of the 
dialogue.
525
 
It is interesting to note that in light of this analysis, the profound differences on human rights 
understanding between the two sides was not to be directly blamed for this limited outcome. 
What is problematic, for Gadamer, is the way the interlocutors dealt with negative prejudices, 
not the prejudices themselves. In light of this, the main conclusion in chapter Two can be 
supplemented. The differences on human rights understanding between the U.S. and Vietnam 
constitute a real but not immediate obstacle to their human rights understanding. 
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A question remains: what did the satisfaction of the first condition by the interlocutors bring 
about? Obviously this was insufficient for reaching a mutual understanding. But the fact that 
the interlocutors did not aim at persuading each other that their view of human right 
understanding was superior facilitated the exposure of differences of understanding. It also 
allowed for human rights related messages to be conveyed, concerns to be raised, and 
promises, commitments, and assurances to be made. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has extracted from Gadamer’s PH a number of conditions for, and indications 
of, mutual understanding. It has then tested these criteria in the 2006 HRD and argued that 
most of the conditions were not met, resulting in a trivial mutual understanding on human 
rights. From a Gadamerian perspective, the 2006 HRD did not help to narrow the differences 
in human rights understanding between the Americans and the Vietnamese; and the main 
obstacle encountered was the parties’ attitudes of ignorance, disengagement and lack of 
openness. Linking the analysis in this chapter to the features of diplomacy, the contention on 
the division of labor between public and private dialogue proves incorrect in the 2006 HRD 
whereas the restriction against changes of diplomats’ views is a real obstacle to mutual 
understanding. And connecting the findings in this chapter to those of Chapter Two, it is clear 
that the profound differences in American and Vietnamese human rights understandings were 
a real but not direct obstacle. What remains less clear at this stage is why the participants held 
such attitudes in the dialogue and the possible impacts of power relations at the time of the 
2006 HRD. The next Chapter conducts a similar analysis so as to answer the research 
questions and the above ambiguities from a different perspective. 
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Chapter Four  
The 2006 U.S. - Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue  
as examined from Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action  
 
In a structure similar to that of the previous chapter, this chapter extracts from Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action the conditions of, and indications for, genuine understanding 
and simultaneously tests whether these criteria are satisfied in the 2006 HRD. It has four 
parts. It first examines Habermas’s conceptualization of mutual understanding in his TCA. It 
then draws out from this theory the conditions of genuine understanding and tests them in the 
2006 HRD. Following this are the discussion and the testing of Habermasian indications for 
genuine understanding. Finally, it discusses criticism of the model and offers preliminary 
conclusions on the nature and extent of mutual understanding in this dialogue. The findings 
in this chapter shed more light to the unresolved questions in the preceding chapters and 
provides answers to the research questions from an Habermasian perspective. 
 
I. Mutual understanding in Habermas’s TCA 
1. An overview of the TCA 
In order to understand Habermas’s conditions for, and indications of, shared understanding, it 
is necessary to grasp a general understanding of his TCA. Habermas’s concept of 
communicative action “refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and 
action who establish interpersonal relations.”526 Thus, for Habermas communicative action 
does not equate with communication, although the capable interlocutors use language to 
communicate with each other. In this interaction, interlocutors do not resort to language only 
to convey information but to “com[e] to an understanding with one another so as to 
coordinate their actions” and through this, “pursue their particular aims.”527 Habermas 
categorizes these aims as illocutionary or perlocutionary ones. 
                                                          
526
 Habermas, Jürgen, The theory of communicative action (TCA), transl. by Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984, Vol. 1, p. 86. 
527
 Ibid., p. 101. 
149 
 
The term “illocutionary” was first proposed by the J. L. Austin in his book How to do things 
with words.
528
 Austin classifies an utterance or a speech act as locutionary, illocutionary, or 
perlocutionary acts. The term “locutionary” refers to the content of propositional sentences or 
of normalized propositional sentences; through locutionary acts, the speaker expresses states 
of affairs; he says something. Through illocutionary acts, the speaker performs an action in 
saying something, such as giving a promise or a command. And through perlocutionary acts, 
the speaker produces an effect upon the hearer. Put in another way, these acts mean, 
respectively, “to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through 
acting in saying something.”529 For example, when I say that “The capital of France is Paris,” 
the fact that Paris is the capital of France is the content of this propositional sentence and I 
perform a locutionary act. However, in saying this sentence, I might be answering a quiz, in 
which case I would perform an illocutionary act.
530
 And putting this utterance in a particular 
context, i.e. a newly wed couple discussing where to spend their honeymoon, this could bring 
about the selection of Paris as the location for the anniversary; that would be perlocutionary. 
Building on this, Habermas argues that any speech act is designed for either illocutionary or 
perlocutionary aims. In pursuing illocutionary aims, a speaker does not “go beyond wanting 
the hearer to understand the manifest content of the speech act.”531 Acting with an orientation 
to understanding, the speaker therefore “selects a comprehensible linguistic expression only 
in order to come to an understanding with a hearer about something and thereby to make 
himself understandable.”532 Whereas a speaker with a perlocutionary aim intentionally wants 
his speech acts to produce certain illocutionary effect on his hearer. Habermas calls this 
action as linguistically mediated strategic action with “an orientation to success.” For a 
strategic speaker, a hearer “could at best infer the speaker’s perlocutionary aims from the 
context” by answering the question that “what else the speaker has in view in uttering it?”533 
An example of a strategic actor is a host telling a story late in the evening to delay a guest’s 
departure: the guest knew the host’s real intention by taking into account the situation, i.e. the 
former was about to leave.
534
 “The description of perculotionary effects,” Habermas argues, 
“must therefore refer to a context of teleological action that goes beyond the speech act.”535 
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Habermas describes a strategic interaction as follows: 
Here we start with at least two goal-directed acting subjects who achieve their 
ends by the way of an orientation to, and influence on, the decision of other 
actors. Success in action is also dependent on other actors, each of whom is 
oriented to his own success and behaves cooperatively only to the degree that 
this fits with his egocentric calculus of utility.536 
Habermas then defines communicative action as “those linguistically mediated interactions in 
which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with the 
mediating acts of communication.”537 It should be noted that reaching mutual understanding 
is not necessarily the communicative actors’ initial goals, as their individual goals are what 
bring them to the conversation table, like strategic actors. The difference between strategic 
and communicative actors is that while the formers coordinate their actions through 
“egocentric calculations” of individual successes, the latter first reach mutual understanding 
and then coordinate their actions accordingly. In other words, participants in communicative 
actions “harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions.”538 
 
2. Habermas’s account of understanding 
Reaching understanding, Habermas contends, is a “process of reaching agreement among 
speaking and acting subjects” that “meets the conditions of rationally motivated assent to the 
content of an utterance.”539 In other words, a genuine agreement has “a rational basis,” “has 
to be accepted or presupposed as valid by the participants,” and “rests on common 
convictions.”540 Therefore, an agreement is genuine when dialogue participants are 
communicative actors pursuing only illocutionary aims or in his words “reaching 
understanding has to be clarified solely in connection with illocutionary acts.”541 
Accordingly, genuine understanding is possible when interlocutors act communicatively; and 
they are able to do so under what Habermas calls an ‘ideal speech situation.’ 
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Complementing the concept of communicative action is Habermas’s concept of lifeworld.542 
In a way, this concept is similar but not identical to Gadamer’s concept of prejudice. For 
Habermas, lifeworld “is formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background 
convictions” and “stores the interpretive work of preceding generations;” it serves as “a 
source of situation definitions” and a “conservative counterweight to the risk of disagreement 
that arises with every actual process of reaching understanding.”543 In connection with 
communicative action, the life world is “the transcendental site where speaker and hearer 
meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims […],criticize and confirm those claims, settle 
their disagreements, and arrive at agreements.”544 Put simply, lifeworld is the source of 
knowledge that participants have and through communication, they can reach a common 
lifeworld upon which their agreement is based. 
Moreover, the concept of lifeworld comprises three structural components, corresponding but 
not identical to the three-formal-worlds concept. The social, the objective, and the subjective 
worlds of the interlocutors are transmitted and renewed through the processes of social 
integration, cultural reproduction, and socialization, respectively. Corresponding to these 
processes are the three structural components of the lifeworld: culture, society, and 
personality.
545
 Their functions also differ: the lifeworld constitutes mutual understanding, 
whereas the formal world concepts “constitute a reference system for that about which 
mutual understanding is possible: speakers and hearers come to an understanding from out of 
their common lifeworld about something in the objective, social, or subjective worlds.”546 
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II. Habermas’s conditions for, and indication of, mutual understanding and the reviews 
of these conditions and indication in the 2006 HRD 
In ideal speech situation, a number of criteria are required for the participants, the relation 
between them, and the structure of the dialogue. In both strategic and communicative actions, 
actors must be “assumed to have the ability to act purposively and to have an interest in 
carrying out their plans.”547 In strategic exchanges, however, participants only pursue their 
self-interests through the egoistic calculations of effects and results and the resort to 
instrumental rationality. Whereas in communicative actions, participants attempt first to 
“negotiate interpretations of the situation at hand” and then “harmonize their respective plans 
with one another;” during this process, they must pursue illocutionary goals without any 
restraints.
548
 An indication of this unrestrained pursuit of illocutionary goals, for Habermas, 
can be found in the attitudes of the interlocutors. He explains: 
Naturally, the binding energies of language can be mobilized to coordinate action 
plans only if the participants suspend the objectivating attitude of an observer, along 
with the immediate orientation to personal success, in favor of the performative 
attitude of a speaker who wants to reach an understanding with a second person 
about something in the world.549 [and] 
speakers and hearers confront one another in a performative attitude as first and 
second persons, not as opponents or as objects within the world of entities about 
which they are speaking.550 
Essentially, Habermas states that communicative actors must regard each other as the first 
and second persons, as rational members of a shared community. On the contrary, strategic 
actors choose the position of observing outsiders and treat their dialogue partners as entities 
that they can manipulate. Thus, a first condition is that interlocutors adopt a performative 
attitude, not an objectivating one. 
However, Habermas argues elsewhere that the meeting of this condition and the like for ideal 
speech situation is insufficient to differentiate communicative action from strategic action. 
This is because, 
communicative and strategic action do not differ primarily in terms of the attitudes 
of the actors but rather with respect to structural characteristics. A formal-
pragmatic analysis of successful speech acts is required precisely because, in 
communicative action, the structure of the use of language oriented toward 
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reaching understanding is superimposed on the fundamental teleological structure 
of action and subjects the actors to precisely such constraints as compel them to 
adopt a performative attitude – an attitude that is more laden with presuppositions 
than is the objectivating attitude of the strategic actor. Interaction mediated 
through acts of reaching understanding exhibits both a richer and more restrictive 
structure than does strategic action.551 
Therefore, the differentiation of communicative and strategic action rests primarily on 
analyzing certain speech acts. To determine if communicative actions had occurred in the 
2006 HRD, it is necessary to also analyze important speech acts in that dialogue. An analysis 
of a human rights dialogue in Habermas’s perspective thus has two folds: the testing of the 
conditions above and the like and of the validity claims of important utterances. The 
remainder of this section discusses and tests the conditions of an ‘ideal speech situation’ 
before analyzing a number of utterances in the 2006 HRD. 
 
1. The testing of the conditions for ‘ideal speech situation’ 
Condition One Interlocutors adopt not an objectivating attitude, but a performative one 
Throughout most of the 2006 HRD, the American and Vietnamese participants treated each 
other not as opponents or objects that they can manipulate. Both sides wanted to reach 
understanding with each other on specific matters. In accounting for human rights progress, 
especially those on religious freedom, the Vietnamese hoped to reach a mutual understanding 
with the Americans, hoping that progress would be sufficient for Vietnam to be removed 
from the CPC list. Likewise, the Americans wanted to point out to the Vietnamese that 
certain Vietnamese laws and regulations constituted serious violations of civil and political 
rights or shortcomings in the implementation of these rights at local level. The interlocutors 
may not have wanted to confront each other on the betterment of their human rights 
approaches or the greater accuracy and reliability of their human rights accounts. For 
example, in the section on religious freedom, Ambassador Hanford referred to the Time 
article and admitted that he “cannot comment on” its credibility.552 Perhaps this is because 
with their diplomatic quality of politeness, the speakers in this dialogue did not wish to out-
argue each other on issues of ideological differences which may lead to unnecessary tensions. 
However, the fact that the interlocutors did not adopt an objectivating attitude does not 
necessarily means that they choose a performative one for an unrestrained pursuit of 
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illocutionary goals. The detailed analysis of specific speech acts after the testing of these 
conditions will clarify this point. Thus, this first condition is only partly met by the 2006 
HRD participants. 
 
Condition Two Participants possess a certain knowledge about the objective, social, and 
subjective worlds of the other 
Besides certain required attitudes, a second Habermasian condition is that communicative 
actors are required to possess a certain knowledge about the objective, social, and subjective 
worlds of each other. To answer yes or no to a validity claim (whether it is as a fact, a valid 
norm, or a subjective expression), a hearer has to decide if it is true in the objective world, 
legitimate in the social world, and trustworthy in the subjective world of the speaker, 
respectively. As Habermas argues, in judging a claim, “the interpreter has to be familiar with 
the conditions of its validity; he has to know under what conditions the validity claim linked 
with it is acceptable, that is, would have to be acknowledged by a hearer.”553 
The participants of the 2006 HRD possessed segments of the lifeworlds of the other side and 
shared a common knowledge about their bilateral relations. Besides, as professional 
diplomats, the American speakers and the main speaker on the Vietnamese side (Pham Binh 
Minh) also knew and mastered the norms and rules in diplomacy. 
On the American side, all the speakers had expertise or were at least familiar with the human 
rights conditions in Vietnam and to a certain extent, with the Vietnamese human rights 
related fears and suspicions. Before the dialogue, Ambassador Marine had been in Vietnam 
for about two years, whereas Ambassador Hanford had visited Vietnam several times.
554
 And 
the head of the American delegation, A/S Barry Lowenkron, was briefed on the human rights 
conditions in Vietnam, Vietnamese laws and regulations on human rights, and the bilateral 
relations.
555
 During the dialogue, Ambassador Hanford demonstrated his knowledge about 
Vietnamese concerns on ethnic minority issue when he claimed that, “the USG understands 
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that the issue of ethnic minority relations is sensitive for the GVN, and that Vietnam has 
more than 50 ethnic groups.”556 
On the Vietnamese side, Director General Pham Binh Minh is a professional diplomat who 
served his terms in the U.S. from 1999 to 2003.
557
 Other speakers in the Vietnamese 
delegation have expertise on human rights related areas such as those related to the judiciary, 
public security, or religious affairs. They had also reportedly been briefed about the bilateral 
relations and the U.S. human rights policy and understanding before the meeting, as a 
necessary procedure in the Vietnamese preparation for the HRD. For instance, a Vietnamese 
participant from the Department of Prison Management demanded further information on the 
allegation in the New York Time that 13% of U.S. prisoners had been sexually abused and on 
the over 300 cases of cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Guantanamo Bay. Without knowing about those mistreatments of prisoners inside and 
outside the U.S. this issue in his preparation for fulfilling his task in the dialogue, the 
Vietnamese interlocutor could not challenge the Americans on that issue. 
Thus, prior to this dialogue participants were quite aware of the subjective and objective 
worlds of each other as well as their intersubjectively shared lifeworlds on the bilateral 
relations and diplomacy. 
 
Condition Three Interlocutors must understand certain linguistic expressions in the same way 
Apart from mastering certain shared knowledge, interlocutors must share or agree upon the 
semantics of the expressions they employed as their discursive acts rely on language. 
Habermas explains that “the ideal character of semantic generality shapes communicative 
action inasmuch as the participants could not even intend to reach an understanding with one 
another about something in the world if they did not presuppose, on the basis of a common 
(or translatable) language, that they conferred identical meanings on the expressions they 
employed.”558 So a third condition is that interlocutors must understand certain linguistic 
expressions in the same way. 
Applying this into the 2006 HRD, with some shared knowledge about diplomacy and the 
bilateral relations, the American and Vietnamese participants were supposed to confer 
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identical meanings on many linguistic expressions that they employed. For example, they 
knew at the time of the conversation what it meant for “strong, cooperative, and productive 
relations,” or what the rights regulated in the ICPR were, or what the CPC issue (Country of 
Particular Concern) was about.
559
 The agreements on the semantics of these and many other 
expressions that they used in this dialogue were sufficient for them to converse without 
arguing over semantics. This precondition for mutual understanding thus was also sufficiently 
realized. 
 
Condition Four Recognize the other interlocutors as equally rational subjects 
Another Habermasian condition is that participants in ideal speech situation must 
acknowledge that the others have the right and ability to challenge them through rational 
arguments. Thus, in raising any utterance, interlocutors must be prepared to defend its 
validity and at the same time be ready to be persuaded by the better arguments of the others. 
“Whoever enters into discussion with the serious intention of being convinced of something 
through dialogue,” Habermas argues, “has to presume performatively that the participants 
allow their ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to be determined solely by the force of the better argument.”560 This 
implies a fourth condition for communicative actors: they must recognize the others as 
equally rational subjects whose arguments may be better than theirs. 
In the 2006 HRD, neither the Vietnamese nor the Americans showed any signs that their 
counterparts could not follow their arguments. Indeed, both sides equipped themselves with 
facts and evidence to support their arguments before the dialogue, in case of being challenged 
by the other side. The Vietnamese searched for information on American prison conditions 
and human rights violations in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay to defend its proposition 
that no country is perfect in the area of human rights. Ambassador Hanford brought with him 
to the dialogue an article on human rights situation in Vietnam in support of his requests. 
However, this preparation does not mean that they recognize each other as equally rational. In 
other words, each side regards the other as rational but may hold that it is the more rational 
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side. This matter is discussed in the next chapter of the thesis. At this stage, it suffices to say 
that this condition might not be satisfied. 
 
Condition Five Conduct a dialogue that adheres to the principles of inclusiveness, equality, 
truthfulness, and freedom from power constraints  
A fifth and final condition is that a genuine dialogue must adhere to the principles of equality, 
freedom, and inclusiveness. In Habermas’s words, “[a]nyone who seriously engages in 
argumentation must presuppose that the context of discussion guarantees in principle freedom 
of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of 
coercion in adopting positions.”561 Habermas calls these are “the four most 
important…unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions” and explains as follows: 
(a) inclusivity: no one could make a relevant contribution may be prevented from 
participating; 
(b) equal distribution of communicative freedoms: everyone has an equal 
opportunity to make contributions; 
(c) truthfulness: the participants must mean what they say; and 
(d) absence of contingent external constraints or constraints inherent to the 
structure of communication: the yes/no positions of participants on criticizable 
validity claims should be motivated only by the power of cogent reasons to 
convince.562 
While the truthfulness of the participants is difficult to test, the other three presuppositions 
are clear. Inclusion is required in a genuine dialogue so that all competent parties must be 
included “so that all valid arguments can be heard.”563 In such a dialogue, all participants 
must be given equal time to raise any questions or claims, to initiate any speech acts and take 
turn to be the speaker.
564
 The stress on a symmetrical distribution of chances, Steve Harrist 
and Scott Gelfand explain, aims at excluding the distorting influence of power from 
                                                          
561
 Habermas, Justification and application, p. 31 
562
 Habermas, J. Between Naturalism and Religion, Malden, MA., MIT Press, 2008, p. 82. See also J. Habermas, 
Moral consciousness …, p. 89 for similar conditions but put differently. 
563
 Daniel. Wehrenfennig, “Conflict Management and Communicative Action: Second-Track Diplomacy from 
a Habermasian Perspective,” Communication Theory, 18, 2008, p. 360. 
564
 McCarthy observes that for Habermas, “the structure is free from constraint only when … there is an 
effective equality of chances for the assumption of dialogue roles.” Thomas A. McCarthy, “A Theory of 
Communicative Competence,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 3: 135, 1973, p. 145. 
158 
 
discourse.
565
 Habermas explains this exclusion by raising the principle of freedom from 
constraints either by external forces or inherent in linguistic expressions. Alan Gross argues 
that for Habermas, the freedoms in communicative actions also include those to “use any 
speech act,” “reveal their ‘inner natures,’ [and] to allow their discourse to become transparent 
to their full subjectivity.”566  
In light of this analysis, the impacts on mutual understanding of certain diplomatic features, 
that have been discussed in the Introduction, are now clear. The diplomatic principle of 
equality is conducive to mutual understanding as it would guarantee an equal distribution of 
opportunities for participants to be speakers. Whereas the diplomatic features of 
exclusiveness and secrecy are harmful to mutual understanding, as it prevents the opportunity 
for listening to all valid arguments. Moreover, truthfulness should not be expected from the 
2006 HRD participants as their ultimate goal was to serve their countries’ interests. The 
diplomats’ ultimate purpose of serving their national interest is thus a real obstacle to mutual 
understanding. 
Testing this condition at the 2006 HRD, it can be observed that this condition is partly met. 
The participants on both sides were in principle freed to initiate any speech act in the 
dialogue. They agreed on this principle at the beginning that “any and all issues of mutual 
concern” could be raised in the dialogue.567 At the same time, they were allocated equal time 
to raise any speech acts, i.e. about their concerns or justifications for their requests. They 
were also equal in the assumption of dialogue roles as speaker and hearer, and inquirer and 
answerer. While the American raised concerns over human rights conditions in Vietnam, the 
Vietnamese also raised concerns about violations of human rights in the U.S. or committed 
by the Americans in other places. The items for the dialogue agenda were proposed by both 
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sides, as suggested by DG Minh in his discussion with the American Embassy in Hanoi on 
the prospect of resuming bilateral HRD.
568
  
However, this HRD was not sufficiently inclusive as required in the ideal speech situation. 
Many people who were the subjects of discussion were not present in the dialogue, such as 
Pham Hong Son or the victims of the church burning incident in the U.S. Had they been 
allowed to participate, they could have provided different reasons why Son was imprisoned 
or their church burnt. Moreover, the exclusion of those whom the diplomats referred to make 
it more difficult for the diplomats to justify the legitimacies of their contentions. The 
Americans may hold that, for example, the dissident Pham Hong Son may disagree that 
freedom of expression is respected in Vietnam. Likewise, the Vietnamese may challenge that 
an American inmate may not believe that the current mechanism addressing prison abuses is 
perfect. Thus, this condition is only partly met. 
Summing up, there are not many deviations from Habermas’s preconditions for mutual 
understanding. In terms of Habermas’s standards, there are three problems with the 2006 
HRD. First, Habermas would share with the conclusion from a Gadamerian perspective that 
the interlocutors did not adopt a performative attitude. Second, the dialogue was not 
sufficiently inclusive, an inherent constraint of diplomacy. And third, the interlocutors might 
not recognize the other as equally rational. With this initial result, the chapter now turns to 
analyzing a number of speech acts on specific issues. 
 
2. Analyzing the main speech acts in the dialogue 
To determine that an interlocutor is acting communicatively not strategically, Habermas 
contends that she must only aim at illocutionary effect and not intentionally at perlocutionary 
impact in her utterance. For that condition to be met, that speech act must satisfy 
simultaneously three criticisable validity claims. They are the claims to: 
 Rightness: the speaker performs a speech act that is right in respect to the given 
normative context (or indirectly for these norms themselves), so that between him and 
the hearer an intersubjective relation will come about which is recognized as 
legitimate; 
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 Truth: the speaker makes a true statement (or correct existential pre-suppositions), so 
that the hearer will accept and share the knowledge of the speaker; and 
 Sincerity or truthfulness: the speaker expresses sincerely or truthfully his subjective 
experience to which he has privileged access (such as beliefs, intentions, feelings, 
desires, and the like) so that the hearer will give credence to what is said.569 
A speaker may stress one particular validity claim in her speech act, and Habermas 
categorizes such speech act as follows: a normatively regulated speech act, such as 
“commands, requests, warnings, excuses, recommendations, advice” for emphasizing the 
claim to rightness; constative speech act, such as “asserting, reporting, narrating, explaining, 
predicting, denying, contesting” for stressing the claim to truth; and a representative speech 
act, such as “to reveal, expose, conceal, pretend, deceive, express” for stressing the claim to 
truthfulness. In each of these cases, a communicative speaker is supposed to assume 
obligations to provide grounds, justifications, and trustworthy to the hearer, respectively.
570
 
And accordingly, every speech act must fit into the following three ‘worlds’: 
 The social world: as the totality of legitimacy regulating interpersonal relations; 
 The objective world: as the totality of entities about which true statements are 
possible; 
 The subjective world: as the totality of experience to which a speaker has privileged 
access and which he can express before a public.571 
Thus, the interlocutors may reach agreement on something that they may treat as a fact, or as 
a valid norm, or as a subjective experience. As the third validity claim concerns the 
subjective world of the speaker to which the hearer cannot have access, the former’s 
truthfulness can be tested by the consistency between her words and subsequent actions, but 
“ultimately [this] relies on trust.”572 And trust is a basic requirement, as along this process, 
                                                          
569
 To illustrate these validity claims, Habermas gives an example of a request addressed by a professor to one of 
his seminar participants, “Please bring me a glass of water.” The participant can reject this request under the 
three following validity aspects: (1) Rightness: No. You cannot treat me like one of your employees; (2) 
Sincerity: No. You really only want to put me in a bad light in front of the other seminar participants; and (3) 
The truth: No. The next water tap is so far away that I could not get back before the end of the session. 
Habermas, TCA, Vol.1, op. cit., p. 99-100 and pp. 306-8. This is a close paraphrasing of Habermas’ words, plus 
personal annotation. 
570
 Ibid., pp. 333-4. See also, Thomas McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 285-7. 
571
 Habermas, Jürgen, TCA, Vol. 2, p. 120. This is also a close paraphrasing of Habermas’s words, with personal 
annotation. 
572
 Thomas Risse, “’Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organizations, Vol. 
54, No. 1, (Winter, 2000), p. 10. Habermas explains the response to the claim to truthfulness as follows: “The 
sincerity of expressions cannot be grounded but only shown; insincerity can be revealed by the lack of 
161 
 
unintended consequences may appear at any time which may threaten to break down 
communicative actions. If a hearer harbours doubts on a validity claim, she must have enough 
trust to give the speaker the benefits of the doubt through raising questions to challenge it. To 
save the communicative action, the speaker then has to offer “explanations and denials, and if 
need be, apologies, in order to dispel the false impression that these side effects are 
perlocutionary effects.”573 In this way, they engage in discursive reasoning until both of them 
agree on the validity or invalidity of their speech acts. The presence of valid speech acts is a 
necessary condition for participants to form their common understandings on the situation, 
from which they would thereafter coordinate their plans of action. 
In his more recent work, Habermas contends that a speech act does not need to satisfy all the 
three claims for the interaction to be communicative. If a speech act satisfies the claims to 
truth and truthfulness but not the claim to rightness, Habermas argues, there still exists 
communicative action, but in a weak sense. A communicative action in a strong sense occur 
when all three claims are satisfied. Habermas elaborates the differences between these two as 
follows, 
I will speak of communicative action in a weak sense whenever reaching 
understanding applies to facts and to actor-relative reasons for one-sided 
expressions of will; I will speak of communicative action in a strong sense as soon 
as reaching understanding extends to the normative reasons for the selection of the 
goals themselves. In the latter case, the participants refer to intersubjectively 
shared value orientations that – going beyond their personal preferences - bind 
their wills. In weak communicative action the actors are oriented toward claims to 
truth and truthfulness; in strong communicative action they are oriented toward 
intersubjectively recognized rightness claim as well; in the case of strong 
communicative action, not just arbitrary freedom of choice but autonomy in the 
sense of the capacity to bind one’s will on the basis of normative insights is 
presupposed.574 
Communicative actions in strong and weak senses result in different outcomes. Habermas 
regards the result of strong communicative actions where participants are able to accept a 
validity claim for the same reason as agreement. While in weak communicative action, when 
a hearer may agree with a speaker on something for the reasons that are good for the latter 
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only, this would bring about mutual understanding (Verständigung).
575
 Put this simply, in 
Habermasian term, agreement is more substantial than mutual understanding, as the 
participants hold the same reasons for what they agreed upon.
576
 
Under this framework and conceptualization, the Chapter now turns to examine a number of 
selective speech acts on specific issues. It should be noted that the order of the issues 
discussed below is intentionally arranged by the author of this thesis. 
 
On the purposes and principles of HRD 
At their opening remarks, Director General (DG) Minh and Assistant Secretary (A/S) 
Lowenkron uttered their understandings of the purposes and principles of the dialogue. In 
their words:  
Minh1 (M1) [hereafter M refers to Minh]: The HRD will help to increase mutual 
understanding between the United States and Vietnam by allowing the two sides 
to frankly discuss issues of mutual concern in the spirit of the Joint Statement. 
Lowenkron1 (L1) [hereafter L refers to Lowenkron]: The United States and 
Vietnam need to do everything in their power to ensure that the HRD bolsters 
their positive relations …. The HRD is also important because … [I have] an 
obligation to report to Congress the HRD and what it has achieved. For the 
United States, the principles surrounding the HRD are threefold: that it leads to 
concrete results; that it is candid and transparent; and, that the two countries can 
bring all of their concerns to the table. [emphasis added].577 
Again, these are all constative speech acts, in which speakers are supposed to provide 
grounds for their assertions and explanations. It is clear that the two sides reached a mutual 
understanding on some principles of HRD, as also is the positive influence that the dialogue 
should have on the overall relationship. A/S Lowenkron agreed with DG Minh on the 
principle of frankness and added that all issues of concerns could be raised. The latter 
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responded to this additional principle right after the former’s speech, “Vietnam agrees that 
the HRD should be used to raise any and all issues of mutual concern.”578 
Though agreed that HRD should positively impacts the relations, the two sides disagreed on 
the reasons for it. For the Vietnamese, the dialogue was to “increase mutual understanding;” 
talk is itself an achievement. For the Americans, it is clear that talk is not enough and tangible 
results must be achieved. It must be noted here that these two goals may or may not exclude 
each other. If specific commitments are reached through mutual understanding, the American 
goal is an advancement from the Vietnamese goal. But if the Americans intend to achieve 
their goal, i.e. the release of Pham Hong Son without having the Vietnamese agree with them 
that it was wrong to imprison the man, the former indeed will be engaging in strategic 
actions. In that case, strategic actions are detrimental to reaching mutual understanding.  
This difference submerged once again and translated into their judgments of the dialogues in 
the concluding remarks: 
M2: The Dialogue was a success, allowing both sides to share experiences, learn 
from each other and increase mutual understanding. We agree on a number of 
issues, and remain in disagreement on some others. The GVN is willing to 
conduct further meetings and exchanges of views. 
L2: [We have] to work hard on making this Dialogue results [-] oriented. We 
would be ultimately judged not on the quantity of meetings we hold, but what 
those meetings produce.579 
While DG Minh claimed the dialogue a success, A/S Lowenkron was more cautious and 
viewed this dialogue as a step in the process of improving human rights conditions in 
Vietnam. Their mutual understanding on this topic are the two principles of HRD and the 
positive influence HRD should have on their bilateral relations. 
 
Approaches to human rights 
The two sides then took turn in presenting their human rights approaches. Among others, they 
raised different accounts of what constitute fundamental human rights but no questions or 
discussions followed. As discussed at the end of the previous chapter, both sides mentioned 
but did not intend to discuss on this topic. This was regrettable as they missed the opportunity 
to engage in the roots of their human rights differences: their different human rights 
understandings.  
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Nevertheless, A/S Lowenkron responded to the two contentions in DG Minh’s speech; the 
exchanges are below: 
M3: In a diverse world, international human rights standards should be 
harmonized with the unique historical, cultural and other traditions of individual 
countries. 
M4: There needs to be a common international understanding about human rights. 
No nation should consider itself perfect in the area of human rights, and there 
should be no double-standards. 
Lowenkron1 (L3)[hereafter L refers to Lowenkron]: In a recent speech, she 
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] noted that democracy by definition cannot 
be imposed, and that there is no single road to building democracy. However, the 
Secretary, the President and the American people believe that there are some 
universal human rights principles.580 
L4: Indeed, no country is perfect in human rights; in fact, no country is perfect.  
(L3) responded to (M3), and (L4) to (M4). (M3) is a constative speech act, asserting the 
particularity of human rights from the Vietnamese perspective. A/S Lowenkron showed his 
agreement with this by providing ground for this claim to truth: our Secretary of State also 
said so. In (L4), however, A/S Lowenkron only accepted the imperfectability of human rights 
realization as legitimate and valid while deliberatively setting aside the Vietnamese claim on 
double standard. This reminds us Jack Donnelly’s observation that American officials often 
stubbornly refuse to consider that the other may see other things, beside their “purest 
motives” in American human rights-related actions. This refusal, as explained in chapter One, 
is rooted in American convictions of their superior and exceptional human rights values. As a 
result, mutual understanding from these exchanges is that each country can have its own road 
to democracy and no country is perfect in human rights. 
 
Criminal procedures code 
The avoidance of certain topics was also evident at the discussion on criminal procedures 
code. A/S Lowenkron raised this issue by asking how the changes in courtroom proceedings 
in the newly amended criminal procedures code were implemented. The Vietnamese response 
was indirect, it accounted for other amendments in the code and only touched upon the new 
regulations related to courtroom procedures but not on how the new regulations were actually 
implemented and changed the courtroon procedures. A/S Lowenkron’s response is short and 
contains two speech acts: an expressive one – “we are grateful for the comprehensive 
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overview of Vietnam's criminal procedures” and a constative one – “areas of concern 
remain;” “American concerns on this issue remain.”581 The first could be interpreted as a 
polite diplomatic appreciation for the Vietnamese presentation while the second shows his 
frankness: he was not happy with that answer. The candid attitude was not followed up, as the 
Vietnamese side did not actually talked to the American and thus no mutual understanding on 
the code was achieved. 
The analysis of the exchanges on these two issues elaborates and confirms the main 
conclusion reached in the previous chapter. That is, the interlocutors avoided unpleasant 
topics that may put them in a disadvantaged position; in these cases, they are the possibility 
of double-standards in American human rights policy and the practical changes of courtroom 
procedures in Vietnam. The American ignorance of the double-standards charge maybe 
because they did not want to be criticized by the Vietnamese on their human rights policy. As 
for the Vietnamese, an elaborating on Vietnamese courtroom procedures would be an 
excellent opportunity for them to challenge the American earlier charge that the trial of Pham 
Hong Son was not carried out in a transparent manner. Why did the Vietnamese side not take 
that chance? Perhaps a discursive reasoning on Son’s trial would lead to a rational agreement 
that the Vietnamese government considers as dangerous. For example, a release of Son and 
other “political dissidents” will be an encouragement and strengthening for the opposition 
elements in Vietnam. Or perhaps the Vietnamese did not want to carry out certain changes in 
the courtroom procedures that they regard as infiltrating capitalist elements. Both of these 
two kinds of elements, as the Vietnamese fear, would lead to the elimination of socialism in 
Vietnam. 
 
Decree 31 
Raised at the same time with the criminal procedures code is Decree 31. A/S Lowenkron 
made a claim to truth that the Decree is “broad, ill-defined and opened to abuse,” and 
“violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” He then recommended 
Vietnam “to repeal the decree and release those imprisoned under it.”582 A Vietnamese 
member Tran Van Thanh responded as follows: 
Thanh (T1)[hereafter T refers to Thanh]: Vietnam is currently attempting to 
transform into a nation based on rule of law. Vietnam needs legal documents to 
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manage society, protect national security and promote human rights. Decree 31 
must be understood in that context.  
T2: However, no legal document is permanent, and Vietnam will consider 
amendments to Decree 31 through a survey and review of the decree to ensure that 
it reflects appropriate international standards.583 
Here, Thanh did not challenge A/S Lowenkron’s claim to truth on Decree 31 but he promised 
to amend the Decree in accordance with “appropriate international standards” - an implicit 
reference to the ICCPR. A/S Lowenkron accepted this promise as valid by stating that “it is 
good to hear that the GVN is discussing ways to amend the law” though this result is far from 
the American expectations.
584
 Mutual understanding on this topic is that the two sides agreed 
that Decree 31 should be subjected to change, but not on why, when, and how it should be 
changed. 
 
Ethnic minority 
Another example of the agreement on overall principle but not on specific details is the issue 
of ethnic minority. A Vietnamese delegation member started the discussion by elaborating on 
Vietnamese achievements on ethnic minority issue, both in laws and practice and ended his 
remark with a request for “support and assistance” from the U.S. Ambassador Marine 
promptly responded to the request by informing that the U.S. was “considering a package of 
assistance, and [would] be presenting it for discussion with the GVN soon.”585 This reply 
indicates that the Americans acknowledged this request as valid. The mutual understanding 
here is that the U.S. promised to assist Vietnam on ethnic minority development efforts. 
However, how exactly such efforts would look like is another matter. Ambassador Hanford 
requested the Vietnamese to ensure that there would be no mistreatment to the Central 
Highland minorities who returned to Vietnam after migrating to Cambodia. Justifying this 
request are his two opening and closing speech acts: “the USG understands that the issue of 
ethnic minority relations is sensitive for the GVN, and that Vietnam has more than 50 ethnic 
groups” and “The U.S. commitment to defend the rights of minority populations is global; for 
example, the United States has urged Cambodia to respect the rights of Vietnamese minority 
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residents.”586 In the rest of this item, the two sides discussed the procedures for a number of 
ethnic minorities to resettle in the U.S. 
Except for the discussion on the procedures, the dialogue on this topic was like a 
conversation among the deaf. Ambassador Hanford set aside the Vietnamese narration on 
ethnic minority policies and achievements. DG Minh in turn ignored both Ambassador 
Hanford’s request and its justifications. It is clear that the two sides did not engage in 
discursive reasoning. It could be argued that the interlocutors only cared about fulfilling their 
strategic aims: the Americans raised their Central Highland concerns; the Vietnamese showed 
that they were doing well on ethnic minority. Perhaps these were the only mandates for the 
diplomats in the dialogue. They did not need to go beyond their assigned tasks, for example 
to identify and agree on the truths about ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Consequently, what the 
two sides achieved out of this exchange cannot be counted as mutual understanding in a 
Habermasian standard: they knew each other’s claims and requests without knowing if the 
other side acknowledge them as valid. 
 
National security and human rights 
Following the discussion on ethnic minority issue is the exchange on the linkage between 
national security and human rights. After DG Minh invited the Americans to understand this 
issue from Vietnam’s historical context, a Supreme People’s Procuracy (SPP) representative 
Xuyen provided a short elaboration on the authority of SPP and the Criminal Code and 
uttered the following significant three speech acts, in the order of their utterance: 
Xuyen (X1)[hereafter X refers to Xuyen]: Vietnam would like assurances that the 
United States will cooperate with Vietnam to extradite him [Nguyen Huu Chanh 
who lives in the U.S. and is wanted in Vietnam for terrorist activities] or compel 
him to return to Vietnam to stand trial if there is sufficient evidence to warrant such 
an action. 
(X2): All of the prisoners of concern identified by the United States in Vietnam 
have been charged, tried and convicted of offenses under Vietnam's criminal code. 
(X3): How the United States could reconcile the Patriot Act, with its provisions 
limiting civil liberties, with its statements urging other countries to consider human 
rights over national security.587 
In turn, A/S Lowenkron promptly engaged with (X2) by claiming that the Vietnamese 
criminal code “itself is a problem,” “lacks precision,” and contains “provisions such as 
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‘National Security Crimes’ that are so vague as to “allow the State to prosecute nearly 
anyone,” adding that “due process is also a problem.”588 In response to (X3), he elaborated on 
the American way of reconciling the Patriot Act with its own human rights commitments, not 
with the American urging for other countries putting human rights over national security as 
the Vietnamese charged. He then responded to DG Minh’s invitation unmistakably with a 
tone of lecturing: 
L5: Vietnam must decide for itself what is national security and what is freedom. 
The more confident and secure a nation is, the more confident it can be to open its 
system. For decades other countries have fought to determine Vietnam's future, but 
now only Vietnam determines Vietnam's future. Advances in human rights and 
openness support Vietnam's economic reform policies and demonstrate both the 
resilience and independence of a free Vietnam.589 
Unlike the previous conversation among the deaf, the exchanges here were full of intentional 
manipulations for perlocutionary effects. In an obvious way, (X3) implied a claim that it is 
not normatively right when U.S. itself prioritized national security over human rights while 
indirectly suggesting that other countries were not capable of doing so. Interpreted (X3) in 
this way, A/S Lowenkron did not directly engage with the question but took this opportunity 
to lecture the Vietnamese on the necessity and importance of liberties. The American side 
might not see A/S Lowenkron’s speech here as lecturing; for them, it is self-evident that 
American value of liberty is the value and thus worth spreading in Vietnam. No engagement 
or even a notice from the Vietnamese side on this speech act. 
With regards to (L5), for A/S Lowenkron DG Minh’s “the historical context” meant the 
decades when “other countries have fought to determine Vietnam’s future.” Whether this is 
the part of Vietnam’s history that the latter wanted to referred to is unclear and so are the 
decades that the former referred to. Neither side felt the need to provide clarifications on this 
ambiguity. The fact that the Vietnamese side did not respond to this A/S Lowenkron’s remark 
and (L5) could be due to these inherent ambiguity in diplomatic talks. Or that could be 
attributed to the structure of diplomatic dialogue: the Vietnamese had used up their time slot 
for this agenda item. Or that the Vietnamese interlocutors decided to break up the 
conversation possibly because of the lecturing tone in (L5). In either way, no mutual 
understanding was achieved out of these strategic interactions. 
The only mutual understanding on this topic was on Chanh’s case when Ambassador Marine 
responded directly to (X2) that the Americans “are willing to work with Vietnam to develop 
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an appropriate response considering the evidence. We are considering appropriate next steps 
on this issue, and will be in touch soon.”590 With this promise, Ambassador Marine accepted 
(X2) as legitimate. Thus, on this topic the Vietnamese secured American commitments to 
work on the case of Nguyen Huu Chanh whereas the issue of freedom raised by the American 
side was not taken up by the Vietnamese. In what follows is the analysis of their exchanges 
on concrete freedoms, namely press, internet, and religious freedoms. 
 
Press, internet, and religious freedom 
Right after A/S Lowenkron’s lecturing speech is the discussion on press and internet 
freedom. A/S Lowenkron started this item with his assessments of Vietnam’s Press Law, his 
views of internet control, and a number of specific requests related to internet freedom. 
Nguyen Tri Dung replied by reading a speech prepared before-hand that elaborated on 
Vietnamese internet freedom policies and achievements. It was not until the end of his 
presentation that Dung addressed one of American requests on internet restrictions by 
claiming that the existing internet regulations were “just circulars which can easily be 
changed or amended” and that “it takes time to perfect the system.” A/S Lowenkron 
responded that what mattered was not the growing number of media outlets but what these 
outlets are about and made a specific request related to Radio Free Asia.
591
 This response was 
ignored by the Vietnamese side. 
The discussion on religious freedom was also informative but not at the level of discursive 
reasoning. After expressing the her government’s hope to be delisted from CPC, Nguyen Thi 
Bach Tuyet described a number of Vietnamese efforts and achievements in religious 
freedom. In concluding her speech, she sought information about the burning down of ten 
Protestant churches in the U.S. Ambassador Hanford responded first with his justifications 
for American concerns on religious freedom in Vietnam: religious freedom is a “fundamental 
right” and “of high interest and concern to the international community.” He then mentioned 
a number of Vietnamese achievements on religious freedom and expressed American 
appreciations by such expressions as “we [the U.S.] recognize and welcome the efforts the 
GVN has made,” “a real commitment to change,” and “eliminating a divisive issue between 
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the United States and Vietnam.” Ambassador Hanford concluded his remark with a promise 
to work with the Vietnamese “in the coming months to resolve the CPC issues.”592 
A number of observations can be made on these exchanges. First, Ambassador Hanford’s 
accounts for Vietnam’s achievements on religious freedom indicate that the U.S. accept the 
Vietnamese constative claims for progress on this issue. A mutual understanding was thus 
registered: Vietnam had made considerable progress on religious freedom. Based on this, 
Ambassador Hanford set the time frame for resolving the CPC issue (the coming months) and 
the condition for this (Vietnam should continue to work with the U.S on the issue). The 
implicit message here is that Vietnamese progress on religious freedom was still not 
sufficient for Vietnam’s delisting.593 Second, no such mutual understanding could be 
observed in the discussion on press and internet freedom, as both sides did not attempt to 
engage in discursive reasoning. And third, as the Vietnamese were busy at describing their 
achievements and the Americans at elaborating on their requests, their fundamental 
differences on the definition of freedom and its constraints, and the function of press were not 
even mentioned and thus remained intact.
594
 The mutual understanding reached here is thus 
similar to that on the ethnic minority issue: both sides agreed on religious freedom progress 
in Vietnam but were divided on the definition and constraint of that very freedom. 
 
Prison conditions 
Like their exchange on national security and human rights, the discussion on this issue was 
also full of strategic actions. A/S Lowenkron expressed American concerns about prison 
conditions and urged Vietnam to “consider full access to prisons and prisoners of concern by 
members of the international community.” In reply, a Vietnamese interlocutor talked about 
prison policies of Vietnam and its humanitarian practice of offering amnesties before 
requesting “clarification of and elaboration on” prison conditions in the U.S., Guantanamo 
Bay and CIA secret prisons worldwide which in his view “are reportedly worse than hell.” In 
response, A/S Lowenkron quickly admitted that the U.S. prison conditions were problematic, 
and elaborated on the American solution to it, which in his words, “American people expect 
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nothing less.” He also tactfully added that the International Committee of Red Cross was 
given “full and unimpeded access to the remaining prisoners” in Guantanamo Bay.595 
These are strategic exchanges. The Vietnamese initial response to American concerns on this 
topic is both indirect and challenging. On one hand, it evaded American concerns for actual 
prison conditions in Vietnam. On the other hand, it conveyed an implicit message that the 
U.S. itself is far from impervious to criticism. This demonstrated that the Vietnamese 
interlocutors rejected American concerns and requests at least at the claim to normative 
rightness: “you are not in a position to criticize us on prison conditions.” A/S Lowenkron also 
acted strategically. He accepted the validity claims to truth of the Vietnamese constative 
speech acts on American prison conditions but might doubt the claims to truthfulness – why 
the Vietnamese were concerned about American prison conditions. Were the Vietnamese, he 
might ask, really concerned about these problems or trying to embarrass the American 
delegation? A/S Lowenkron indeed used his acceptance of American problem as a foundation 
to convey what he intended to do: the U.S. allowed international access to its prisons and had 
the perfect way to solve problems. 
Doubts and tactical moves emerged again in their concluding remarks on this item: 
M5: EU Ambassadors and the Swiss Ambassador have been able to visit prisons. 
While the GVN had arranged for A/S Lowenkron to visit a prison in Ho Chi Minh 
City, the delegation decided against it. 
L6: it is important for Vietnam to allow the UN [United Nations] access to 
prisons.596 
(M5) is a constative speech act with direct claim to truth but its implication is obvious. It was 
an indirect challenge to American intention in their request for prison visiting. The speech act 
raised doubt about the truthfulness of the American concern. This time it was the Vietnamese 
side to question American sincerity. If the Americans were really concerned about prison 
conditions in Vietnam, why would they decline to visit a Vietnamese prison? Was the U.S. 
real purposes in this request to not visit any prison, but to visit and show supports for 
“political dissidents” in Vietnam? A/S Lowenkron took no attempts to explain and clear this 
doubt in order to save the communication; he simply repeated an earlier American demand.  
In short, in this exchange communicative actions were not established as the claims to 
truthfulness were quickly rejected whereas there were not enough trust on both sides to act 
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communicatively. Consequently, both sides were engaging in strategic actions and no mutual 
understanding was achieved on this agenda. 
It should be noted that the Americans once tried to establish communicative actions. For the 
first and only time in this dialogue, the American side touched upon the Vietnamese 
subjective feelings in justifying for their requests, apart from the benefits for Vietnam’s 
development and international status. Below are the two speech acts that Ambassador 
Hanford made before and after making his requests on ethnic minority issue: 
Ambassador Hanford1 [hereafter H refers to Ambassador Hanford]: The USG 
understands that the issue of ethnic minority relations is sensitive for the GVN, 
and that Vietnam has more than 50 ethnic groups. 
H2: The U.S. commitment to defend the rights of minority populations is 
global; for example, the United States has urged Cambodia to respect the rights 
of Vietnamese minority residents.597 
Here, Ambassador Hanford demonstrated his knowledge about the lifeworlds of the 
Vietnamese interlocutors: the objective world (Vietnam has 50 ethnic groups) and the 
subjective world (ethnic minority is sensitive for Vietnam, and is the real American target is 
the political regime, not ethnic issue, in Vietnam?) As the Vietnamese side did not mention 
the sensitivity it attached to ethnic minority issue, this could be interpreted as the American 
responses to some of Vietnamese contentions earlier. In explaining Vietnam’s approach to 
human rights early in the dialogue, DG Minh mentioned territorial integrity as one of the 
values that Vietnam cherished, apart from sovereignty and non-interference in its internal 
affairs. Putting these two speech acts in the dialogue context, Ambassador Hanford tried to 
save or establish communicative action. He aimed at clearing any perlocutionary effects of 
his requests, such as the Vietnamese doubts that the U.S. is supporting secessions in Central 
Highland and focused only on Vietnam in order to promote regime change. 
This effort seemed to be effective, but not for long. DG Minh responded to (H2) by showing 
the Vietnamese willingness to allow and facilitate certain Montagnards who wanted to move 
to the U.S. He then asked for another American understanding on Vietnam’s human rights 
records by inviting the Americans to evaluate the records from Vietnam's “particular 
historical context.” However, the Americans rejected this invitation, as they did on the other 
two Vietnamese similar invitations.
598
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Against the scarcity of efforts to establish trust and communicative interactions was a greater 
number of times when pressures had been used. The American side raised the same deadline 
four times for human rights improvements in Vietnam during the dialogue. At his opening 
remark, A/S Lowenkron linked human rights progress with President Bush’s visit.599 This 
tentative visit was mentioned again in the discussion on criminal code, prisons and prisoners 
of concern. A/S Lowenkron stated, 
L7: By frankly raising our concerns in these areas, we will be able to see progress 
before the President's visit in November.600 
(L7) is an expressive speech act, revealing the American delegation’s hope for progress 
before President Bush’s visit to Hanoi later that year. It has direct claim to truthfulness (the 
Americans sincerely hoped so), indirect claims to truth (President Bush was scheduled to visit 
Vietnam) and rightness (it was appropriate for the U.S. to hope so). However, like the first 
time, DG Minh and other Vietnamese speakers ignored this speech act, making it difficulty to 
decide at that moment whether all the claims to validity of this speech act were implicitly 
accepted or which one was rejected by the Vietnamese. 
Only later on, when Ambassador Hanford raised this deadline for the third time, did the 
Vietnamese react to it and this ambiguity was cleared. In response to the former’s claim that 
continued progress in religious freedom would “provide a more solid basis for a successful 
visit by President Bush,” DG Minh denied that “any external pressure” was the source of 
GVN’s human rights efforts, arguing that it came from the sincere wish of his government.601 
In this way, DG Minh considered Ambassador Hanford’s deadline as a threat and rejected it. 
The American side insisted on this deadline by raising it for the fourth time. In this final time, 
the threat was totally exposed. In the middle of his remark on press freedom, A/S Lowenkron 
stated,  
L8: The November 2006 APEC meetings as an opportunity for Vietnam to either 
highlight its openness and development, or be subject to criticism from frustrated 
journalists who find themselves unable to access blocked Internet sites.602 
As observed earlier, both sides did not attempt to engage in discursive reasoning in this 
exchange over press freedom. The vulnerability contained in this utterance of A/S 
Lowenkron confirmed this observation. His claim on “frustrated journalists” at APEC 
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meetings could be rejected on the claims to truth and truthfulness: whether the journalists 
would be angry and A/S Lowenkron could not speak for them. The Vietnamese side also 
made several speech acts which could be easily attacked by the Americans. The latter, 
however, did not openly challenge but reported with doubts in their report on the dialogue.
603
 
The use of strategic actions in the form of threats thus eliminated any trust leftover in this 
2006 HRD.  
 
Summing up, the analysis above brings about the following main results: 
(1) HRD should be conducted in a candid and transparent way with all concerned issues to be 
discussed and HRD should have positive influence on the overall relationship; 
(2) Each country can have its own road to democracy and no nation is perfect in human rights 
issue; 
(3) The Vietnamese government promised to change Decree 31 to meet international 
standards, 
(4) There had been considerable progress in religious freedom in Vietnam since Ambassador 
Hanford’s 2005 visit, and the government of Vietnam promised to continue to improve 
religious freedom. 
(5) The U.S. promised to assist Vietnam on its ethnic minority development efforts and to 
work with Vietnam on the case of Nguyen Huu Chanh on the basis of evidence. 
The first result, a mutual understanding on the principle of their HRD was not borne out of 
this dialogue as the principle of “a candid and transparent” human rights dialogue had been 
agreed upon long before that.
604
 In other words, (1) was reaffirmations of what both the 
leaders of the two countries had agreed upon. Whereas (2) seems to be an undeniable truth 
that does not require reference to American and Vietnamese human rights perceptions and 
understandings. Apart from these, the rest of these mutual understandings are either promises 
or commitments. The Americans committed to assist the development of Vietnamese ethnic 
minority and to work with Vietnam on Chanh’s case; the Vietnamese promised to amend 
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Decree 31 and continue to improve religious freedom. It should be noted that, as analyzed 
above, each side held different justifications for those commitments. 
Moreover, the analysis above sheds more light into and supplements the previously 
concluded reasons for failing to meet Habermas’s preconditions. Besides the exclusiveness 
nature of this diplomatic dialogue, two other possible diplomatic obstacles prove to be real: 
the ambiguity in diplomatic speeches and the diplomats’ focus on fulfilling their assigned 
tasks for promoting their national interests. As the analysis of specific speech acts on the 
topic “national security and human rights” has shown, ambiguity in diplomacy contributed to 
the break up of further communication on that topic and accordingly the lack of mutual 
understanding. Whereas the American and Vietnamese listings of their respective requests 
and records on Vietnamese ethnic minority spared no time left for discursive reasoning on the 
justifications and reasons for their demands and achievements. As the possible failure of 
recognizing the other as equally rational, the lecturing tone in the American account on 
liberties suggest that the American interlocutors were more likely the candidates in this case. 
Apart from this inequality, it should also be noted that it was the U.S. side who set the 
deadlines and raised threats in this dialogue. 
And finally, the lack of a performative attitude (as initially found in examining Habermas’s 
overall conditions) or the presence of evasive and ignorant attitude (as concluded via a 
Gadamerian analysis of the dialogue) is both demonstrated and initially explained at this 
stage. The overwhelming of strategic actions over communicative interactions reflected such 
attitudes. It could also be argued the other way round, that negative attitudes have led to the 
temptations to use strategic actions. As the hearers chose to turn their backs to any new 
‘truths’ raised by the speakers, the latter had no choice but to abandon communicative action 
and act strategically. The hearers in turn stick to their negative attitudes and also acted 
strategically. This created a vicious cycle of distrusts and manipulations. The question is why 
the Vietnamese and American interlocutors adopted such attitudes and strategic actions in the 
first place? How did this cycle emerge? Also what remains unclear at this stage are the 
dynamics of the Vietnamese concerns for territorial integrity as well as their suspicions over 
American true intentions identified in the above analysis. These questions are answered in the 
following chapter; before that are discussion on the Habermas’s indications for genuine 
understanding and the criticism against his model. 
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III. Indications of communicatively reached agreement 
For Habermas, a genuine agreement has three detectable indications. First, the outcome of 
communicative interactions is more stable than that of strategic ones. As strategic actors 
reach agreement on the calculations of interests, such agreement is subject to change once 
dialogue participants change their interests. Habermas explains that “coordination of the 
subjects’ actions depends on the extent to which their egocentric utility calculation mesh. The 
degree of cooperation and the stability is determined by the interest positions of the 
participants.”605 Whereas the outcome of communicative interactions has a rational basis, 
“has to be accepted or presupposed as valid by the participants,” and “rests on common 
convictions.”606 Accordingly, a communicative outcome is free from any changes of their 
interests. “What we hold to be true,” Habermas contends, “has to be defendable on the basis 
of good reasons, not merely in a different context but in all possible contexts, that is, at any 
time and against anybody.”607 Thus, a more stable and context-free agreement could serve as 
an indication of a genuine dialogue. 
However, this does not mean that the outcome of a genuine dialogue remains unchanged. On 
one hand, validity claims go beyond the context in which they are raised. On the other hand, 
those claims rest on the force of better arguments or the best reasons. Participants may find 
out in their subsequent encounters that there may be better reasons to modify or even change 
their shared understanding. Jennifer Mitzen captures this situation well: 
On the one hand, it [communicative action] can generate stable consensus: a 
possible response to a validity claim creates an agreement on a fact and 
“obligations relevant to future interaction.” But validity claims also always point 
beyond a particular context. Because ideally, communicative agreements are 
supported by the “best” reasons, any achieved agreement must remain open to 
“better” reasons in the future. Through social learning and change, over time 
some reasons can become obsolete.608 
Thus, neither the outcomes of communicative nor strategic actions stay unchanged but for 
different reasons. However, it is safe to say that a genuine dialogue brings about a more 
stable result: agreements drawn from communicative actions are unlikely to be challenged by 
possible changes in the participants’ interests or the situations. 
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A second indication is that participants coordinate and carry out their respective follow-up 
actions on the basis of their communicatively achieved agreements. Habermas argues that 
communicative actors must, among other things, “tie their agreement to the intersubjective 
recognition of criticizable validity claims,” and be “ready to take on the obligations resulting 
from consensus and relevant for further interaction.”609 In other words, they do not stop at the 
point of reaching agreements, they must move on to coordinate their actions based on these 
agreements. An examiner of a dialogue must thus observe if the promises and compromises 
made in the dialogue have been actually realized, and if subsequent actions of dialogue 
participants are in conformity with the reached agreements. 
A third indication could be found in the changes of the participants’ lifeworlds. In 
communicative actions, participants draw their rational arguments from their own lifeworlds 
and stay ready to be convinced by the others’ better arguments. Thus, their own lifeworlds 
are also subject to be changed or rationalized. And it is likely that in reaching agreement, they 
can also share certain common lifeworlds (either they have certain common lifeworlds in 
advance or they work for a shared lifeworlds or both). In any cases, the lifeworlds of the 
interlocutors are no longer the same but have been transformed. Participants come out of a 
genuine dialogue with changes in their convictions, interests, and even identities. 
In sum, a genuine dialogue can be confirmed by the relatively stable and interests-free 
outcome, the realizations of coordinated actions based on their agreements, and the changes 
of the interlocutors’ convictions and ideas. The last indication, as concluded in the answers 
for the thesis questions from a Gadamerian perspective and also evident in this chapter, was 
not present. There were no changes in the convictions and positions of the 2006 HRD 
interlocutors. Moreover, as the interlocutors disagreed on the claims to rightness, the 
indications of this 2006 HRD mutual understanding are of the first two types and can be 
found in events after the dialogue. 
The outcomes of this dialogue seem to satisfy these two conditions. From this round of 
dialogue to the next round in April 2007, neither side stated any contradiction to the mutual 
understandings listed above.
610
 Indeed, both sides fulfilled their commitments and promises 
though to different extents, as proved in the following selective events. 
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In December 2006, the National Assembly passed a resolution supporting a GVN’s proposal 
to abolish Decree 31. According to the resolution, from January 1, 2007, authorities would no 
longer use administrative detention and instead rely on the judicial process “to mete out 
punishment for actions identified in law as crimes.”611 Then Minister of Justice Uong Chu 
Luu was quoted as saying that “the denial of the rights of the suspected through an 
administrative decision [in the Decree] was legally problematic …[and] … In the context of 
Vietnam’s judicial reform and in accordance with international norms, such denial should be 
made through judicial proceedings to protect citizens’ rights.”612 The Vietnamese thus acted 
in accordance with their previously reached agreement with the U.S. on the Decree. 
On Chanh’s case, though the U.S. has not extradited him to Vietnam to stand trial, the U.S. 
has shown indications of cooperation on the issue. About three months after the dialogue, 
Ambassador Marine informed Vice Minister of Public Security Nguyen Van Huong in a 
meeting that “there have been meaningful and beneficial exchanges of information regarding 
the case of Nguyen Huu Chanh.”613 And when FBI Director Robert Mueller visited Vietnam 
in January 2008, Huong thanked him for information “concerning investigations regarding 
Nguyen Huu Chanh and his associates.”614 Based on these evidences, it can be assumed that 
the Americans had kept their promises on this issue. And on the American pledge to assist 
Vietnam in development for ethnic minority, American Congress had provided two million 
USD to help improving economic conditions for ethnic minorities in the Central 
Highlands.
615
 
 
IV. Criticism of Habermas’s TCA and the answers to the research questions from a 
Habermasian perspective 
1. Criticism against Habermas’s TCA 
                                                          
611
 Vietnam Moves to Abolish Decree 31, Wikileak cable, this can be found at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06HANOI3018.html, accessed 23 July 2013.  
612
 “NA members want detested two-year detention law scrapped,” this can be found on 
http://www.intellasia.net/na-members-want-detested-two-year-detention-law-scrapped-30332, accessed 3 April 
2014. 
613
 Ambassador Meets MPS Vice Minister, this can be found on 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06HANOI1115.html, accessed 4 April 4, 2014. 
614
 FBI Director Meets With Vice Minister Of Ministry Of Public Security, this can be found on 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08HANOI169.html, accessed 4 April 4, 2014. 
615
 This was informed by Ambassador Marine to a leader from the Ministry of Public Security in May 2006. 
This can be found on http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06HANOI1115.html, accessed 4 April 2014. 
179 
 
Not surprisingly, Habermas’s TCA has been under an array of criticism. This subsection 
focuses only on the critics related to the conditions for, and indications of, a genuine dialogue 
and suggests that those critics are surmountable. 
The first criticism is about the sufficiency of these conditions. McCarthy questions the 
sufficiency of symmetry in terms of time and opportunities for all participants that are 
necessary for rational discourse, as other “empirical conditions … referring to the 
intelligence, competence, psychological normality, etc. of the participants” may also be 
required.
616
 Held, meanwhile, argues that the conditions for ideal speech situation do not 
include such categories as “the nature (content) of cultural traditions” and “the distribution of 
material resources.”617 In response, Habermas argues that on one hand the sensitivity to these 
sources of deviation “is built into the theory at the formal level;” on the other hand, he views 
the results of such deviations are essentially “unproblematic” as participants can realize the 
equality principle has been breached.
618
 As Habermas explains, “should one party make use 
of privileged access to weapons, wealth or standing, in order to wring agreement from 
another party through the prospect of sanctions or rewards, no one involved will be in doubt 
that the presuppositions of argumentation are no longer satisfied.”619 In other words, if an 
interlocutor resorts to her advantages over the other interlocutors to win their agreement, she 
will be viewed by others as engaging in strategic action and the agreement as not genuine. 
Inequality is tolerable in communicative action if it is not used by the advantaged 
interlocutors. In this way, communicative actions can still occur in dialogue among unequal 
partners. 
Habermas’s defense against this first criticism provides further analysis for the 2006 HRD. 
The two sides of that dialogue presented two unequal partners, the U.S. and Vietnam, in 
terms of the level of development and power, among others. Indeed, in order to extract 
Vietnamese acquiescence to the U.S. demands, the American interlocutors made use of their 
advantages. They offered the Vietnamese both the sanctions (the prospects of “frustrated 
journalists” at the upcoming APEC meeting and the limited result of President Bush’s visit) 
and the rewards (Vietnam’s higher international status and further economic development). A 
similar threat from the Vietnamese about the visit of their leaders to the U.S. cannot be 
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compared to this American threat on President Bush’s visit, even practically unthinkable. 
Likewise, it is unlikely that Vietnam, a country still struggling with its development, would 
map out the development path for the U.S., a developed country and even the number-one 
economy in the world. 
A second objection that appears more difficult to tackle relates to the differences between 
strategic and communicative actions. For Jeffrey Alexander, the distinction between strategic 
and communicative actions is not clear because communication and understanding are also 
required in strategic actions. Alexander gives an example of a successful deceit, where both 
the perpetrator and his/her victim need particular understandings: the former needs an 
“intricate understanding of the meaning of his victim’s actions,” and the latter’s 
“understanding of his interlocutor’s actions in an ‘objectively preferable’ way.”620 In his 
view, this is because Habermas misinterpreted Austin’s ideas on strategic and communicative 
acts, for whom strategic or perlocutionary acts include understanding so that it is also true for 
communicative or illocutionary acts to include strategizing.”621 Illocutionary understanding, 
Alexander concludes, “can never occur without the calculation of effects and the purposive 
direction of action toward that end.”622 To a lesser extent, Jon Elster raises the difficulties in 
differentiating the two actions as people often justify a proposal for their own narrow 
interests “by means of arguments that have a general and impartial character” so as to gain 
support from wide groups.”623 
In response to these criticisms, Habermas concedes that his distinction between 
communicative and strategic actions is analytical, and strategic interactions “also demand 
discerning achievements in understanding and interpretation.” And he revised his position on 
the differences between strategic and communicative actions. Apart from objectivating and 
performative attitudes, these two interactions can be distinguished by examining whether the 
interlocutors reveal or disguise their true motivations in the dialogue. Habermas posits that 
while strategic actors intentionally conceal their real goals, communicative actors must 
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declare their aims at the beginning of the dialogue.
624
 Habermas gives an example that a 
person Y borrows some money from a person H without telling H the truth about the reason 
for this borrowing. If H knew in advance that Y’s real purpose was to use the money to 
prepare for a burglary, H would have refused to lend Y the money; in this situation, Y had 
acted strategically.
625
 This Habermas’s revision has a consequence on our model for a 
genuine dialogue: an additional condition for reaching agreements is that the interlocutors 
openly declare the goals that they expect from their dialogue. As it has become clear after the 
analysis of the 2006 HRD from both Gadamer’s and Habermas’s perspectives, the 
interlocutors declared their expected goals openly at the beginning of the dialogue and judged 
the outcome of their meeting on those goals. 
A last strand of criticism is about the practicality of Habermas’s conditions. “It is apparent 
that the conditions of actual speech,” McCarthy remarks, “are rarely, if ever, those of the 
ideal speech situation. Indeed the space-time limitations, the psychological limitations, and 
the like, of actual discourse seem to exclude a perfect realization of these conditions.”626 
Likewise, Michel Foucault argues that besides power relationships external to the discourse 
which might influence actors’ arguments, “power as social structure resides in the discourse 
itself” as it “prescribe[s] which arguments can be legitimately used by the participants,” 
which renders an ideal speech situation impossible.
627
 In his defense, Habermas contends that 
“linguistic reconstruction … calls for empirical inquiries with actual speakers.”628 Under this 
view, the ideal speech situation should be viewed, in Alan Gross’s words, not as 
“generalization from experience” but as “a rational reconstruction of the criteria that make a 
certain kind of experience possible.”629 Though the conditions in this ideal speech situation 
may have never been fully realized, a testing of these conditions in a particular dialogue 
would bring insights into explaining the successes or failures of that dialogue. Specifically, 
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and this has been mentioned in the Introduction and demonstrated in this chapter, the 
satisfactions or failures to meet these conditions reveal the obstacles to American and 
Vietnamese mutual understanding on human rights. 
 
2. The answers to the research questions from a Habermasian perspective 
Can diplomatic dialogues narrow the differences on human rights understanding between 
Vietnam and the U.S.? 
The analysis of the 2006 HRD from Habermas’s perspective points to a similar conclusion 
from a Gadamerian perspective, that is no substantial differences on the Vietnamese and 
American understanding of human rights were bridged. The interlocutors failed to discuss 
their justifications for their respective human rights positions, leading to the scarcity of 
intersubjective rationality in the dialogue. However, analyzing the dialogue from a 
Habermasian lens brings about concrete outcomes in the forms of promises and 
commitments. Though they held different reasons for these common understandings and 
commitments, these promises were indeed communicatively achieved in, and had been kept 
fulfilled after, the dialogue. A concise Habermasian answer to this question is that although 
the 2006 HRD failed to narrow the American and Vietnamese human rights perceptions, it 
still brought about a number of true commitments and mutual understandings on concrete 
issues. 
 
What are the obstacles for the American and Vietnamese diplomats to their mutual 
understanding on human rights? 
The main reason for the failure to narrow the human rights understanding gap, as measured 
from a Habermasian perspective, is that participants resorted to strategic actions. The reasons 
for this and also are the obstacles to mutual understandings are: first, the dialogue lacked the 
participations of involved parties whose names were mentioned, their activities discussed, 
and their interests expressed. Second, the focus of the 2006 HRD participants to fulfill their 
tasks rather than discussing their human rights differences and the ambiguity in their 
utterances are to be blamed for the limited outcome. Third, there were a certain level of 
inequalities as the Americans seemed to consider their human rights understanding more 
rational and took their relative advantages to the Vietnamese to their argumentations in the 
dialogue. And finally, the lack of the interlocutors’ performative attitude is both the reason 
183 
 
and the cause of their strategic actions. Underlying all these reasons, as the analysis suggests, 
were the lack of trust and the impacts of asymmetries in terms of power and development 
level. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has drawn from Habermas’s TCA a number of conditions for, and indications 
of, mutual understanding. A testing of these criteria in the 2006 HRD leads us to a similar 
outcome result as that extracted using a Gadamerian perspective: there were no substantial 
agreement or mutual understanding on human rights approaches between the U.S. and 
Vietnam. However, there were a number of promises and commitments which were 
communicatively achieved in the dialogue, which had been evidenced in subsequent events. 
The main obstacle to their mutual understanding on human rights, from an Habermasian 
perspective, was the overwhelmin use of strategic actions in the dialogue. The exensive use 
of strategic ations sheds light into the diplomatic constraints: reconfirming the diplomats’ 
resistance to changes as an obstacle to mutual understanding. It also verifies that the 
exclusive nature of diplomatic meeting, the ambiguity in diplomats’ speeches, and their 
ultimate goal of serving their national interests obstruct mutual understanding. And finally, 
this analysis of the 2006 HRD using an Habermasian perspective suggests the presence and 
impacts of the fear factor (as concluded in the preceding chapter) and the asymmetries of 
power and development level (which the Gadamer model fails to identify). The next chapter 
elaborates on these obstacles. 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
By now, the three possible obstacles raised in the introduction are revealing themselves 
clearly. The profound differences in American and Vietnamese human rights perceptions 
constitute a real obstacle but they are not the main one. As for the second possible obstacle, 
the diplomatic framework, the diplomatic features listed in the introduction have been tested 
and discussed throughout Chapters Three and Four. The impact of diplomatic features on 
mutual understanding will be summarized and discussed further here. And the third obstacle 
namely power imbalance, is discussed in details here, as also fear and ethnocentrism. 
This conclusion has three parts. It first argues that diplomacy is not all to be blamed for the 
limited outcome of the 2006 HRD. Second, the chapter shows that the three factors of power 
imbalance, fear and suspicions, and ethnocentrism that have appeared along this thesis 
constitute the underlying and main obstacles to mutual understanding on human rights 
between the U.S. and Vietnam. The chapter discusses in details the impacts of, and the 
mutual effects of these obstacles before turning to the conclusion and the theoretical and 
practical contributions of this thesis. 
 
I. Diplomacy; an obstacle to mutual understanding on human rights? 
Does diplomacy stand in the path of a genuine dialogue? The analyses of the 2006 HRD from 
both Gadamer’s and Habermas’s perspectives have shed light into determining which 
diplomatic features obstruct or facilitate mutual understanding. The diplomats’ ultimate 
purpose of serving their national interests, the ambiguity in their speeches, the restrictions on 
changing their views or opinions, and the exclusive nature of their meetings are all creating 
obstacles to mutual understanding. With national interests being their ultimate goals, the 2006 
HRD participants resorted to strategic actions, such as threats or pressure to extract certain 
commitments or promises from the other side. At the same time, the lack of confirmation or 
rejection of the other side’s claims broke up the flow of communication, preventing any 
possible discursive reasoning or the emergence of new meanings on the topic discussed. 
Furthermore, the absence of a number of involved parties in that dialogue rendered any 
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claims referred to them be challenged while the sanction against changing the interlocutors’ 
positions prevented any possible change to occur. In light of these diplomatic constraints, it is 
understandable why the interlocutors failed to satisfy a number of the Gadamerian and 
Habermasian conditions for genuine understanding.  
However, not all diplomatic features are detrimental to genuine understanding on human 
rights. The issue of principles and ideologies was still discussed in the 2006 HRD, and was 
even reserved a separate agenda item. Besides, mutual respect, courtesy, and equality are 
conducive to agreement: the first two prevent the interlocutors from out-arguing the other, the 
last one assures a certain level of equalities (in terms of opportunity to assume the speaker 
role, of time slots in the dialogue, and of setting the agenda). 
Overall, diplomacy appears to bear ultimate responsibility for the lack of mutual 
understanding on human rights, as claimed by a number of scholars.
630
 The analyses of the 
2006 HRD in the two preceding chapters also demonstrate how strategic actions and 
reserved, evasive and disengaging attitudes obstruct mutual understanding between the two 
sides. However, two questions remain. Was it only because the 2006 HRD participants were 
supposed to have those attitudes and strategic actions in their quality of diplomats? And as 
raised in Chapter Four, why did the cycle of these attitudes and strategic actions emerge? 
While the diplomatic constraints to mutual understanding are clear and second track 
diplomacy and public spheres are more compatible with Habermas’s ideal speech situation, it 
does not necessarily means that diplomacy is mainly to be blamed for the lack of mutual 
understanding. The decisive culprit for the limited outcome of the 2006 U.S. - Vietnam 
human rights dialogues are the three factors mentioned earlier: fears and suspicions, the 
conviction in the superiority of one’s own values or ethnocentrism, and power and 
development level imbalances. The next section discusses these in turn and argues that they 
are the underlying obstacles to U.S- Vietnam mutual understanding on human rights. 
 
II. Three underlying obstacles to mutual understanding 
1. Fears and Suspicions 
Fears and suspicions seemed to reside in the Vietnamese interlocutors’ thinking while the 
Americans held suspicions over their true motivations. In the 2006 HRD, the American 
delegation acknowledged some of Vietnamese fears when Ambassador Hanford stated that 
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the U.S. respected the territorial integrity of Vietnam and understood the sensitivity that it 
attached to ethnic minority issue. This acknowledgment, as discussed in the preceding 
chapter, was not sufficient for the Americans to convince the Vietnamese of their good 
intentions. This is because the sources of such fears and suspicions extend to the war legacies 
and political system differences. Accordingly, it requires more than just claims of good 
intentions to eliminate the fears and suspicions that are latent on both sides. 
There is neither space nor intent to provide a full account of the war legacies.
631
 What should 
be stressed is their ongoing different ways to explain and justify the war. For the Americans, 
it was a war to fend off communism in Asia and liberate the Vietnamese people. For the 
Vietnamese, it was first and foremost a war against foreign aggression and for the 
reunification of the country. Twenty five years after the war ended and fifteen years after the 
normalization of the bilateral relations, this difference re-emerged at the first American 
president visit to Vietnam in 2000. After a welcoming remark, General Secretary Le Kha 
Phieu challenged President Clinton on how to understand the war and the past in these terms: 
About the past, I agree with you that we do not forget the past, and cannot remake 
it. The important thing is to understand it correctly. More specifically to 
understand correctly the war against aggression that we had to undertake. What 
was the origin of our war against aggression? The root of it was when imperialism 
raised wars to colonize other countries. As Vietnam did not invade the U.S., why 
the U.S. brought its troops here to invade Vietnam? The result of our war against 
aggression is that we had gained national independence, reunified the Motherland 
and brought the nation into socialism. Thus, for us the past was not a historical 
chapter of darkness, sorrow and unhappiness.632 
In his memoir My Life, President Clinton recalled the encounter that “[t]he party leader, Le 
Kha Phieu, tried to use my opposition to the Vietnam War to condemn what the United States 
had done as an imperialist act. I was angry about it” and “told the leader in no uncertain terms 
that while I had disagreed with our [the U.S.] Vietnam policy, those who had pursued it were 
not imperialists or colonialists, but good people who believed they were fighting 
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communism.” Clinton also recalled his response to another Vietnamese statesman who 
praised him for his opposition to the war in a more friendly atmosphere, “I said that the 
Americans who disagreed with me and supported the war were good people who wanted 
freedom for the Vietnamese.”633 It is clear from these exchanges that the two leaders 
understood the notion of freedom differently. For the head of the CPV and nominally of 
Vietnam, freedom means first and foremost national freedom from foreign aggression and 
domination. For Clinton, it was the freedom for every Vietnamese from communism.
634
 
The Vietnam war was indeed mentioned in the 2006 HRD. A/S Lowenkron’s claim is quoted 
again here: “for decades other countries have fought to determine Vietnam's future, but now 
only Vietnam determines Vietnam's future. Advances in human rights and openness support 
Vietnam's economic reform policies and demonstrate both the resilience and independence of 
a free Vietnam.” For A/S Lowenkron, the U.S. is one of those “other countries” who fought 
to determine a future for Vietnam; such future, which the U.S. envisioned before and during 
the war and still does now, is a “free Vietnam.” Accordingly, it can be speculated that for 
many Americans the war is ongoing and in a new battle field: human rights. The victor of this 
war is the party that could succeed in convincing the other of the rightness of their arguments. 
The words of Thomas L. Friedman captures this well, “we can still hope - as partially 
happened in Vietnam - that our values will triumph where our power failed.”635 Thus, many 
Americans may hope that the U.S. might have lost the war but will win the peace in Vietnam; 
supposedly when Vietnam finally sees the light and embraces (American) liberties. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, in early 1994 the CPV officially considered “peaceful 
evolution” one of the four main risks to the regime. In Chapter Four, we have observed the 
Vietnamese fear of infiltrating capitalist elements into its court room procedures, their 
concerns for Vietnam’s territorial integrity and the non-interference in its internal affairs 
while discussing ethnic minority issue, and their doubts about American true intention in the 
latter’s request to visit prisons in Vietnam. The Vietnamese communists may interpret 
American requests on changing courtroom procedures and visiting Vietnamese prisons as 
attempts to support “political dissidents” when they are on trial or imprisoned. Likewise, 
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American concerns for the Montagnards who demanded an independent state were perceived 
by the Vietnamese as causing instability and even risking secession in Vietnam’s Central 
Highland. Therefore, many Vietnamese are convinced that American engagements with 
Vietnam are to serve an ultimate goal: to topple the communist regime and turn Vietnam into 
a capitalist country. This is the common view of many Vietnamese interviewees.
636
 As 
observed by a Vietnamese diplomat whom I interviewed, the U.S. would never change its 
goal in Vietnam, “the Americans were just patient and accept incremental changes, they 
knew that they could not change Vietnam overnight as they had done in Eastern Europe.”637 
With such concerns in mind, the Vietnamese communists did not believe that American 
interests and advices were benign and free of ultimate intents unpalatable to Vietnam. 
Accordingly, perhaps the Vietnamese communists too hold that the war between a capitalist 
U.S. and a socialist Vietnam is not yet over; they must be on constant guard against possible 
danger from the former, a past invader and a current class enemy. 
Moreover, the differences in political regimes associated, ideological filters prevent each side 
from understanding the other correctly. While the Americans have known the separations of 
power for over two centuries, the Vietnamese are only familiar with the centralization and 
monopoly of power. A Vietnamese interviewee observed that with regards to human rights, 
those in the State Department are more practical whereas Congress members often have a 
more aggressive and hard-line tone, which for him was just a division of roles of a good 
cop/bad cop.
638
 Another difference stemming from regime differences is the role of press. As 
discussed in Chapters One and Two, for the Americans, press is an independent tool siding 
with the people against a necessary evil state; whereas the CPV’s official view is that press is 
a tool of the state to orient public opinion towards supporting state policies and party 
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guidelines. To differentiate their particular understanding about press freedom, the 
Vietnamese communists attach the adjective “revolutionary” to the word “press.”639 
Therefore, the Americans view the Vietnamese government’s attempts to suppress any voice 
openly challenging the official [communist] lines as nothing but serious violations of press 
freedom so as to cling to power. In this case, it is the Americans who are unable to accept 
what Vietnam considers legitimate human rights-related measures. 
The following example is insightful. In 2002, then American Ambassador Raymond 
Burghardt commented on Vietnamese understanding of human rights as follows, 
GVN officials remain officially wedded to the propaganda that the CPV has 
been the savior of the Vietnamese people from the centuries of what they see as 
tyranny by outside forces, including the U.S. As such, they view the CPV (and, 
through it, the GVN itself) as the creator of (not even restorer) of those rights 
now enjoyed by the people of Vietnam, primarily that of national independence 
but also of the larger societal “rights” of stability, economic development, and 
equality. 
[T]he Vietnamese insistence … on the enshrined priority of national solidarity, 
as well as the frequent references to threats to internal stability, may reflect an 
unacknowledged anxiety that longer term trends for Vietnam do indeed not 
favor the continued monopoly.640 
In this, Ambassador Burghardt viewed Vietnamese human rights arguments as nothing but 
propaganda of a party who was trying to retain monopoly of power over the country against 
an unavoidable trend toward political pluralism. This was the reason for his earlier claim that 
“there should be no illusions … [of] any meetings of the minds between the two delegations 
on the nature of human rights and the extent of problems in Vietnam.”641 
In sum, suspicions originating from the war legacies and different political systems result in 
the insufficient basic trust and goodwill necessary for a genuine dialogue. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, according to Habermas trust is needed for interlocutors to engage in and save 
communicative actions (raising questions for clarifications or justifications should the hearer 
harbor doubts on a validity claim of the speaker). In Chapter Four, we have seen the lack of 
willingness to engage in unpleasant topics, in fear of giving the other side an upper hand. 
These fears and suspicions thus are explanatory for the attitudes of ignorance and 
disengagements which, as concluded in Chapter Three, prevent both sides from reaching a 
genuine mutual understanding. 
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2. Ethnocentrism 
Ethnocentrism can be understood as the habit of seeing things from the view of one’s own 
group and judging other culture by the standards of one’s own culture.642 It can create a 
strong sense of group solidarity and superiority, but also can lead to “overt political conflict, 
war, terrorism, even genocide.”643 In its benevolent form, ethnocentrism means that one 
group or one culture thinks that its way of life is superior to that of any other group; even in 
such form, however, it leads to “narrow minded conclusions about the worth of diverse 
cultures” and “discourages intercultural or intergroup understanding.”644 Why do we still 
need to engage in intercultural understanding, an advocate of ethnocentrism may argue, if 
what is ours equates what is “true,” when our own way of reasoning is “the only good 
one,”645 and when the specific values of our own society are unwarrantedly established as 
universal values.
646
 Thus, for the ethnocentric advocate, if there is a cultural dialogue, the 
purpose of such dialogue is to persuade the other interlocutors to believe in, or accept her 
universal values. 
Tzevan Todorov explains the ethnocentrist’s claim to universality as follows: 
The ethnocentrist is thus a kind of caricature of the universalist. The latter, in his 
aspiration to universality, starts with a particular phenomenon that he then 
undertakes to generalize, and this particular phenomenon is of necessity a 
familiar one: that is, in practice it must be found in his own culture.647 
Thus, for the ethnocentric universalist it has become natural and unquestionable that ‘his’ 
values are superior and universal, and that others should adopt these very same values. With 
sincere wishes for the betterment of the others, a naïve ethnocentrist could not comprehend 
that he is in fact imposing his values onto others. 
Todorov gives an indication of an ethnocentric judgment which is worth quoting at length 
here: 
Francisco de Vitoria, a theologian, jurist, and professor at the University of 
Salamanca, in justifying the Spanish wars against the Indians [the formers’ 
conquest of America], considers "that an intervention is permissible if it is made in 
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the name of the innocent against the tyranny of native speakers or laws, a tyranny 
that consists "for instance of sacrificing innocent men or even putting to death 
innocent men in order to eat them." Such justification of war is much less obvious 
than Vitoria would suggest, and in any case does not derive from reciprocity: even 
if this rule were to applied alike to Indians and the Spaniards, it is the latter who 
had decided on the meaning of the word tyranny, and this is the essential thing. 
The Spaniards, unlike the Indians, are not only subject to the decision but also its 
judge, since it is they who select the criteria according to which the judgment will 
be delivered: they decide, for instance, that human sacrifice is the consequence of 
tyranny, but massacre is not. Such a distribution of roles implies that there is no 
real equality between Spaniards and Indians.648 
Essentially, Todorov points to the unequal interactions between the Spaniards and the 
Indians. The former judged the latter by standards and even terms unknown to the latter, i.e. 
the word “tyranny” and its contents were determined by the Spaniards and alien to the 
Indians. The failure to view the other as both different and equal, Todorov claims, leads to 
misunderstandings between the Spaniards and the Indians and the tragic elimination of the 
latter.
649
 
Parallel patterns of inequality can be detected between the Americans and the Vietnamese in 
the issue of human rights. As argued in Chapter One, not until the early 1990s did the 
Vietnamese scholars embark upon making sense of the phrase human right and its 
contents.
650
One may argue that by 2006 the Vietnamese were no longer ignorant of the 
concept of human rights; after all, Vietnam by then had acceded to the ICCPR. Thus, unlike 
the Indians who might be alien to the concept of “tyranny,” the Vietnamese interlocutors 
knew and had developed their own account of human rights. 
This does not mean, however, that a measure of ethnocentric prejudices is no longer latent 
between the Americans and the Vietnamese on human rights related concepts. That both the 
U.S. and Vietnam are members of the ICCPR does not guarantee that they understand such 
terms as political rights or freedom of expression in the same way. As argued in Chapters 
One and Two and also evidenced in the encounter between Lê Khả Phiêu and Bill Clinton, 
such a basic concept as freedom has been interpreted differently by the two sides. Besides, 
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while the Americans took part in the drafting of ICCPR, the Vietnamese did not have any 
voice in that process.
651
 Moreover, in the 2006 HRD, the Americans appraised Vietnam’s 
actions by not only ICCPR standards but also American laws. 
In regards to the CPC issue and internet freedom, the Vietnamese presented their 
achievements on religious freedom hoping for their country to be removed from the CPC list. 
A standard was set in the International Religious Freedom Act enacted by the American 
Congress in 1998, which defines what constitutes violations of religious freedom, and to what 
extent violations would lead to including a violator in the list. Referring to Todorov’s words 
that “the criteria according to which the judgment will be delivered,” it can be said that the 
term “violations of religious freedom” were all decided by the Americans.652 As for internet 
freedom, it was again the American side who set the limitations for this freedom in Vietnam. 
A/S Lowenkron told the Vietnamese side that the internet should be controlled only on those 
concerning “crime, terrorism, violence and sabotage of computer networks.” Thus, the 2006 
HRD or most of it was conducted in American terms and language.
653
 
Other indications of ethnocentrism are the American universalization of their own values and 
the perceived superiority of its problem-solving mechanisms. What A/S Lowenkron claimed 
as universal includes the rights for “full political participation,” and to have “a robust civil 
society,” and a “transparent and accountable” government. These are unmistakably American 
human rights, political and civil liberties that an individual is deemed to possess to safeguard 
herself against a possible evil state. And when he was challenged with the proposition that the 
U.S. itself violates these same rights, A/S Lowenkron presented his country’s long 
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established mechanisms for problem-solving and his own convictions on the superiority of 
these mechanisms. In his own words, 
[On the incidents at Abu Ghraib] This kind of incident was not unique in 
American history, but when it has happened in the past, we have counted on a 
free press, a fully independent court system, including the Supreme Court, and a 
fiercely independent and active U.S. Congress. The American people expect 
nothing less....; 
[On the rendition of Ramsey Youssef] this is a procedure that nations need to 
defend themselves against attack; and 
[On the reconciliation between human rights and security in the Patriot Act] the 
United States has faced many similar crises in past wars, and has met them by 
debating necessary national security decisions openly and transparently. This ... 
is the best guarantee against abuse by the state.654 
In his first statement, we can observe that it was an American solution, the U.S. Congress and 
the American people were mentioned. In the last two statements, however, American 
solutions were described in general term, “nations” and “the state” not the U.S. In other 
words, these solutions were no longer for American people only but they could be applicable 
to all. Combined with the traditionally established concept of Manifest Destiny, it has 
become self-evident for the Americans to try to dictate what Vietnam should and should not 
do, from general advices to specific requests.
655
 For example, A/S Lowenkron claimed that 
the improvement of human rights conditions in Vietnam would help to strengthen its renewal 
policy, “increase its international stature and have a positive role beyond its borders,” while 
Ambassador Hanford suggested that Vietnam should consistently accelerate its recognitions 
of new congregations and churches. These advices, for the two Americans, are not contrary to 
their Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s claim that the U.S. did not attempt to impose its 
understanding of democracy onto others.
656
 
The Vietnamese interlocutors, on one hand, rejected American claims to universality. It was 
not without implication that the Vietnamese side claimed that “no nation should consider 
itself perfect in the area of human rights” and raised a number of notorious human rights 
violations in the U.S. On the other hand, the Vietnamese interlocutors might interpret 
American requests, particularly the concrete ones, as interferences into their internal affairs or 
worse, attempts to subvert their communist regime. It thus can be speculated here that the 
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Vietnamese reserved and disengaging attitudes are linked to what they consider acts of 
ethnocentric imposition. As remarked by a Vietnamese researcher, “HRD might be equal, but 
the human rights issue is not.”657 
So how exactly does ethnocentrism stand in the way of mutual understanding? From the 
analysis above, each side was unable to acknowledge what the other side consider as facts. 
The Americans failed to acknowledge that they were imposing their values onto the 
Vietnamese and that this could be one of the reasons why the latter could not but reject their 
advice. Under the impression of being dictated and lectured, the Vietnamese opted for the 
attitudes of ignorance and disengagement, the factor leading to trivial mutual understanding 
from Gadamer’s perspective. By ignoring entirely the experiences shared by the Americans, 
however, the Vietnamese might miss any valuable input and critique emerging from 
American perceptions of human rights and their problem-solving mechanisms. 
To sum up at this stage, fears and suspicions, and ethnocentrism are impediments to 
American and Vietnamese mutual understanding on human rights. In Gadamerian terms, it is 
the interlocutors’ prejudices or more specifically, negative prejudgments that form a barrier 
to understanding. And these prejudices are supported and even substantiated by certain 
historical legacies, including but not exclusively the Vietnam war and the myths of American 
religious freedom and Manifest Destiny. Gadamer would argue that such historical legacies 
have certain effects in our understanding; as he claims, “a proper hermeneutics would have to 
demonstrate the affectivity of history within understanding itself,”658 and this effective 
history  
determines in advance both what seems to us worth enquiring about and what 
will appear as an object of investigation, and we more or less forget half of what 
is really there – in fact, we miss the whole truth of the phenomenon when we 
take its immediate appearance as the whole truth…[and] in all understanding, 
whether we are expressly aware of it or not, the power of this effective history 
is at work.659 
Applying this concept of effective history into the U.S. – Vietnam human rights encounter, it 
can be observed that for the Americans, what is worth enquiring about are political and 
religious freedoms and the objects of their investigation are Vietnamese laws and practices 
related to these rights and the “political dissidents.” Consequently, the Vietnamese records on 
social and economic rights and their concern for the collective rights of national 
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independence and self-determination drop beneath the U.S. radar or are even considered not 
rights per se. Likewise, the Vietnamese prejudice of “peaceful evolution” determines in 
advance how they should interprete American human rights-related advices: the suspected 
U.S. true intentions behind such advices and any possible capitalist elements that may 
infiltrate their political regime and society. This is another way to explain why the 
Vietnamese maybe unable to perceive any valuable input and critique emerging from 
American human rights-related statements and problem-solving mechanisms. In this way, the 
effects of history are so powerful that both sides miss the whole picture of human rights 
understanding in general and human rights conditions in Vietnam in particular. 
 
3. The impacts of power imbalance, and difference in development levels 
A dialogue between unequals is always problematic, as power-holders may set agendas, 
dominate the stage and have an unfair say on the outcome. Fortunately, as discussed at the 
beginning of the previous section, the diplomatic principles of equality and mutual respect 
can mitigate these negative effects. However, these principles could not help prevent other 
impacts of power asymmetry which influenced the Vietnamese and the Americans in 
different ways. 
The Vietnamese took the U.S. material strength into their appreciation of American values. A 
common phrase quoted by Vietnamese interviewees in their explanations for American 
human rights values is “mạnh vì gạo, bạo vì tiền” (stronger by rice, daring by money). In 
other words, American (human rights) values are spreading worldwide not because those 
values are superior, but because of the U.S. position as unrivaled superpower and of its 
projection of human rights as an important foreign policy interest. In this way, the 
Vietnamese may not appreciate American human rights understanding on its own merits. 
Power imbalance affects the Americans too. It provides them with the discretion to opt for 
strategic actions. As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, it was the Americans who set a 
deadline for Vietnam human rights improvements, and raised threats and made a number of 
demands and requests to the Vietnamese. At issue is that even when the Americans aim at 
interacting communicatively with the Vietnamese, their upper hand position allows and 
tempts them easily to slide to using strategic actions. With a self-perceived upper hand in the 
bilateral relation at their discretion, the Americans may combine both persuasions and threats 
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to reach their goals in dialogues with the Vietnamese. Ambassador Hanford described his 
experiences in dealing with the Vietnamese on the CPC in the following terms: 
We spent an enormous amount of time forming trusting relationships, so 
Vietnamese officials would believe we were dealing in good faith, that we were 
not discussing religious freedom issues to rub their nose in it, but that we were 
pursuing the interests of the United States. Because no other government raises 
the religious freedom issue as we do, we had to explain our position, as well as 
the threat of CPC designation…. I spent time explaining why the U.S. cares 
about religious freedom, how it goes back to our heritage, how we were 
founded by people fleeing religious persecution. Also we had this International 
Religious Freedom Act which places particular requirements upon every 
Administration, whether they like it or not.660 
Here, on one hand, Ambassador Hanford acted communicatively when he spent time building 
trust with the Vietnamese hearers by explaining to them the importance the U.S. attaches to 
religious freedom. On the other hand, he disregarded his hearers’ feelings about the 
imposition of American standards onto the Vietnamese and had no difficulty in threatening 
them on CPC designation. These strategic actions, as concluded in the analysis from 
Habermas’s perspective, are detrimental to reaching agreements. 
The difference in development level also influences the interlocutors. It may not lead to a 
conviction that Vietnam should take an identical route to development as the U.S., however, 
the fact that Vietnam is a developing country while the U.S. is a developed one dictates 
which side has to change. Changes in human rights perceptions and situations in Vietnam are 
presumed as inevitable and necessary by both American and Vietnamese interviewees. If 
both sides are imperfect on human rights, then Vietnam is farther than the U.S. on the issue. 
What the 2006 HRD participants disagreed on was what pace, direction and how the human 
rights related changes should happen, such as whether and when Decree 31 should be 
amended or abolished.
661
 Nevertheless, the fact that after all Vietnam is now also embracing a 
measure of market economy (and also the concept of human rights) makes the Americans 
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more convinced of their Manifest Destiny, of succeeding in having Vietnam embrace what 
they see as their own version of human rights. 
Expecting the Vietnamese to adopt American standards on religious freedom in the 2006 
HRD is a good example for this. Another example is Ambassador Hanford’s sharing of 
experiences in dealing with the Vietnamese: “countries [like Vietnam] are less insulted if you 
tell them, give them notice, … and plot a specific roadmap for improvements.”662 As the 
power holder for a nation that has gone through a long tradition of liberty and market 
economy, it has become natural and appropriate for Ambassador Hanford to “map out the 
road” for Vietnam’s development. The Vietnamese are thus not considered on an equal 
footing and are subject to benevolent assimilation efforts. 
Three observations follow: first, the asymmetries of power and development level reinforce 
the other two obstacles. The gap of development justifies American ethnocentric thinking and 
determines which side is supposed to change and whose values are deemed superior. At the 
same time, power imbalance consolidates Vietnamese fears and suspicions. Whereas as the 
power-holders, the Americans have at their discretion the option of using such strategic 
actions as pressures and threats on the Vietnamese, either in combination with 
communicative action or in direct use, should they deem it necessary. These pressures and 
threats only cornered the Vietnamese into adopting reserved and disengaging attitudes and 
consolidating the fear of ‘peaceful evolution’. And as the U.S. is much more powerful than 
the Vietnamese, fears seem to reside in the Vietnamese side only. We may hypothesize a 
converted situation: if the Vietnam and the U.S. exchanged their power positions, the fears of 
communism in the 1950s would return to the American interlocutors in the 2006 HRD.  
Second, the manifestations of American ethnocentric prejudices further feed Vietnamese 
fears: the American attempts, even in a naïve way, of making the Vietnamese enjoy the same 
liberties are interpreted as plots to eliminate the latter’s socialist regime as the final victory 
for an unfinished Vietnam war. Third, and consequently, these factors limit the interlocutors’ 
appreciation on any possible valid rationality and truth in the others’ arguments and human 
rights understanding. They also blind the overwhelmingly powerful side from realizing that it 
is indeed imposing its version of human rights and development on Vietnam. In this sense, 
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the interlocutors allowed these factors to distort their perceptions and understanding of the 
other.
663
 
To sum up, this section has argued that fears and suspicions, ethnocentrism, and the 
asymmetries of power and development level have infused the 2006 HRD in particular and 
the Vietnamese and American understanding of human rights issue in general. They are the 
underlying reasons for the evasive, reserved and disengaging attitudes and the use of strategic 
actions and the vicious circle that they generated in the dialogue. Combined together, the 
three underlying obstacles create a mine field of misunderstandings and distortions upon 
which both Vietnamese and American interlocutors might easily step. The remainder of this 
section answers the last research sub-question: could these obstacles be overcome within a 
diplomatic framework, if so, how? 
 
4. Beyond diplomacy 
With the insights acquired so far, the thesis now reassesses the role of diplomatic framework 
on genuine understanding. The diplomatic principles of equality, mutual respect, and 
sovereignty which are conducive to mutual understanding help to reduce the negative impacts 
of power asymmetries. The power-holder cannot alone set dialogue agenda, dominate the 
forum, and assume the role of the speaker. Any interference into the internal affairs of a state 
requires justification. Besides, the conventional function of problem-solving in secret 
diplomacy creates opportunities for substantial mutual understanding in human rights-related 
matters. This is not to deny the necessity and desirability of presenting the parties’ human 
rights respective versions. However, an intensive discussion on their differences, i.e. which 
right is more important freedom of expression or the right to shelter, might never conclude or 
end up with consolidating the convictions that the parties’ respective human rights 
understandings are incommensurable. It could be easier for both American and Vietnamese 
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have some repercussions on both sides: the Vietnamese may view the Americans as pressing them for specific 
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diplomats to reach an agreement on specific human rights related issues, such as whether 
Decree 31 should be kept or abolished. Through such discussion, they would have to expose 
and apply their own ethnocentric prejudices and their fears and suspicions in their 
argumentations on the Decree. According to Gadamer, application also means understanding; 
thus such application may lead to agreement on what could be counted as rational on this 
particular issue. This is one way for both sides to build on their intersubjective rationality on 
human rights against the profound differences of their human rights understandings. 
The diplomatic features of exclusiveness and strategic actions, however, feeds the fears and 
suspicions that are standing in the way of mutual understanding. With strategic actions 
tolerated and even necessary in diplomatic dialogues, diplomats of the stronger side might be 
more prone to, and skillful at, using such tactics as pressures and threats to achieve their 
assigned goals, than in conversation held outside diplomacy. This practice will be responded 
by the weaker side with the attitudes of ignorance and disengagement, thus putting the circle 
of ignorant attitudes and strategic actions in motion and consequently, a lack of 
communicative interactions. Besides, faced with a tension between time constraints and their 
priority of fulfilling their assigned tasks, diplomats on both sides may use strategic actions to 
reach specific outcomes rather than spending time persuading their counterparts that it is the 
right thing for the other side to follow their recommendations. As a result, diplomats are not 
free to fully reflect upon their prejudices, which is an important Gadamerian condition for, or 
even an increased possibility of, mutual understanding. 
In sum, within a diplomatic framework there are both favorable conditions for, and 
impediments to, a genuine dialogue. While equality, mutual respect and sovereignty ensures 
equality in chances to speak and selecting agenda items, the exclusion, time constraints and 
tolerance for strategic actions make it more difficult for interlocutors to pursue 
communicative actions and resist strategic actions. With this understanding, exchanges 
beyond first-track diplomacy do not automatically yield better outcomes than official secret 
diplomatic meetings. On the contrary, while certain obstructions might be removed (such as 
in academic exchanges), due attention must be paid to the requirements of equality and 
mutual respect. And whether the dialogue is within or beyond diplomatic framework, the 
distortions caused by ethnocentrism, power imbalances, different development level and 
political regimes will likely emerge as these are not the properties of diplomacy. 
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Conclusion 
 
Human rights remain controversial in international politics. This issue had been strongly 
contested between the developed North and the developing South in the 1960s and the 1970s, 
between the socialist and the capitalist camps during the Cold War, and between the 
proponents and opponents of the “Asian values” in the 1990s. A review of these debates point 
to the incompatibility of human rights understanding and the balance of power as possible 
influencing factors to the U.S. – Vietnam human rights dialogue. Besides, the diplomatic 
framework can be both supporting and detrimental to mutual understanding in dialogue. A 
review of scholars’ attempts to narrow the human rights differences while overcoming the 
charge of ethnocentrism and imposing values onto others suggests the use of Gadamer’s PH 
and Habermas’s TCA as the thesis’s theoretical frameworks. 
Chapters One and Two address the first possible obstacle: the incompatiblities of the U.S. - 
Vietnam human rights understandings. The analyses and comparisions of the two 
understandings reveal overwhelming differences. While the Americans view the state as a 
necessary evil, the Vietnamese conceptualise it as a benevolent service provider, of care and 
order. For the Americans, strict regulations must be imposed upon the state as a guard from 
abuse of power and infringement of individual rights. For the Vietnamese, strict regulations 
are placed upon individuals against the abuse of their freedoms to undermine the social order 
and the ultimate national goal of socialism. Accordingly, the concept of dictatorship that 
bears only negative meaning in American view is considered by the Vietnamese communists 
as necessary. Besides, while the Americans view the press as a tool of the people to watch 
against the state, the Vietnamese communists regard the press as a tool of the state to advance 
collective interests. Other matters that the U.S. rejects or is unfamiliar with include the 
following Vietnamese views: the contigencies of realising human rights on development 
level, the subordination of individual rights to collective interests, and the unities between 
individual rights and national independence and between rights and responsibilities. These 
incompatible and even incommensurable views attest that human rights differences pose a 
real and important obstacle to the two parties. 
The analsyses of a real encounter on human rights between the Vietnamese and American 
diplomats as examined from Gadamer’s and Habermas’s perspectives in the Chapters Three 
201 
 
and Four revealed additional obstacles to their mutual understanding. For Gadamer the 
dialogue only yields a trivial outcome as no substantial common horizon on human rights was 
established. Habermas would agree with this, adding that a number of promises and 
commitments made during the dialogue can still be counted as mutual understanding. 
Gadamer would blame this limited result on the disengaged and reserved attitudes of the 
participants, whereas from a Habermasian lens, the dialogue was not inclusive and the 
interlocutors were acting strategically. In a way, one can argue that there is a connection 
between strategic actions and negative attitudes, each nurtures and leads to the other. As these 
are considered the properties of diplomacy, diplomacy can be blamed for the lack of 
substantial agreement on human rights dialogue. However, the thesis turns against this 
conventional thinking in its last chapter.  
By questioning the reasons why interlocutors adopted strategic actions and those attitudes in 
the first place, the thesis argues that the underlying obstacles to mutual understanding go 
beyond diplomacy and the irreconcilability of their human rights positions. Ethnocentrism, 
fear and distrust due to their past legacies and opposing political regimes, and asymmetries of 
power and development level explain the diplomatic limitations. The last two have distorted 
both the Americans and the Vietnamese understanding of the other side’s positions 
justifications.  
The Americans failed to understand that there may exist certain truths in Vietnamese 
justifications, besides mere propaganda and excuses for CPV to cling to monopoly of power. 
The Vietnamese turned a blind eye to the appealing truths in American arguments as they 
only viewed them as the language of a much stronger who would never abandon the aim of 
destroying the Vietnamese revolutionary cause. Ethnocentrism further blinded the Americans 
to the fact that they were imposing their standards and values onto the Vietnamese. In this 
way, the Americans failed to understand themselves. These three impediments are inter-
related, they nourish each other and together lay the numerous traps on the road to human 
rights mutual understanding between the U.S. and Vietnam. 
 
Theoretical implications 
The models drawn from Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics bring different insights and different weaknesses when 
appropriated for the purpose of analyzing human rights dialogues. The former is useful in 
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searching for any mutual understanding reached in dialogue. Through analyzing all the 
speech acts in the dialogue and observing how the hearers respond to them, it is possible to 
determine what the interlocutors consider mutual understanding and differences. The three 
dimensions of the three criticisable validity claims shed light into explaining why and on 
what grounds the interlocutors agreed or disagreed with each other. Thus, applying 
Habermas’s model helps to identify specific dialogue outcomes. However, as developing a 
model of a genuine dialogue is not the aim of Habermas’s TCA, the model drawn from his 
work in this thesis does not provide a satisfactory explanation for such outcome. As can be 
seen in Chapter Four, in the 2006 HRD the majority of his preconditions for mutual 
understanding are satisfied, such as the interlocutors knowing about the others’ lifeworlds, 
not hiding their real goals, and recognizing the other as rational subjects. The only deviations 
from these preconditions are the participants’ failure to put themselves into the others’ 
perspectives and the absence of other interested parties. The question is why, despite all these 
satisfactions, they still chose to act strategically. 
A comparison of the two American main speakers, A/S Lowenkron and Ambassador Hanford 
is a good illustration for this question. The latter as an Ambassador-at-large for International 
Religious Freedom possessed a very sound knowledge about human rights (at least religious 
rights) conditions in Vietnam and about the Vietnamese concerns over the issue. He had 
visited Vietnam several times before the dialogue. From 2002 when he became the 
Ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom to early 2006 when the dialogue 
occurred, Ambassador Hanford had expressed his concerns several times with the leaders, 
officials and the alleged victims of human rights violations in Vietnam.
664 Though there is no 
record of the number of A/S Lowenkron’s visits to Vietnam, it is safe to speculate that 
Ambassador Hanford had more first-hand experiences than A/S Lowenkron on human rights 
condition in Vietnam. In fact, as discussed in Chapter Four, during the dialogue, the former 
demonstrated his understandings about Vietnam by acknowledging Vietnam’s concerns over 
territorial integrity in the issue of religious freedom and its sensitivity to ethnic minority 
issue. This did not, however, prevent him from joining A/S Lowenkron in setting a time 
frame for progress on human rights in Vietnam. According to Habermas, the more the 
speaker knows about the lifeworlds of the hearer, the greater opportunity she has to act 
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 Ambassador Hanford visited Vietnam in August 2002 as his first visit as the newly appointed Ambassador at 
large for international religious freedom, this can be found on 
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/maryann%20love%20vietnam%20case%20study.
pdf, accessed 11 April 2014. He came back to Vietnam in November 2003; for an American cable report on this 
visit, see http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=03HOCHIMINHCITY1093, accessed 8 April 2014.  
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communicatively with the latter. Why did a better knowledge about the Vietnamese 
lifeworlds not prevent Ambassador Hanford from opting for strategic actions in the dialogue? 
In this regards, the model drawn from Habermas’s TCA does not provide an entirely 
satisfactory explanation for the limited outcome of this human rights dialogue. 
Gadamer’s model does provide an explanation to the limited outcome of the dialogue. As 
argued in Chapter Three, the failures of the 2006 HRD participants in meeting Gadamer’s 
conditions for genuine understanding point to the reserved, evasive and disengaging attitudes 
of the participants. Following Gadamer, though the participants sought agreements 
concerning the objects of discussion, their mutual understanding was limited by their lack of 
sufficient willingness to be led by the “truth” of the matter and openness to new meanings 
provided by the other. In this way, Gadamer’s model provides a better understanding of the 
dialogue’s limited outcome than Habermas’s TCA. 
This comparison of the two models demonstrates that the two models can complement each 
other: the Habermas’s TCA excels at identifying concrete dialogue results, the Gadamer’s PH 
stands out at identifying the attitudes blocking the way to mutual understanding. In other 
words, the former compensates for the lack of detailed analysis in the Gadamerian model 
whereas the latter brings about greater insights into explaining the dialogue outcome. This 
observation supports McCarthy’s argument that there can be “intimate connection of critical 
reflection to hermeneutics understanding” between Habermas’s TCA and Gadamer’s PH 
despite different attitudes that they hold towards tradition.
665
 As he observes,  
Whereas Gadamer speaks of tradition primarily as a source of insights and values 
that have to be constantly reactualized in ever new situations, Habermas stresses 
the elements of domination, repression, and distortion, which are also 
incorporated in our heritage and from which we must continually strive to 
emancipate ourselves. Whereas Gadamer speaks of ‘the dialogue that we are,’ 
Habermas speaks of the dialogue that is not yet but ought to be. Whereas 
Gadamer is moved by respect for the superiority of tradition, Habermas is 
motivated by the anticipation of a future state of freedom.666 
So what can we draw from the application of their models in this thesis? As their projects are 
critical not explanatory, the models seem not to provide a satisfactory explanation for this 
limited dialogue outcome. In a way, the obstacles identified by this thesis still fall within the 
terms of Habermas’s TCA and Gadamer’s PH. For Habermas, power and developmental 
imbalances are factors in the interlocutors’ objective worlds, while ethnocentric thinking, fear 
                                                          
665
 Thomas McCarthy, op. cit., p. 192. 
666
 Ibid. 
204 
 
and distrust belong to their subjective worlds. In Gadamerian terms, those are all 
interlocutors’ prejudices or more specifically, negative prejudgments to understanding. 
Despite this, it seems that both Habermas and Gadamer have not provided a sufficient 
account for how the distortions in the interlocutors’ lifeworlds or their negative prejudices 
block the path to mutual understanding. However, the testing of their conditions for genuine 
understanding made us reflect upon the dynamics of these distortions and negative 
prejudices. The thesis has then elaborated on how these dynamics have helped the 
interlocutors adopt negative attitudes in dialogue and distorted their viewing and 
understanding of the others. Any application of the models by Habermas and Gadamer or any 
attempt to build a better model for genuine dialogue should take this into consideration.  
In regard to the attempts to bridge the differences on human rights, on one hand, the 
empirical findings of this thesis rejects Chris Brown’s and John Rawls’s efforts to identify 
some substantive common grounds for human rights. Sympathetic feelings were not found in 
the American and Vietnamese interlocutors in the 2006 HRD; indeed the Vietnamese had to 
ask for such feelings from their American interlocutors. Further, Rawls’s list of rights proper 
is unrealistic from a Gadamerian perspective. Following Gadamer one could not reject one’s 
own human rights prejudices that are imbedded in the cultural and philosophical backgrounds 
as these are all one has when encountering the other. Specifically, the Americans would have 
to call upon their liberal ideas of social contract theory in assessing the list; likewise, the 
Vietnamese could only view this list from a lens of the combined ideologies of Marxism, 
Confucianism, and Buddhism and their historical and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, 
Rawls’s list of the rights to life, liberty, property, and formal equality is much shorter than 
certain rights that could be found in the current human rights regime, including the UDHR 
and related covenants. In this way, Donnelly is right in his observation that the list of basic 
rights are substantial, but he is wrong to claim that the differences on the interpretations and 
implementations of these rights are minor. We have observed in the two preceding chapters 
how the differences on American and Vietnamese understanding of internet and press 
freedom contributed to the breaking down of communication between the Americans and the 
Vietnamese. Lastly, An-Na’im’s thesis on the legitimacy of the current international human 
rights standards may not be applicable to the U.S. – Vietnam case of human rights 
differences. Clearly in the 2006 HRD, the Vietnamese did not challenge the existing human 
rights regime on the ground that they had little say in its formulation, but on the ground of 
historical, cultural, and development level differences. 
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As it has become clear by now, the fundamental differences on the nature of human rights 
between the U.S. and Vietnam is an important obstacle, but not the direct one. The 2006 
HRD participants did not expose their prejudgments and prejudices on human rights because 
of their negative attitudes and the adoption of strategic actions. Thus, in order to touch upon 
the incompatibilities of their human rights understandings, the Vietnamese and the Americans 
must pay due attention to the underlying causes of these attitudes and actions: ethnocentrism 
and the war legacies. In a broader context, in analyzing a human rights dialogue between a 
Western country and non-Western one, due attention must also be paid to contextual factors, 
such as the impacts of ethnocentrism, power asymmetry, and distrust among the interlocutors. 
Therefore, efforts to narrow the human rights differences should focus first and foremost on 
addressing these impediments.  
With sufficient attention to the contextual factors, interlocutors may engage in discursive 
reasoning on practical human rights issues that could help to expose, challenge, and move 
their human rights related prejudices. This is a possible way to reach some communicative 
rationalities that can present solid steps towards greater human rights mutual understandings. 
However, it must be stated here that discussing practical issues does not necessarily means 
silencing all foundational arguments. For example, it is not to suggest that the Americans and 
the Vietnamese should not discuss the concepts of human nature or class struggle. 
Abandoning such foundations is impossible, according to Gadamer, as these are the 
prejudices that one has and starts with. Interlocutors will inevitably draw upon their 
prejudices to engage in discursive reasoning and this may bring about some critical 
reflections upon their own foundational justifications. Thus, instead of discussing the human 
rights foundations which may be close to incompatible, interlocutors from different cultures 
may find it easier to agree on specific proposals for specific circumstances. Of course, 
agreements on specific contexts do not guarantee some common justifications for human 
rights. But the possible questioning of one’s own foundations in the process of discussing 
specific cases may lead to an increased possibility of agreement at a more abstract and 
conceptualized level. 
Finally, this thesis supports Charles Taylor’s and Richard Shapcott’s dialogical approaches. 
Taylor argues that we could agree on certain basic norms despite our different justifications 
for these norms. A process of mutual learning on human rights, for Taylor, could start with 
agreements on a number of human rights norms which have been attained at the outset. Later 
on, this process “mov[es] toward a ‘fusion of horizons’ in Gadamer’s term, in which the 
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moral universe of the other becomes less strange. Out of this will come further borrowings 
and the creation of new hybrid forms.”667 Whereas for Shapcott, the meaning of human rights 
and their universality is no longer a “truth” of which one side tries to convince the other, but 
the common subject of a dialogue. Following Shapcott, it could be argued that the current 
regime is flexible enough to accommodate cultural differences; Jack Donnelly may suggest, 
human rights documents should be treated not as fixed but could be subjected to changes by 
better arguments. Again, it is up to the parties to determine the status of the current human 
rights regime through communicative actions. In this way, the injustice to those who had no 
chance to participate in drafting the human rights documents could be remedied.
668
 
 
Practical implications 
As shown in this thesis, both the Americans and Vietnamese have been content with the 
current mechanism of their human rights dialogues, which they view both in public and 
private as open and candid. Although at times they have not been satisfied with the dialogue 
outcomes, most of the time they referred to them as successful. This study has provided a 
different account of their dialogues. It posits that such a dialogue is not open, frank and 
effective as they have claimed to be, but brings about only limited results. Without 
acknowledging and addressing the distortions caused by ethnocentrism, fear and suspicion, 
and power distortion and development level imbalances, human rights differences will never 
be correctly comprehended and assessed. Consequently, the same kinds of accusations, 
justifications, and arguments will be repeated and the gap on their human rights 
understanding will not be narrowed.  
A question arises, can the U.S. and Vietnam avoid this repetition so that the improvements in 
the bilateral relations no longer suffers the “ceiling” created by the human rights issue? After 
all, the U.S. will remain more powerful and developed than Vietnam, at least in the 
foreseeable future and ethnocentrism is unavoidable as one’s own values are all that one has 
to compare and judge the other side. Likewise, so long as the two opposing political regimes 
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remain in place, Vietnamese suspicions of the American motivations behind human rights 
issue will persist. 
The thesis is thus an indirect attempt to end this repetition. Pointing the Americans and the 
Vietnamese to what stand in the way of their human rights understandings is to expose and 
challenge their respective prejudices. Following Gadamer, exposing the interlocutors to 
prejudices that may be negative to mutual understanding is a necessary condition for a 
genuine agreement on an issue. Thus, exposing the Americans and the Vietnamese to the 
three underlying obstacles and their distorting effects upon understanding is a necessary step 
toward a possible deeper mutual understanding on human rights. Such a mutual 
understanding could bring the two nations closer. And in a larger context, as the issue of 
human rights is closely associated with the ethnocentric claim to universality as well as 
changes in state policies and institutions, these distorting impacts could also be found in other 
dialogues between the developed and the developing worlds. 
Speaking to the Vietnamese students in his visit to Vietnam in 2000, President Bill Clinton 
recalled the early days of the U.S. – Vietnam relationship when the “two distant cultures were 
talking past each other” and calls for those days “be gone for good.”669 And for the U.S. and 
Vietnam become comprehensive partners, it took more than two decades of war with 
destructions and pains which were inflicted on both sides and have not yet healed. During 
these years, soldiers killed and destroyed whole village to save them from communism.
670
 
One may argue that these tragic years could have been avoided if opportunities had not been 
missed due to misunderstandings. Today, the Americans and the Vietnamese are talking to 
each other, but they still have a long way to go to truly understand each other, so that good 
intentions do not end up destroying the other. 
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APPENDIX 
The 2006 U.S. – Vietnam human rights dialogue 
 
Summary  
Delegations from the United States and Vietnam met for the two countries' first Human 
Rights Dialogue in over three years February 20. The morning session included opening 
remarks, Vietnam's presentation of its approaches to human rights, a discussion of criminal 
code, prison conditions and prisoners of concern and an abbreviated discussion of religious 
freedom, which was picked up in the afternoon session (septel). The tone of the HRD was 
open and cordial, with both sides expressing their desire to use the discussions to further 
accelerate positive developments in bilateral relations. In response to DRL A/S Lowenkron's 
presentation on criminal code, prisons and prisoners of concern, the GVN highlighted recent 
progress in legal and judicial reform and suggested that Decree 31 (administrative detention) 
may be amended, but not abolished. A/S Lowenkron also called for greater access to trials 
and prisons and urged the GVN to allow the UN access to prisons. The GVN representatives 
left open the possibility that there would be future amnesties or sentence reductions for 
prisoners of concern, including Pham Hong Son, and agreed to discuss further our prisoner 
list. 
The GVN sought clarification of the reported mistreatment of prisoners in U.S. prisons, 
incidents at Abu Ghraib and the situation in Guantanamo Bay. In the discussion on religious 
freedom, the GVN representatives highlighted recent advances, including the promulgation of 
a new legal framework on religion, efforts to ensure that local officials and religious believers 
are aware of the changes and the registration of new congregations. U.S. Ambassador-at-
Large for International Religious Freedom Hanford acknowledged these improvements and 
pledged to work with the GVN to address our issues of concern in order to remove Vietnam 
from the list of Countries of Particular Concern. The two sides agreed to continue in the 
afternoon the discussion on religious freedom, including remaining issues of USG concern.  
End Summary.  
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Opening Remarks  
---------------  
Vietnam delegation head and MFA International Organizations Department Director General 
Pham Binh Minh opened the 11th round (and first in over three years) of the U.S.-Vietnam 
Human Rights Dialogue (HRD) February 20 (full participants' lists in Para 33). In his initial 
remarks, Minh noted that bilateral relations had greatly improved in 2005, and Prime 
Minister Phan Van Khai's visit to the United States and the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Statement 
were the year's highlights. With Vietnam's WTO accession efforts and its hosting of APEC 
2006, this year would prove to be an equally important year for bilateral ties. In this context, 
the HRD will help to increase mutual understanding between the United States and Vietnam 
by allowing the two sides to frankly discuss issues of mutual concern in the spirit of the Joint 
Statement, DG Minh said. 
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Barry F. Lowenkron 
noted that the fact that the United States and Vietnam were able to schedule the HRD shows 
that the two sides had overcome the obstacles that had led to the HRD's suspension in 2002. 
Today, the United States and Vietnam enjoy strong, cooperative and productive relations and 
have the responsibility to build on PM Khai's historic visit to the United States. The Joint 
Statement commits the two countries to raise their ties to a higher plane, and this is the basis 
for the efforts surrounding the HRD. United States Ambassador-at-Large for International 
Religious Freedom John V. Hanford's participation in the HRD signals the importance of the 
HRD and the key place religious freedom has in this dialogue, A/S Lowenkron said.  
The United States and Vietnam need to do everything in their power to ensure that the HRD 
bolsters their positive relations, the A/S continued, particularly because of President George 
W. Bush's plans to visit Hanoi in November 2006 for the APEC Leaders Meeting. The HRD 
is also important because the A/S has an obligation to report to Congress the HRD and what 
it has achieved. For the United States, the principles surrounding the HRD are threefold: that 
it leads to concrete results; that it is candid and transparent; and, that the two countries can 
bring all of their concerns to the table. On this occasion, the United States delegation will 
present a number of suggestions for Vietnam's consideration, including possible actions that 
Vietnam could take that would be well received by both the President and the international 
community. We note the positive steps that the GVN has taken in the area of religious 
freedom and in releasing a number of prisoners of concern. Vietnam has much to be proud of 
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in its socio-economic development efforts on behalf of its citizens. Improvements in these 
areas are without question. Continued improvements in the human rights situation, and 
political and legal developments, can bolster Vietnam's efforts in other areas. They can also 
help to demonstrate the importance Vietnam attaches to these matters and establish Vietnam 
as a model country that respects fundamental human rights, A/S Lowenkron stressed.  
In the May 5 exchange of letters, the United States committed to engage in dialogues, 
Ambassador Hanford observed, and the United States is pleased in connection with HRD to 
uphold this commitment. Over the past few years, the United States and Vietnam have 
worked on the religious freedom issue in ways that have improved official and unofficial 
bilateral ties. Progress in the area of religious freedom and other areas on the HRD's agenda 
will allow the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to improve further, Ambassador Hanford said.  
  
Approaches to Human Rights  
--------------------------  
Turning to the next item on the agenda, "Approaches to Human Rights," DG Minh noted that 
to understand Vietnam's perspective on human rights, one had to understand Vietnam's 
historical circumstances, particularly its over thousand-year struggle for freedom and 
independence. These are the basic human rights that Vietnam cherishes, along with 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal affairs. Furthermore, 
Vietnam believes that the protection of political and civil rights are linked with social and 
economic development. As such, Vietnam's efforts to develop its economy, such as through 
its "doi moi" (renovation) policy, are designed to encourage social progress. Vietnam also 
believes that, in a diverse world, international human rights standards should be harmonized 
with the unique historical, cultural and other traditions of individual countries, DG Minh said.  
The principal responsibility of each nation is the protection of its citizens' human rights, the 
Director General continued. In Vietnam, individual rights can only be secured once the 
common interests of the community, and the nation, are respected. Finally, given historical, 
political and cultural differences, each nation's values are also different, but there needs to be 
a common international understanding about human rights. No nation should consider itself 
perfect in the area of human rights, and there should be no double-standards. In closing, 
Vietnam agrees that the HRD should be used to raise any and all issues of mutual concern, 
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and, in that spirit, Vietnam stands ready to use the dialogue to learn from the United States, 
DG Minh said. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has spoken often on the subjects of human rights and 
democracy promotion; in a recent speech, she noted that democracy by definition cannot be 
imposed, and that there is no single road to building democracy, A/S Lowenkron responded. 
However, the Secretary, the President and the American people believe that there are some 
universal human rights principles: the right for the full political participation of the citizens of 
each country; the right for the development of a robust civil society; and, the right to have a 
government that is transparent and accountable to the people. Vietnam's doi moi policy can 
be strengthened by the advancement of the human rights and democracy agenda and, in so 
doing, Vietnam can increase its international stature and have a positive role beyond its 
borders. Indeed, no country is perfect in human rights; in fact, no country is perfect, A/S 
Lowenkron noted.  
  
Criminal Code, Prisons, Prisoners of Concern  
--------------------------------------------  
A/S Lowenkron opened the next agenda item by expressing hope that, by frankly raising our 
concerns in these areas, we will be able to see progress before the President's visit in 
November. Vietnam's National Assembly amended its criminal code in 2003 [differs from 
Vietnam criminal procedure code, it seems that A/S Lowenkron mistook the criminal 
procedure code for criminal code, as the former was amended in 2003, the latter in 2009. In 
light of the scencesetting report to A/S Lowenkron, it seemed that he mistook the Criminal 
Code for the Criminal Procedure Code] to allow for increased rights for defendants. The 
purpose was to change courtroom proceedings to a more "adversarial" system in which the 
judge presides over proceedings while the State and the defense make their arguments (rather 
than the previous system in which the judge helped to guide the State's case). The United 
States would be interested in learning how these changes are being implemented.  
Furthermore, the United States continues to have concerns about Decree 31/CP, which deals 
with administrative detention. We are concerned that the definition is broad, ill-defined and 
open to abuse. It also appears that Decree 31 violates the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). We urge Vietnam to repeal the decree and release those imprisoned 
under it. At the most recent U.S.-Vietnam HRD in 2002, this issue was discussed, and we 
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would be interested in hearing whether Vietnam thinks that it would be possible to move 
beyond this decree, A/S Lowenkron asked. In the view of the United States, detentions, trials 
and sentencings without due process damage Vietnam's international image. Opening court 
trials to observers, journalists and Vietnamese citizens could increase confidence in 
Vietnam's legal system, A/S Lowenkron continued. There have been some arrests, including 
of Pham Hong Son, that appear to contravene the ICCPR because the trials were not carried 
out in a transparent manner. The Unites States would also like to see further reforms to allow 
for unrestricted pre-trial access to an attorney from the time an individual is arrested, A/S 
Lowenkron stressed.  
On the subject of prisoners of conscience, Vietnam ratified the ICCPR in 1982, the A/S 
noted. However, Vietnam has detained, arrested, brought to trial and imprisoned individuals 
for seeking to exercise their right to free speech. This is a serious violation of the ICCPR. We 
have a list of prisoners of concern and those facing travel and other restrictions that we will 
share with the GVN, and, as always, we would welcome any further information on these 
prisoners and other individuals. On the list are a number of prisoners of particular concern, 
such as Pham Hong Son, who distributed an essay calling for democracy and translated an 
article from the State Department's website entitled "What is Democracy?" The American 
people and Congress will not understand why a country the United States wants good 
relations with would arrest someone for translating an article from the State Department 
website. Vietnam would send an important message by releasing Son and others, such as 
Nguyen Vu Binh, Do Van My and Pham Van Ban. We are also concerned about religious 
prisoner Ma Van Bay, A/S Lowenkron said.  
Finally, the United States is concerned about prison conditions, the A/S noted. While we note 
progress since the criminal code came into effect in July 2004, we would also note that the 
last prison visit by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions was in 1994. The United 
States urges Vietnam to consider full access to prisons and prisoners of concern by members 
of the international community. These are not easy issues, but we seek to discuss them with 
Vietnam in the spirit of mutual understanding. They are at the core of President Bush's beliefs 
and U.S. Congressional interest in Vietnam, A/S Lowenkron stressed.  
  
Vietnam Responds: Criminal Procedures Code  
------------------------------------------  
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Asked by DG Minh to respond to a number of the issues raise, Ministry of Justice 
representative Dang Hang Oanh described Vietnam's efforts at legal reform as being aimed 
towards building a just system that is clear, sound, transparent and democratic. One aspect of 
this is decreasing sentences, expanding the number of set punishments and using non-
detention sentences, such as re-education. Vietnam is also seeking to decrease its use of the 
death penalty, which now applies to a limited number of serious crimes. Thanks to the 
revision of the criminal procedures code in 2003, there are now strict procedures for arrests, 
interrogations and sending cases to trial. For example, the 2003 code clearly defines who has 
the right to make an arrest: the chief and deputy chief of the Supreme People's Procuracy and 
military procuracies at all levels; a presiding judge or deputy and military judges at all levels; 
appellate judges of the Supreme People's Court or Trial Council and the heads and deputies 
of investigative agencies, Oanh described.  
Section 2, Article 18 of the revised criminal code also spells out rights and obligations 
regarding searches. If an arrest is carried out in someone's residence, a communal official or 
neighbor must be present as a witness. Similarly, if an arrest takes place in a workplace, a 
workplace representative and local official must be present. The criminal procedures code 
was also amended in 2003 to lay out rules for arrests in emergency situations. Following an 
emergency arrest, Article 81 of the criminal procedures code requires the local people's 
procuracy to approve the arrest warrant. If the warrant is denied, the person must be released 
immediately. The rules guiding administrative detentions have also been changed. In the past, 
a person could be held indefinitely for a national security crime, but now the time limit is four 
months. The 2003 code revisions also established regulations regarding interrogations and 
questions and answers in court. This was to increase the responsibility of prosecutors to make 
their case. The prosecutor asks questions, and the accused has the right to defend himself or 
herself. Defense lawyers also have increased rights to express their opinions in court to 
ensure that the trial is run in a fair, democratic and transparent manner, Oanh concluded.  
  
Prisoners of Concern  
--------------------  
Tran Van Thanh of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) addressed the issue of prisoners of 
concern. He noted that Ambassador Hanford presented a list of 86 persons of concern, both 
prisoners and those facing restrictions, to MPS Vice Minister Huong in October 2003. MPS 
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discovered one duplicate name, decreasing the number to 85 persons of concern. Among 
these, 13 could not be identified, four had not been arrested and two were not present at their 
residences. Since then, 47 of the 85 have been released or received amnesties. The remaining 
19 are serving their sentences. In June 2005, Ambassador Marine presented Vice Minister 
Huong with a list of 13 persons of concern and, in January 2006, provided Prime Minister 
Khai with a list of 17 persons of concern, including a number on the previous list and a 
number of individuals facing restrictions. With regard to the June 2005 list, seven individuals 
have been amnestied, one person committed suicide, four are serving their sentences and one 
is under consideration for an amnesty. Based on progress during his detention period, Nguyen 
Khac Toan was recently released on the occasion of Tet, Thanh observed. 
For other cases of concern, based on the necessary conditions for receiving an amnesty and in 
accordance with Vietnamese law, MPS will work closely with other concerned agencies, 
Thanh said. In the time to come, there may be additional individuals of concern who receive 
amnesties, are released or receive sentence reductions. Among those individuals raised by 
Ambassador Marine who are facing restrictions, MPS has found that only one is subject to 
probation based on Vietnamese law. The others are leading normal lives in their areas of 
residence. MPS stands ready to discuss with the United States, through different channels, the 
U.S. list of names. That said, all the individuals of concern who are in prison were tried in a 
democratic and transparent manner and in accordance with Vietnamese law, Thanh averred.  
On the subject of Decree 31 (administrative detention), Thanh said that Vietnam is currently 
attempting to transform into a nation based on rule of law. Vietnam needs legal documents to 
manage society, protect national security and promote human rights. Decree 31 must be 
understood in that context. However, no legal document is permanent, and Vietnam will 
consider amendments to Decree 31 through a survey and review of the decree to ensure that it 
reflects appropriate international standards, Thanh said.  
 
Prisons, and a List of Concerns About the U.S.  
--------------------------------------------- -  
Nguyen Van Ninh of the Department of Prison Management (MPS) said that Vietnam's 
prison policies are in accordance with Vietnam's regulations and legal code. Vietnamese law 
prohibits mistreatment of prisoners and encourages prisoners to reflect on their crimes to 
become better citizens in the future. Vietnam's humanitarian policies and traditions are 
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reflected both in its prison laws and in the practice of offering amnesties. For example, in 
2004 and 2005 there were four grand amnesties in which 35,299 persons were released, 
including over 100 foreigners and 25 individuals of concern to the United States. Anyone is 
eligible regardless of religion, ethnicity or citizenship, provided their fellow prisoners vote 
that he or she should be amnestied and Vietnam's Amnesty Council agrees, Ninh said.  
Turning to a number of issues of concern to Vietnam about the United States, Ninh noted that 
U.S. prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners are not ideal and sought further 
information on the alleged mistreatment and sexual abuse of prisoners. A November 12, 
2004, New York Times article reported that over 13 percent of U.S. prisoners have been 
sexually abused. The news surrounding Abu Ghraib was also disturbing. Furthermore, since 
2003, there have been over 300 cases of cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. According to a number of documents made public by the 
White House in June 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense authorized the harsh treatment of 
prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. Vietnam also has concerns about the detention without trial of 
a number of individuals. Since September 11, 2001, 70 persons, including 69 Muslims, have 
been detained because of their refusal to provide information to U.S. courts. Finally, the GVN 
would like further information on the secret prisons the CIA has reportedly established in 
eight countries. Over the past four years, some 100 suspects have been detained in these 
locales, with 30 of them turned over to third country intelligence services. The German press 
has also reported many rendition flights over its territory. The conditions in these prisons are 
reportedly worse than hell. The GVN seeks U.S. clarification of and elaboration on these 
matters, Ninh requested.  
Prior to asking A/S Lowenkron to respond, DG Minh noted that the Vietnamese side listened 
carefully to the U.S. delegation's legal and judicial reform recommendations. He suggested 
that some of these views may be reflected in future legislation and legal revisions.  
 
A/S Lowenkron Responds  
----------------------  
The list the U.S. delegation will hand over today will have more than 13 names but fewer 
than 86. The list's content reflects discussions at both the State Department and White House 
and was updated to note Nguyen Khac Toan's amnesty, which was welcomed in Washington. 
We will continue to work with the GVN in the months ahead to share information about the 
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individuals on the list to hopefully resolve the 21 cases. The release of Pham Hong Son 
would send a strong signal to the international community. On Decree 31, it is good to hear 
that the GVN is discussing ways to amend the law, even if there are no discussions underway 
to abolish it. It is not for the United States to discuss Vietnam's history, but Vietnam is 
resilient, independent and strong, and Decree 31 does not reflect a Vietnam that is now more 
open and confident, particularly after so many difficult years. We are grateful for the 
comprehensive overview of Vietnam's criminal procedures code, but areas of concern remain. 
The United States is willing to work with Vietnam in a partnership to strengthen its legal 
system and reform efforts.  
In response to A/S Lowenkron's question about whether there will be further amnesties this 
year, Ninh said that the State President makes the decision, and an amnesty or sentence 
reduction is granted based on the subject's progress in prison. A/S Lowenkron stressed that 
the international community is very interested in access to prisons and for observers to attend 
trials.  
On the issues of concern to Vietnam, A/S Lowenkron said that the incidents at Abu Ghraib 
are inexcusable and indefensible. While there have been more than 300 cases of prisoner 
abuse around the world, there have been over 400 prosecutions in the United States for these 
abuses and over 100 persons were found guilty. The question of how the United States 
organizes prisons in the context of the global campaign against terror has been debated 
openly and freely in the United States. This kind of incident was not unique in American 
history, but when it has appened in the past, we have counted on a free press, a fully 
independent court system, including the Supreme Court, and a fiercely independent and 
active U.S. Congress. The American people expect nothing less. The debate on interrogations 
and prisons is conducted on the basis of a free press, rule of law and the Congress, A/S 
Lowenkron stressed.  
On Guantanamo Bay, over one-third of the prisoners have been released or sent back to other 
governments. The International Committee of the Red Cross has full and unimpeded access 
to the remaining prisoners. In fact, the days of Guantanamo Bay are numbered, and 
Guantanamo Bay is not Abu Ghraib. These prisons are not prison camps but camps for 
prisoners of war. The war on terror is a long and difficult struggle and involves many nations. 
Progress will be fitful. Working with others, the United States will do everything it can to 
ensure that its principles are honored while these same principles, and its homeland, are 
protected to the full extent of our law and international law. On the issue of renditions, 
232 
 
Ramsey Youssef, one of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers, is probably the most famous 
rendition case, and this is a procedure that nations need to defend themselves against attack. 
In short, no country is perfect, but the fundamental freedom of debate, rule of law and 
listening to the people through the electoral process can help to discover and address 
problems, the A/S said.  
DG Minh wrapped up this agenda item by noting that EU Ambassadors and the Swiss 
Ambassador have been able to visit prisons, and said that, while the GVN had arranged for 
A/S Lowenkron to visit a prison in Ho Chi Minh City, the delegation decided against it. A/S 
Lowenkron stressed that it is important for Vietnam to allow the UN access to prisons.  
  
Religious Freedom: Vietnam Describes Achievements  
--------------------------------------------- -----  
Nguyen Thi Bach Tuyet of the GVN's Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA) opened this 
agenda item by expressing her government's hope that Vietnam's achivements in this area 
would allow Vietnam to be removed from the list of Countries of Particular Concern (CPC). 
Over the past year, Vietnam has promulgated the Ordinance on Religion and its 
Implementing Decree and the Prime Minister's Instruction on Protestantism. To ensure that 
local officials understand the new legal framework, the GVN has organized training courses 
and workshops for over 2,000 civil servants in charge of religious affairs. Some 12,878 
religious leaders and followers have also taken part in these courses. A total of 281 courses in 
32 out of 64 provinces and cities have reached 1,154,735 civil servants at all levels. The 
central-level CRA is working closely with local authorities to promote communication and 
information sharing and ensure that there is broad awareness of the new laws and regulations, 
particularly in the Central Highlands and northwest and southwest, Tuyet explained.  
In the Central Highlands and Binh Phuoc Province, there are currently 300,760 Protestant 
believers, 32 pastors, 37 honorary pastors, 105 missionaries and 50 Protestant congregations. 
Out of these 50, 12 are new or recently established. Local authorities in Dak Lak and Gia Lai 
have allocated land for the construction of churches, and a new church was recently opened 
in Gia Lai on February.Also, there are increasing numbers of ordained pastors and honorary 
pastors. Some 25 students from Gia Lai were sent to attend a training course at an institute for 
bible and theological studies, and there have been three courses for 113 deacons and an 
additional 115 deacons in Binh Phuoc. The GVN is also considering recognizing additional 
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Protestant branches, such as the Baptists. It has published 60,000 copies of the Ordinance and 
the implementing decree, with half of them written in ethnic minority languages. The GVN 
has also produced three films regarding the Central and Northwest Highlands and the 
southwest to help the international community understand better the situation there, Tuyet 
said.  
There have been a number of important visits to Vietnam by religious leaders over the past 
year, she continued. In 2005, Buddhist leader Thich Nhat Hanh led a large delegation to 
Vietnam for discussions. Cardinal Sepe of the Vatican also traveled to Vietnam to ordain 57 
priests in Hanoi; he also visited a number of diocese. EU Ambassadors have visited both the 
Northwest and Central Highlands and conducted meetings with religious leaders and 
followers. Ambassador Hanford himself has visited the Central Highlands. Vietnamese 
religious organizations have sent delegations abroad, including to the ASEM Dialogue on 
Beliefs in Bali. The CRA and other agencies have also sent delegations abroad, and the 
positive outcomes to date have been thanks to the efforts and goodwill of religious 
organizations and followers. Tuyet closed by seeking information the ten Protestant churches 
that were recently burned down in the United States.  
 
Ambassador Hanford Responds  
---------------------------  
Religious freedom is an issue of high interest and concern to the international community, 
Ambassador Hanford said. No country, including the United States, is perfect, but respect for 
religious freedom is a fundamental right. It is important to recognize that the large portion of 
the Vietnamese population is able to enjoy a significant degree of religious freedom. The 
focus of U.S. concern is on particular groups that are not able to freely practice their faith. 
We recognize and welcome the efforts the GVN has made to promote religious freedom and 
address issues of concern. For example, the GVN has released a number of religious 
prisoners of concern. These were individuals for whom we had made personal appeals, and 
we appreciate the GVN's responsiveness, Ambassador Hanford said.  
The most important initiative to date has been the introduction of new laws, including the 
Ordinance on Religion and Belief, its implementing decree and the Prime Minister's 
Instruction on Protestantism, the Ambassador continued. These represent a real commitment 
to change and established a nationwide structure to protect new freedoms or preserve 
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freedoms established in the past. It is commendable that the Prime Minister demonstrated his 
personal commitment to this issue as reflected in his special instruction on Protestantism. The 
GVN's efforts to reach the May 5 exchange of letters were also significant, and we appreciate 
the GVN's hard work to conclude this exchange. As President Bush said in his meeting with 
PM Khai, this is a landmark agreement, the implementation of which will help bilateral 
relations to reach a higher plane. President Bush has a personal interest in this matter and, as 
A/S Lowenkron said, the Secretary has the same interest, Ambassador Hanford noted.  
We have heard from various religious groups in Vietnam that there is increasing openness for 
religious practice, he continued. In particular, the USG welcomes the explicit ban on forced 
renunciations. This kind of progress goes far in eliminating a divisive issue between the 
United States and Vietnam. Religious believers in the United States can be expected to find it 
very difficult to understand such an extreme practice. The GVN claimed this was not the law 
of Vietnam, and now that a ban on forced renunciations has been codified, this issue has been 
clarified for all concerned parties both at home and abroad. The USG also welcomed: the 
Evangelical Church of Vietnam- North's (ECVN) December 2004 Congress, the first in 
twenty years; Thich Nhat Hanh's visit to Vietnam after 38 years; the new latitude granted to 
religious groups to select their leadership; the recognition granted to Grace Baptist Church 
and the Seventh Day Adventists, which opens up a new chapter in the recognition of religious 
groups; the formal recognition of over 200 meeting points in Gia Lai Province, facilitating 
over 200 meeting points for Protestants for Christmas service in Dak Lak Province; and, 
providing religious training and building permits, which in the past have been difficult to 
secure. The United States and others in the international community recognize these and 
other positive steps. We hope to work together in the coming months to resolve the CPC 
issues, Ambassador Hanford concluded. 
At this point, the two delegations agreed to break for lunch and continue in the afternoon the 
religious freedom discussion, including our remaining areas of concern  
(afternoon session reported septel). A/S Lowenkron and Ambassador Hanford cleared this 
message. MARINE 
This can be found on http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06HANOI669.html, accessed 22 
July 2013 
 
Continuation of Morning Session  
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-------------------------------  
 
In an agreed continuation of the morning session on religious freedom and ethnic minority 
affairs of the February 20 U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, before beginning the 
afternoon schedule, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom John Hanford 
presented the GVN side with a copy of a recently released Time Magazine article entitled 
"Police Raids Show Vietnam Still Fears Illegal Religion." Ambassador Hanford said that 
while he cannot comment on the credibility of the sources for the article, it raises several of 
the points he wants to highlight. The article mentions the progress Vietnam has made in 
protecting religious freedom, a point Ambassador Hanford also stressed. There are, however, 
areas for further improvement.  
First, he said, Vietnam should improve the rate and consistency with which it registers and 
recognizes new congregations and churches. In recent months, he acknowledged, the GVN 
has recognized some congregations and registered many new churches. However, many 
churches and other places of worship have faced long delays or have been turned down 
without adequate explanation. In particular, Ambassador Hanford said, the pace of 
recognition and registration of churches is slowest in provinces in the Northwest Highlands, 
such as Ha Giang Province, singled out in the Time Magazine article. One of the positive 
points in the Vietnamese legal framework on religion is the deadlines for official action on 
applications for recognition and registration, but some local officials are not honoring those 
deadlines. The GVN should consider streamlining procedures and paperwork for registration 
and recognition, and thoroughly explain the reasons for rejecting any application. It would be 
particularly useful, he added, if the GVN could provide in a few months time a breakdown of 
the numbers of successful and unsuccessful registrations, disaggregated by province and 
containing reasons for the rejection of unsuccessful applications.  
Second, the GVN needs to work on educating local authorities to properly enforce the law. 
The changes in the legal framework have begun to contribute to the expansion of religious 
freedom and benefit religious practitioners. Despite this progress, Ambassador Hanford said, 
his office continues to receive credible reports of church closings, obstruction of worship 
services and pressure on believers to renounce their faith, particularly in the Central and 
Northwest Highlands. In some areas, he said, particularly the Northwest Highlands, local 
authorities have rejected applications for registration and then used the information contained 
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in the applications to suppress those groups and harass individual members. Ambassador 
Hanford took note of improvements in the Northwest Highlands, noting that as recently as 
one year ago Ambassador Marine reported that local officials in Ha Giang Province stated 
that there are no religious believers at all in Ha Giang. He stressed that the USG does not 
believe that this is the result of the GVN's unwillingness to implement the new framework on 
religion, but instead demonstrates the need for continued efforts to educate local officials. 
The USG is heartened, he stated, by Deputy Director General of the Department of External 
Relations of the Committee on Religious Affairs Nguyen Thi Bach Tuyet's description of 
vigorous efforts to train local officials. The USG respects the territorial integrity of Vietnam 
and does not defend groups who lack peaceful intentions. The USG's concern is for sincere 
religious believers who simply seek to practice their faith and in the past have been 
suppressed.  
The Time article is illustrative, Ambassador Hanford continued. The article gives credit to 
Vietnam, mentioning the ordination of new priests and the GVN's permission for Thich Nhat 
Hanh to return to Vietnam with his entourage. Specifically, he quoted the article's statement 
that "the days when the Communist Party suppressed general religious practice in Vietnam 
are long gone, and millions worship freely in Vietnam." However, the problems cited in the 
article are the same problems that have been reported to the Office of Religious Freedom in 
the State Department. The chief of police in Tung Ba Commune in Ha Giang Province, 
according to the article, is forcing people to stop practicing religion there "because it is 
illegal." He is quoted saying that he caught 20 people "red handed illegally singing." 
Believers say that when they were caught singing, the police beat them; the police claim they 
only fined the singers. The Protestant leaders there claim that they are members of the 
Evangelical Church of Vietnam (North) but that the local government will not recognize new 
congregations. And finally, it reports an old police practice more common several years ago, 
which is the practice of billeting officials in the homes of local believers to keep them quiet. 
The article admits that it is "unclear" if the Ha Giang crackdown was ordered by Hanoi or 
was the brainchild of an overzealous local Communist Party organization, but it adds that fear 
of ethnic minority unrest is also a concern. These problems may fundamentally be caused by 
poor implementation and awareness of the law at the local level, Ambassador Hanford 
concluded, but the USG calls on the GVN to ensure that implementation of Vietnam's legal 
framework for the protection of religion is uniform across Vietnam.  
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Ambassador Hanford also urged the GVN to respond "promptly and firmly" to reports of 
violations of religious freedom, such as those alleged in the Time article. Individuals must be 
held accountable, he added, including those listed in the article as violating religious freedom, 
if the article is found to be accurate. This would send the clear message that the GVN is 
standing by its public pronouncements, he said.  
The third issue the article touches on is Vietnam's efforts to release prisoners of concern 
imprisoned for expression of their religious beliefs. These efforts have been very impressive, 
Ambassador Hanford said, noting that only the case of Ma Van Be remains on the U.S. list. 
The United States remains concerned about the continuing house and pagoda arrest of some 
individuals, and restrictions on the right to travel of some others, including Thich Quang Do, 
recently detained for trying to visit Buddhist patriarch Thich Huyen Quang. The United 
States asks the GVN to end travel restrictions and surveillance on individuals "for the 
practice of their faith," and instead ensure that they have the same rights as any Vietnamese 
citizen.  
Over the past months, Ambassador Hanford stressed, the GVN has made remarkable progress 
on religious freedom, which Ambassador Hanford has expressed publicly to "doubters" in the 
United States. Just as progress on religious freedom helped to pave the way for a successful 
visit by PM Phan Van Khai to the United States in June of 2005, Ambassador Hanford said, 
continued progress will provide a more solid basis for a successful visit by President Bush, as 
well as an improved environment for continued bilateral relations and Vietnamese 
engagement with the international community.  
Vietnam's delegation's leader, Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organizations 
Department Director General Pham Binh Minh, thanked Ambassador Hanford for his positive 
assessment of GVN actions, and repeated Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang's earlier 
statement that the GVN is making many efforts to ensure that Vietnamese citizens have all 
their religious rights. This effort, he stressed, is taken not because of any external pressure but 
because the GVN wishes to truly guarantee the rights that all Vietnamese citizens are entitled 
to. To that end, the GVN will "continue to redouble its efforts to perfect the legal system and 
do its best to ensure that all officials strictly implement the documents and regulations on 
religious freedom." Regarding the article, DG Minh said that the GVN will "verify, 
objectively and in due course," the information it contains, and does not want to admit or 
reject anything in it now. He said the two sides are in agreement that considerable progress 
has been made since Ambassador Hanford's last visit.  
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Deputy DG Nguyen Thi Bach Tuyet from the Committee on Religious Affairs said that the 
CRA is making "many efforts" to increase the awareness of local authorities of the 
documents on religious freedom in Vietnam. The Time article needs to be verified, she said, 
but based on the CRA's recent unsatisfactory visit to Ha Giang (where the local authorities 
repeated the statement to the CRA delegation that there are no believers in Ha Giang, a 
statement the CRA acknowledges is untrue) the article's description of the local authorities' 
behavior "might be true." If Vietnam were too perfect, she joked, there would be no reason to 
have a dialogue on human rights. Supreme People's Procuracy Deputy DG Nghiem Quang 
Xuyen said that if the article is true, some of the officials mentioned could face criminal 
charges.  
Significant progress has been made in the Central Highlands in the past 18 months, DDG 
Tuyet continued, and now the CRA is focused on the Northwest Highlands provinces. The 
CRA hopes to be able to report significant progress there, too. "There is a saying that 
Moscow was not built in a day," Tuyet said seriously, "and so we hope you will show 
patience."  
Responding to an earlier inquiry about church burnings in Alabama, Ambassador Hanford 
stated that those attacks are thoroughly investigated, and the perpetrators severely punished. 
Sometimes, he said, the attacks occur not for religious reasons but for ethnic or racial ones. 
These crimes are just as serious, and also against the law.  
Deputy DG of the Department of External Relations of the Committee for Ethnic Affairs 
Hoang Van Phan circulated a pamphlet highlighting the situation for ethnic minorities in 
Vietnam, and identified specific GVN policies and accomplishments that showed Vietnam's 
positive treatment of its ethnic minority population. The State of Vietnam, he pointed out 
several times, guarantees rights to all people, including ethnic minorities. He enumerated 
many of those rights, which amounted to a recitation of the Vietnamese Constitution. He 
pointed out that the representation of ethnic minorities in the National Assembly is actually 
higher in percentage terms than their representation in the population at large, and drew 
attention to several huge nationwide infrastructure-building and antipoverty projects that 
focus heavily on minority-populated areas, citing extensive statistics on Vietnam's successful 
infrastructure development and poverty alleviation efforts. (He did not comment on the fact 
that antipoverty and infrastructure development programs by definition focus on districts with 
high minority populations in Vietnam, because ethnic minorities are by far more likely to live 
in high-poverty districts than majority ethnic Kinh populations.) He concluded his 
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presentation with a request for "support and assistance" from the United States for ethnic 
minority development. Ambassador Marine replied that the United States is considering a 
package of assistance, and will be presenting it for discussion with the GVN soon.  
Ambassador Hanford said the USG understands that the issue of ethnic minority relations is 
sensitive for the GVN, and that Vietnam has more than 50 ethnic groups. Of special interest 
to the United States is the matter of access to those groups, particularly those in the Central 
Highlands who have returned to Vietnam after migrating to Cambodia. Ambassador Hanford 
said the USG greatly appreciates the GVN's willingness to permit access to these groups by 
U.S. diplomats, other country diplomats and officials from the UN High Commission on 
Refugees. There have been concerns that some of the returnees have faced mistreatment or 
detention on their return to the Central Highlands, Ambassador Hanford said. He urged the 
GVN to follow up with local authorities to ensure that the guarantees not to mistreat or detain 
returnees under the tripartite MOU among Vietnam, Cambodia and UNHCR are respected. 
Ambassador Hanford further noted that the U.S. commitment to defend the rights of minority 
populations is global; for example, the United States has urged Cambodia to respect the rights 
of Vietnamese minority residents.  
DG Minh asked that the United States consider the cases of a number of ethnic minorities in 
the Central Highlands who have requested resettlement in the United States but have not been 
able to complete the necessary visa procedures. He said that authorities in Dak Lak have 
recently issued 43 passports to willing travelers, Dak Nong has issued 13 and Lam Dong has 
issued 145. These are cases that have not yet been addressed by the United States, Minh said. 
Ambassador Marine thanked Minh for the GVN's efforts to issue travel documents to the 
family members of refugees admitted to the United States for resettlement, and pledged to 
review specific cases as soon as the GVN can provide more detailed information. In all, he 
noted, there are 750 people eligible to rejoin their family members in the United States, and 
the USG hopes to see their relocation completed as soon as possible.  
 
National Security and Human Rights  
----------------------------------  
DG Minh opened the session on national security and human rights with a plea for the USG 
to make a special effort to understand Vietnam's particular historical context when evaluating 
its human rights record. "For a long time," he said, "national security has been the paramount 
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issue for Supreme People's Procuracy DDG Xuyen explained that the SPP has the right to set 
the time of detention of criminal suspects and to order investigation, and is the only agency 
with the right to bring charges against suspects. Without the approval of the SPP, no 
Vietnamese citizen can be arrested or detained during the investigation period. With this in 
mind, the SPP "tries to minimize" cases where "preventive measures are applied" (read: 
individuals arrested and detained) but the defendants are found not guilty or the cases are not 
pursued. Fifteen of the 344 articles in the Vietnamese Criminal Code deal with national 
security, he said, of which three are violent crimes: rebellion, banditry and terrorism. The 
SPP is currently considering the case of Nguyen Huu Chanh, who lives in the United States. 
Chanh is wanted in Vietnam for terrorist activities, Xuyen explained, and Vietnam would like 
assurances that the United States will cooperate with Vietnam to extradite him or compel him 
to return to Vietnam to stand trial if there is sufficient evidence to warrant such an action. 
Xuyen additionally declared that all of the prisoners of concern identified by the United 
States in Vietnam have been charged, tried and convicted of offenses under Vietnam's 
criminal code.  
Deputy Director General of the Supreme People's Court (SPC) asked how the United States 
could reconcile the Patriot Act, with its provisions limiting civil liberties, with its statements 
urging other countries to consider human rights over national security.  
A/S Lowenkron responded to DDG Xuyen that if he is correct that all of the persons of 
concern on the U.S. list have violated the criminal code, then the criminal code itself is a 
problem. The criminal code lacks precision, containing provisions such as "National Security 
Crimes" that are so vague as to allow the State to prosecute nearly anyone. Due process is 
also a problem, A/S Lowenkron said, noting that from rights to an attorney to the right to face 
one's accuser to the right of appeal, due process needs to be critically addressed in Vietnam. 
Reforming the criminal code, as Vietnam has said it is doing, is a positive step, he said. The 
phrase "National Security Crimes" should be narrowed to prevent abuse.  
Regarding the Patriot Act, A/S Lowenkron noted that the Patriot Act was passed after lengthy 
public debate in Congress and heavy coverage in our free press and is subject to review by 
the independent judiciary. The United States has faced many similar crises in past wars, and 
has met them by debating necessary national security decisions openly and transparently. 
This, he said, is the best guarantee against abuse by the state. In the United States, the debate 
is full and diverse, including intra-party as well as inter-party discussions. Vietnam must 
decide for itself what is national security and what is freedom. The more confident and secure 
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a nation is, the more confident it can be to open its system. For decades, he noted, other 
countries have fought to determine Vietnam's future, but now only Vietnam determines 
Vietnam's future. Advances in human rights and openness support Vietnam's economic 
reform policies and demonstrate both the resilience and independence of a free Vietnam, he 
concluded. Ambassador Marine added that on the subject of Nguyen Huu Chanh, the United 
States and Vietnam have been in discussions on the topic and we are willing to work with 
Vietnam to develop an appropriate response considering the evidence. We are considering 
appropriate next steps on this issue, and will be in touch soon, he said.  
  
Freedom of the Press and Internet Freedom  
-----------------------------------------  
Assistant Secretary Lowenkron said he has heard that the National Assembly is considering a 
new Press Law, and hopes that a new law will reduce both official censorship and self-
censorship. The current press laws are too broad, he stated, and allow anyone to be 
prosecuted, thus opening up the possibility of abuse. The Internet is also an area where 
Vietnam should embrace freedom. The United States is ready to work with Vietnam on 
controlling Internet problems, but only those that concern crime, terrorism, violence and 
sabotage of computer networks.  
Outside of those areas, the United States believes in Internet freedom, an issue affecting not 
just Vietnam but many other countries as well. Vietnamese citizens should have the freedom 
to use the internet for peaceful purposes, including political ones, without fearing arrest, A/S 
Lowenkron declared. With this in mind, he again raised the issue of imprisoned dissident 
Pham Hong Son. "Congress and the American people cannot understand imprisoning 
someone for translating and forwarding a U.S. document," he said. A/S Lowenkron identified 
the November 2006 APEC meetings as an opportunity for Vietnam to either highlight its 
openness and development, or be subject to criticism from frustrated journalists who find 
themselves unable to access blocked Internet sites.  
A/S Lowenkron identified a specific list of USG requests related to Internet freedom, 
including: relaxing restrictions on Internet usage; eliminating the requirement that cybercafes 
register the personal information of customers; releasing those who have been imprisoned for 
expressing peaceful political views; recognizing increased Internet access and usage as an 
improvement of human rights in Vietnam; and, seeing the Internet as a way to promote 
242 
 
investment and trade in Vietnam and allow Vietnam to compete effectively in a globalized 
world.  
Deputy Director Nguyen Tri Dung of the Ministry of Culture and Information's Department 
of the Press, who spent much of the day's sessions tapping ostentatiously on the GVN 
delegation's only laptop computer, read the official GVN response from a roughly 
mimeographed sheaf of papers. The GVN attaches great importance to freedom of the press 
and freedom of speech, he intoned, which are fundamental rights of the Vietnamese people 
and guaranteed under Article 69 of the Constitution. The GVN is trying to implement 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press, he continued, especially in the development of 
common strategies and policies for national development. Vietnamese newspapers, he said, 
are not censored before being printed or published. As evidence of Vietnam's press freedom, 
he cited the rapid increase in the number of media outlets in TV, radio, newspaper and 
Internet channels. The advance of technology is increasingly meeting the information needs 
of the Vietnamese people, he added  
However, the Internet is new in Vietnam, he said. In contrast to the United States, which has 
had the Internet for more than 40 years, Vietnam was only connected to the Internet in 1997, 
and then access was limited to scientists. It was not until 2002-2003 that Vietnam began to 
see widespread Internet access; now, however, Vietnam boasts more than 2.9 million Internet 
subscribers and more than 10 million users. Vietnam, he boasted, is "second in the world in 
the percentage of the population using the Internet and telecommunication devices." (Note: 
Not likely. End Note.)  
Dung further elaborated on the specific numbers of schools connected to the Internet at all 
levels of education. This, he said, illustrated the dual nature of the Internet: on one side of the 
coin, the Internet brings advantages to people, but on the other, it brings disadvantages, 
particularly to children. Protecting children from the evils of the Internet, particularly online 
games, pornography and violent sites, is the reason for Vietnam's regulation of the Internet. 
The Ministry of Culture receives "tens of thousands" of letters from concerned parents 
regarding the harm the Internet causes their children, and there have been reports of children 
quitting school to spend their time playing online games and surfing the Internet from cafes.  
Vietnam is aware, Dung continued, of the need for an "information society" built on the twin 
pillars of information and communication. This is why Vietnam is promoting Internet usage. 
This process, however, is difficult for Vietnam and the GVN is in need of experience sharing, 
243 
 
technical assistance and human resources development from the international community. 
The existing regulations on the Internet, Dung conceded, are just "circulars" which can easily 
be changed or amended. "It takes time to perfect the system," he said. DG Minh added that 
the press in Vietnam plays a valuable role in ferreting out corruption, and as a result a number 
of officials, including high officials, have been arrested and prosecuted.  
A/S Lowenkron acknowledged that the growth in the number of media outlets in Vietnam is 
positive, but said that the issue is not the amount of programming available but what that 
programming is. Vietnam could and should stop blocking Radio Free Asia, both the radio 
signal and the website. Vietnamese domestic Internet demand represents a thirst to enter a 
globalized world, he said. The United States and Vietnam can agree on protecting children 
from pornography and violence, but the prisoners of concern to the United States such as 
Pham Hong Son are not pornographers. This is an issue that will remain contentious, he 
predicted.  
DG Minh replied that Pham Hong Son was convicted of espionage under Article 80 of the 
criminal code, not for using the Internet. (Note: This is disingenuous. Son's Internet use 
provoked his arrest; his conviction on thinly supported espionage charges stemmed from that, 
though the Internet was not mentioned in the actual conviction. End Note.) A/S Lowenkron 
stated that on this subject, we disagree.  
Concluding the talks, DG Minh declared that the Dialogue was a success, allowing both sides 
to "share experiences, learn from each other and increase mutual understanding." We agree 
on a number of issues, and remain in disagreement on some others, he said. The GVN is 
willing to conduct further meetings and exchanges of views. A/S Lowenkron closed with an 
appeal to work hard on making this Dialogue "results oriented," noting that we would be 
ultimately judged not on the quantity of meetings we hold, but what those meetings produce.  
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